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The banking reforms in China have played an instrumental role in the country’s 
overall effort to transform a centrally-planned economy into a market-driven 
economy. The thesis examines the changes that took place in the banking system 
from 1979 to 2003.  It attempts to address four main areas when analyzing the 
banking industry during this period.    
 
Firstly, the thesis finds answers to some important policy-related questions 
concerning the impact of banking industry development on China’s overall 
economic growth. The Granger-causality empirical outcomes reveal that banking 
industry development helps explain its economic growth in the reform era. There 
is a “supply-leading” causality relationship between two financial deepening 
indicators, that is, real M1 to real GDP growth, and real M2 to real GDP growth, 
and the economic growth indicator, that is, real GDP growth. With the exception 
of real quasi-money to real GDP growth, the empirical test also demonstrates a 
similar “supply-leading” causal relationship between all the other financial 
deepening indicators and real fixed assets investments growth. The study 
concludes that the more productive non-state sector should not be overlooked in 
the financial deepening process as it will be the new engine of growth for China 
in the foreseeable future. It recognizes, however, that the primary shortcoming of 
this empirical test is that it completely ignores the role of curb market financing in 
non-state sector development.    
 vi
Secondly, the relative technical and scale efficiencies of a sample of Chinese 
banks are analyzed using a non-parametric technique, called Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). This technique allows the identification of both the “relatively” 
efficient and inefficient banks. Recommendations are made to all the inefficient 
banks to implement percentage reductions of their various input usage areas so as 
to attain full efficiency or move to the “efficient frontier”. The results also allow 
management to revisit the way resources are currently utilized and better plan for 
their organizations’ future.  
 
Thirdly, in analyzing the effectiveness of the central bank, the People’s Bank of 
China (PBC), as a monetary policy manager, financial supervisor and regulator, 
the thesis concludes that it has only gained some operational independence and 
not complete independence as China’s central banker. As China progressively 
opens to the rest of the world, it is timely that the PBC revisits its roles and 
functions and makes a quantum leap to genuine central bank management, as 
practiced in market economies. 
 
Finally, in assessing the implications of China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on domestic banking, the thesis highlights that the banks 
need to embark on six major strategies to counter the increasing competition 
amongst themselves as well as from their foreign counterparts. The new banking 
landscape ultimately will still be shaped by China’s trade and investment 
liberalization and overall economic reform program. 
 vii
It is apt that the thesis concludes with a pragmatic analysis of the many challenges 
that a post-WTO environment would bring about, with China’s banking industry 
moving on to a higher plane, and the banking reforms starting on a new journey in 
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Banking reforms: policy changes, implementation issues and implications 
 
1.1 Introduction and motivation of the thesis 
 
China has had a varied and “progressive” experience in the banking arena from 
the time of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911); to the founding of the Republic of 
China (ROC), by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen on 1st January 1912; the Communist takeover 
and founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, led by Chairman 
Mao Ze-Dong; the Cultural Revolution era (1966-1976); the Deng Xiao-Ping era 
with major economic reforms implemented from 1978; and to the present day 
when it faces challenges that comes with globalization and the advent of the New 
Economy (Samansky, 1981; Byrd, 1983; World Bank, 1990; Dipchand et al., 
1994; Gang, 1994; Tam, 1995; Wan, 1999; Cheng, 2003).  
 
Banking reforms have played an important role in China’s overall effort to 
transform a centrally-planned economy into a market-based economy. The 
banking system, however, faces many challenges as it is being transformed into a 
modern system, emulating those in a capitalistic world. While it boasts of state 
banks that are huge even by international standards, that is, by assets, the banking 
system’s fragility has led to many debates among the academia, and the private 
and public sectors alike, on the possibility of it triggering off a financial crisis. Its 
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transformation has been much hampered by the weaknesses and inertia reforms of 
the enterprise, social security, and the budgetary systems (Lardy, 1998b; Xu, 
1998; Dornbusch and Giavazzi, 1999). 
 
The thesis has four main objectives. It seeks to do the following: 
1. address some important policy-related questions concerning the impact of 
banking industry development on China’s overall economic growth during 
the reform era,   
2. analyze the relative efficiencies of the financial intermediaries, 
3. analyze the effectiveness of the central bank, that is, the People’s Bank of 
China (PBC) as a monetary policy manager, financial supervisor and 
regulator, and  
4. assess the implications of China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on domestic banking, and analyze the major 
strategies that these banks could embark on to counter the problems that 
may impair their competitiveness in a post-WTO setting. 
 
CHAPTER TWO of the thesis, entitled “Whither the impact of financial 
deepening on China’s economic growth 25 years on?” seeks to address the 
following questions regarding the development of the banking industry. These 
include the following: 
- how was the state of financial intermediation in the initial 25 years 
of reform? 
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- does the development of the banking industry help to explain 
China’s economic growth during the reform era and vice versa? 
- have both the state and non-state sectors benefited equally from the 
development of the banking industry?, and   
- does financial intermediation include the role of informal finance 
or curb market financing in private sector development?     
   
In CHAPTER THREE, a non-parametric technique called the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) is used to analyze the relative efficiencies of the Chinese 
financial intermediaries. The study compares a sample of major banks and 
attempts to answer the following questions: 
- what are the relative technical and scale efficiencies of these 
banks?   
- how do the banking segments perform, such as the state-owned 
commercial banks, other national commercial banks, regional 
banks, and city commercial banks?  
- what account for their inefficiencies?, and  
- what areas of operations can they improve upon?   
 
CHAPTER FOUR, entitled “A paradigm shift for China’s central banking 
system” seeks to provide answers to the following questions regarding the role of 
the central bank: 
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- what leadership role does the PBC play in China’s central 
banking?  
- how effective is the PBC in executing its roles as a monetary 
policy manager, financial supervisor and regulator?   
- how does the PBC manage its relationship with the central 
government, the party, the local governments, state-owned 
enterprises and the financial institutions?, and  
- how do the current organizational and operational mechanisms 
play a positive role in the banking industry? do they exacerbate the 
problems already faced by the industry?    
 
The implications of China’s accession to WTO on domestic banking are analyzed 
in CHAPTER FIVE, which is entitled “Confronting the new Chinese banking 
environment post-WTO: implications and strategies”. The following key 
questions are discussed:   
- what are the strategies that the domestic banks need to work on to 
counter the increasing competition amongst themselves as well as 
from their foreign counterparts? 
- will the intense competition from the foreign banks result in 
reduced profitability, market shares and “brain drain” of business 
and critical staff? or will the new climate also offers new revenue-
generating business opportunities, and innovative and quality 
products and services? 
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- how will the new Chinese banking marketplace look like in a post-
WTO era?, and   
- will the new banking landscape ultimately still be shaped by 
China’s trade and investment liberalization and overall economic 
reform program? 
 
The concluding chapter, that is, CHAPTER SIX, revisits the approach undertaken 
by the government in reforming the banking industry so as to get a clearer picture 
of where it is heading to, in the near future. This is especially so when the 
industry is now at a “new” crossroads after having experienced two and a half 
decades of transformation.  
 
While major banking reforms in China were not implemented until early 1990s 
(Ariff and Khalid, 2005), this introductory chapter examines the changes that took 
place in the banking system since 1979. The period for analysis is further divided 
into two phases, namely, 1979-1993, and 1994-2003. In each phase, policy 
changes were scrutinized and their implementation issues highlighted. Although 
the reforms that took place during the 1979-1993 period were significant, as the 
Chinese economy emerged from the recent “Cultural Revolution” setting to a 
market economy, their implementations had some impact but were too slow. 
However, they were part of the broader financial reforms which aimed to 
mobilize savings, facilitate a more efficient allocation of credit and promote 
macroeconomic stability. Ultimately the objective was to raise China’s economic 
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performance. The restoration of the independence of the central bank, the PBC, 
was an important reform that took place. This claim of the PBC’s “independence” 
stature was, however, widely criticized as it was seen manifesting operational 
independence and not complete independence. A discussion on its lack of 
independence is found in CHAPTER FOUR of this thesis, “A paradigm shift for 
China’s central banking system” (pp. 146-182). Other banking developments 
included the creation of a formal banking structure and state banks with their own 
economic niche roles; the increase in savings or investment channels for the 
individuals and enterprises; the development of a wide variety of financial 
instruments, and the establishment of money and capital markets. 
 
The period 1994-2003 saw the pressing need for urgent economic reforms as the 
country faced pressing battles with slowing economic growth figures. The growth 
rate of GDP declined from 12.6 per cent in 1994 to 7.1 per cent in 1999 before it 
rose to 8.0 per cent in 2000, 8.3 per cent in 2002, and 9.3 per cent in 2003 (see 
Table 1.1). As part of the government’s comprehensive economic program 
announced in 1994, the banking industry was to be developed further to facilitate 
both the development of the overall financial sector as well as effective monetary 
policy operations. In the later years much of the government’s focus were devoted 
to recapitalizing the pillar state banks which faced high non-performing loans and 
were insolvent, the empowering of the central bank in its supervisory and 
regulatory roles, and the accession of China into the WTO.     
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This chapter provides adequate background knowledge on China’s endeavors in 
reforming its banking industry, so as to allow better understanding of the other 
areas of analysis in the subsequent chapters of the thesis. In all, the thesis meets 
its objectives of effectively scrutinizing the layers below the “ice-berg” of 
banking reforms in China through its boldness in making a “gradualistic” leap 
from a “command-driven” banking system to a “market-driven” one, embedded 
with “Chinese characteristics”, and in the process changing the face of the 
Chinese financial landscape.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses China’s economic 
performance, while the policy changes, issues and implications of the banking 
reforms during the two periods are explored in Sections 1.3 and 1.4 respectively. 












1.2  Economic performance   
 
The Chinese economy has achieved spectacular performance since 1979, with its 
GDP growing at an average rate of 10.3 per cent during 1980-1990 and 9.6 per 
cent during 1990-2003 (World Development Indicators, 2005). In 1978, China’s 
total GDP was only USD44 billion. However, by mid-2000 its total nominal GNP 
had reached USD1 trillion (Wong, 2003). China’s GDP per capita had also 
steadily moved up from USD167.6 in 1980 (Dutta, 2006) to USD963 in 2002 
(World Development Indicators, 2005).   
 
Table 1.1 and Table 1.5 highlight the economic and social performance of the 
Chinese economy during the period 1979-2004.  In the last five years, its GDP has 
consistently achieved growth rates of between 7.5 per cent and 9.5 per cent. While 
its agricultural sector’s share of GDP has declined from 31.17 per cent in 1979 to 
13.11 per cent in 2004, the services sector’s share of GDP has increased from 
21.44 per cent in 1979 to 40.67 in 2004. The industry sector’s share of GDP has 
been consistent since 1979, averaging 45 per cent. In fact the growth rate of this 
sector fell to 11.1 per cent in 2004 from 12.7 per cent in 2003 (Asian 
Development Outlook, 2005).       
 
There was an increase in the growth rate of domestic savings to GDP in particular 
after 1994, averaging 40 per cent. Ariff and Khalid (2005) reiterated that this was 
largely due to the reforms that were initiated during the 1991-95 period. Fixed 
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capital formation to GDP has shown a gradual increase between 1979 and 2004, 
although there was an approximate 10 per cent increment over this period.  
 
Between 1979 and 2004 China has experienced both inflationary and deflationary 
pressures. There were two episodes of high inflation which exceeded 10 per cent. 
These occurred in 1988-1989 and 1993-1995 (Woo, 2003). The change in 
consumer prices was 18.33 per cent in 1989 and 24.1 per cent in 1994. Beginning 
in 1995, the inflationary pressure started to decline and meanwhile the growth rate 
of GDP declined from 9.6 per cent in 1996 to 8.8 per cent in 1997, 7.8 per cent in 
1998, and 7.1 per cent in 1999 before it rose to 8.0 per cent in 2000. The PBC has 
experimented with both direct and indirect controls to manage money supply 
during these inflationary and deflationary periods. The share of money supply to 
GDP has grown tremendously from 27.46 per cent in 1979 to 150.14 per cent in 
2004. Its growth rate in 2004, however, fell to 14.6 per cent from 19.6 per cent in 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































China’s international trade has expanded steadily with its overall share in world 
trade rising from less than 1 per cent in 1979 to about 6 per cent in 2003 (Prasad 
and Rumbaugh, 2004). With the relaxation of import and export controls in the 
1980s and the implementation of broader trade reforms in the 1990s, China’s 
trade contribution to GDP has increased 3.6 times, that is, from 18.07 per cent in 
1979 to 65.35 per cent in 2004. Both imports and exports have increased rapidly. 
It attained a current account surplus of 3.3 per cent of GDP in 2004.  
 
China now serves as the final processing and assembly platform for a large 
quantity of imports from other Asian countries, in particular, which are to be 
exported to western countries. Table 1.2 shows its growing market shares in major 
export markets in the developed nations such as Japan, the United States of 
America and the European Union. In 1980 it held a 3.1 per cent, 0.5 per cent and 
0.7 per cent market shares in Japan, the United States of America and the 
European Union, respectively. However, by 2003 this has increased to 18.5 per 
cent, 12.5 per cent and 8.9 per cent in these countries, respectively. At the same 
time, the Chinese economy’s role in Asian regional trade has also become 
increasingly important. It is now among the most important export destinations 
for other Asian countries such as the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian 
Nations), Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, as illustrated in Table 1.3.  The Asian 
countries’ share of imports increased from 15.0 per cent in 1980 to 52.8 per cent 




Table 1.2: Market share in major export markets (imports from China 
divided by total imports, in per cent) 
 













0.7 2.0 3.8 6.2 7.5 8.9 
 
Source: Rumbaugh and Blancher (2004) 
 
 
Table 1.3: Sources of imports (as a percent of China’s total imports)  
 
 1980 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 
 
Asia  15.0 41.0 47.1 53.5 53.1 52.8 
 
 ASEAN   3.4  5.6  7.4  9.3 10.4 11.3 
 
 Japan 26.5 14.2 21.9 17.8 18.1 18.0 
 
 South  
 Korea 
 
     -   0.4  7.8 10.0  9.7 10.4 
 





15.8 17.0 16.1 13.3 13.1 12.9 
United 
States of 
America   
 
19.6 12.2 12.2  9.6 
 
 9.2   8.2 
 
Source: Rumbaugh and Blancher (2004) 
                                                 




China is also very successful in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). In 
recent years, it has become the most favored destination of all developing 
economies for FDI. This registered almost 4 per cent of the GDP between 1999 
and 2003. In 2004 China’s FDI was valued at USD60.6 billion, 3.32 per cent 
higher than 2003 (China Knowledge Press, 2005). As both exports and FDI grow, 
her foreign exchange reserves grow and help contribute to her international credit 
rating. By the end of 2003, China’s foreign exchange reserves reached 
USD416,199 millions, becoming one of the ten largest holders for foreign 
exchange reserves (see Table 1.4).  
 





































Source: World Development Indicators (2005) 
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Table 1.5 highlights the social performance of the Chinese economy. The 
unemployment rate has ranged between 2-4 per cent for the last two and a half 
decades. Unemployment fell marginally to 4.2 per cent in 2004 from 4.3 per cent 
in 2003. However, this does not include laid-off state-owned enterprises’ workers 
or those who migrate to the cities looking for employment (Asian Development 
Outlook, 2005). The continuing downward trend of China’s population growth 
rate, which fell from 1.33 per cent in 1979 to 0.6 per cent in 2004, is largely due 
to its “one-child” policy.  
 













1.33 1.31 1.53 1.13 0.95 0.71 0.73 0.67 0.62  0.6 
 




In general, China’s economic performance in the past two and a half decades has 
indeed been remarkable. Its membership to the WTO in 2001 and the current 
dynamic growth in almost every major sector of the economy would help ensure 
China’s prospects of sustained economic growth in the future. This would also 
have far-reaching implications for the Asia Pacific region and the rest of the 
world. 
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1.3 1979-1993  
 
The key reforms during this period involved mainly institutional developments to 
strengthen the banking system, and it was clear that financial intermediaries, such 
as the banks, started to play dominant roles in resource allocation. The pre- 
1979’s financial system was characterized by a Soviet-style “monobanking” 
system with only three main players, namely, the central bank, PBC, the Bank of 
China and the People’s Construction Bank of China.2 While the Bank of China 
took care of the international business and the People’s Construction Bank of 
China provided the funding for the construction of infrastructure, the PBC also 
held a second portfolio of running the industrial, commercial and savings banking 
businesses. Their functions were mainly to accommodate the central planning 
mechanism so as to allow it to realize its physical output plan for the economy 
(Xu, 1998).  
 
Since 1979, with economic “openness” being hyped as a strategic move by the 
elite echelons, the banking system was restructured along with overall 
macroeconomic reforms, in particular after every macroeconomic fluctuation 
experienced by the country. The PBC’s general banking businesses were taken 
over by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China on 1st January 1984, while 
it focused specifically on monetary affairs and acted as a lender of last resort. 
Together with the Bank of China and the People’s Construction Bank of China, 
                                                 
2 It was later renamed as China Construction Bank. 
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the Agricultural Bank of China 3 and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, were positioned strategically as “specialized banks”, each serving a niche 
sector, such as foreign exchange, capital construction, agriculture, and urban and 
industrial, respectively. Thus a two-tiered banking structure soon evolved, 
consisting of the central bank and the specialized banks.   
 
Banks only began to play a dominant role in the country’s resource allocation 
process when the government converted its budgetary grants, mainly to state- 
owned enterprises, to loans which were subjected to interest charges. The central 
bank also changed its ways of doing business with the banks. Unlike under the 
“monobanking” system, credit from the PBC had to be repaid. Since 1986, the 
two-tiered banking structure was replaced by a three-category “Specialized 
Banking System”. This included a new player, that is, the “other financial 
institutions”, namely, the non-bank financial institutions. This new structure 
formed the cornerstone of a new financial system in China during this period. It 
laid the stage for the many major reforms that took place to lift the country out of 
its “closed-communist” economy and enter the international financial arena. The 
“other financial institutions” included new players such as the trust and 
investment companies, negotiable securities companies and financial companies 
funded by the local governments and enterprises, the rural and urban credit 
cooperatives societies, other commercial banks, regional banks and housing 
                                                 
3 The Agricultural Bank of China’s operations were previously subsumed within 
the Rural Bank Management of the central bank, particularly since 1965; and was 
reestablished in February 1979 as a separate bank.      
 17
savings banks. It was also during this period that the reformed system also called 
for a decentralization of the existing credit management system. The banks were 
given the discretion to make loans, as long as the total sum still equaled the 
planned target figure, where previously the central bank called the shots. They 
were allowed to retain profits, although these were insignificant as the difference 
between the loan and deposits interest rates was small. As illustrated by Table 1.6, 
the 5-year average spreads for 1981-85 and 1986-90 were 0.9 per cent and 0.36 
per cent, respectively (Ariff and Khalid, 2000). These were low compared to the 
3.3 per cent spread for 2003 (World Development Indicators, 2005). Table 1.7 
shows a comparison of China’s interest rate spread with other countries’ for 1990 
and 2003. Its spread is relatively smaller than many of the other countries’, except 
for Japan in 2003. The Chinese banks were allowed to make working capital 
available to individuals at rates of up to 20 per cent greater than the central bank’s 
posted rate (Lardy, 2004) and since 1996 they were allowed to set their own 
interest rates “within a 30 per cent around a base rate set by the authorities” (Ariff 
and Khalid, 2005, pp. 82). The banks were also to make loans based on 
borrowers’ credit worthiness and not according to what their physical plans 







Table 1.6: Interest rates (5-year average) 
5-year average (per cent) 
 
   



























Source: Ariff and Khalid (2000), pp. 247   
 
Table 1.7: Comparisons of interest rate spreads 
 





Australia  4.4 5.1 
 
















3.4  1.8  











Source: World Development Indicators (2005) 
                                                 
4 The calculation derived is based on the interest rate charged by banks on loans 
to prime customers minus the interest rate paid by commercial or similar banks 
for demand, time, or savings deposits (World Development Indicators, 2005).  
 19
Two other implementations also changed the banking landscape of China, 
namely, the creation of the inter-bank market in 1986 (Dipchand et al., 1994; 
Chang et al., 1999), and the re-entrant of foreign banks (Reynolds, 1982; Zhang 
and Zheng, 1993). These institutions, considered “capitalistic” with embedded- 
western ideologies, were closed down since communism took over the country in 
1949. The inter-bank market not only provided a good source of credit for the 
many banks and regions whose needs were omitted from the state credit plan, it 
also facilitated the most efficient use of funds. Since its inception, China’s inter-
bank market developed very rapidly. From a modest business volume of RMB30 
billion in 1986 (Delfs, 1986), it grew to RMB230 billion in 1987 and RMB520 
billion in 1988. The latter is a more than 17-fold increase over the 1986’s business 
volume. However it declined to RMB260 billion in 1990 (Zhao, 1991; Shi and 
Yan, 1992), a result of the austerity measures undertaken by the government to 
combat inflation and an overheated economy (Dipchand et al., 1994, pp 129). 
 
The foreign banks, on the other hand, began to play an instrumental role in 
channeling foreign funds to China and transferring banking technical and 
management know-how, these being critical ingredients in the reforms of the 
financial sector. These were necessary for the overall development of the 
country’s real sector. Moreover, the government understood that the ability to 
access other countries’ financial markets had to be reciprocated with the opening 
up of China’s market to the foreign banks. By the end of June 1993, foreign banks 
had 56 operational institutions (which included branches, wholly-owned foreign 
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bank subsidiaries or Sino-foreign joint venture banks) and 260 representative 
offices (Zhang and Zheng, 1993, pp.1). A chronology of foreign banking reforms 
in China from 1979 to 2006 is provided in the “APPENDIX” section of the thesis.    
 
1.3.1 Assessments and implementation issues 
 
While key institutional changes did lay the stage for a new post-1979 Chinese 
financial era, their implementations were not without difficulties. The legacy of 
central planning in the pre-1979 period prevented the successful implementation 
of these banking reforms. The main players, that is, the central bank, the 
specialized state banks, the state-owned enterprises and the local governments, 
were not capable of functioning in this new banking environment during this 
period. This was because they were either continuing to operate under the rules of 
the old regime, or they were resisting operating under the new regime. The 
following assessments of the banking reforms help create awareness of the 
implementation issues encountered during the 1979-1993 reform process.        
 
Firstly, the PBC was given the mandate to function as the country’s designated 
central banker. It was a right policy move to separate the central bank from its 
commercial businesses as this would allow the PBC to focus only on central 
banking affairs and also helped to minimize any conflict of interest. However, in 
practice, the functions of the PBC were blurred and its power as a central bank 
was restrained, in particular it being put under the steering influence of the 
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“Cabinet-equivalent” State Council, which was the ultimate decision-maker of 
monetary policy.   
 
Secondly, the decentralization of the credit management system was a positive 
move. The banks and financial institutions could now compete for customers, and 
be held accountable for their business performances, that is, being responsible for 
their own profits and losses. The creation of the specialized state banks allowed 
for focus attention to niche sectors, thereby contributing to their economic 
development. However, many of them continued to act as mere agents for the 
PBC, although they were expected to operate autonomously and independently. 
There were obliged to fulfill fiscal objectives by lending to the state-owned 
enterprises, and at preferential rates. So ironically the termination of budgetary 
grants, from the PBC to the state-owned enterprises, had resulted in the central 
bank passing the job over to the banks to serve fiscal needs, an area that conflicted 
with their performance-oriented business goals. Besides, although there were 
some changes made to the structure of interest rates, these were still under the 
control of the PBC. They were not market-driven.  
 
Thirdly, the addition of “other financial institutions”, that is, the non-banking 
financial institutions, to the three-category “Specialized Banking System”, created 
opportunities for some of their owner organizations to operate outside the 
government’s credit plan. This resulted in the violations of government 
regulations and disruptions in the financial system. This was particularly so for 
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the trust and investment companies which were set up mainly as non-retail 
deposit-taking finance companies and some of them were granted discretion to 
borrow from abroad. These companies were often backed by the state banks, 
regional governments or sector specific ministerial organizations, and hence there 
was strong political influence on the operations of the trust and investment 
companies.  Many of them served as vehicles for funding unregulated and high-
risk ventures such as real estate investments and stock trading, and were blamed 
for the financial disorder and runaway inflation in 1988 and the wave of financial 
speculation and irregularities in 1992-1993 (Pei, 1998). The implementation of 
the financial reform package in 1994, however, put the conflicting relationships 
between the non-bank financial institutions and their founding companies under 
close government’s scrutiny, where banks had to divest their security, trust and 
investment businesses.         
            
Fourthly, there was inefficiency in the allocation of capital in the banking system, 
with the continued use of the three-pronged approach, namely, policy lending 
being the largest share of total lending; the central bank’s allocation of loanable 
funds from regions of high growth to low growth as demonstrated by their loan- 
to-deposit ratios (Lardy, 1998b; Tsai, 2002); and the continued reliance on 
administered interest rates. Much of the dissemination of funds was directed 
through the implementation of policy lending. Funds flowed from the central bank 
to the financial institutions, primarily the specialized banks, and finally to the 
borrowers, the state enterprises. At the end of 1993, these banks received more 
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than 97 per cent of the total central bank loan outstanding of RMB989.85 billion 
(Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 1994; People’s Bank of China, 1994). 
 
Moreover, the effect of the lending quotas imposed by the State Planning 
Commission (SPC) and the PBC was to reallocate loan funds away from regions 
of relatively high economic growth, such as Guangdong, Zhejiang and Fujian, to 
regions of relatively low economic growth, such as Heilongjiang. The main 
beneficiaries of the financial resources were the loss-making state-owned 
enterprises which were responsible for supporting “pillar industries”, hence 
“crowding out” the growing non-state enterprises. Although the non-state sector 
accounted for 51.9 per cent of the total industrial output by 1992, it accounted for 
only 20.7 per cent of the total credits being utilized by the whole economy (Chen, 
et al., 1999). The “overlooked” non-state sector had to rely on either the regional 
banks and non-bank financial institutions, such as the urban credit cooperatives 
(Girardin, 1997; Girardin and Bazen, 1998), the reinvestment of profits, curb 
market financing (Tsai, 2002), or the state-owned firms with which they have 
close economic ties (Lardy, 1998b), to finance their growth. These firms were, 
however, not forthcoming in extending credit to the non-state enterprises to 
prevent them from providing competition, particularly in the capital-intensive 
manufacturing sector. Such limited competition from the non-state sector was one 
reason that accounted for the dismal economic performances of many of the state 
enterprises.      
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Lastly, the specialized banks were insulated from competition. The introduction 
of competition was one of the significant developments in the mid-1980s, 
particularly when the authorities allowed the entry of new financial institutions 
into the marketplace. However, their sheer numbers were overwhelmed by the 
specialized banks’ number of branches, thousands of sub-branches, and the 
organizational structure below each sub-branch. It was also a fallacy that the 
presence of foreign banks would help inject competition in the banking industry, 
hence increasing the financial stature of the Chinese economy. Instead these 
foreign players faced many operational restrictions, such as the limited scope in 




The authorities, having experienced the initial challenges of banking reforms 
during the 1979-1993 period, were now able to develop new measures to 
overcome these challenges and to better manage the banking industry. The new 
financial developments included the establishment of policy banks to handle fiscal 
related affairs, the commercialization of the specialized state banks, the enactment 
of the rule of law for central bank management and overall financial governance, 
the abolition of the credit-quota plan in late 1997, a major restructuring at the 
central bank along the line of the United States of America’s Federal Reserve 
System, and measures to strengthen supervision in 1998 when financial risks 
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accumulated over the years surfaced, particularly since 1992 when financial 
speculation started to occur in China (Pei, 1998). 
 
The establishment of three policy or development banks5 in 1994 was a positive 
move to eliminate the conflict of interests in the roles of the specialized state 
banks between serving the marketplace as well as fulfilling their fiscal 
obligations. This would allow them to focus more on commercial banking. This 
also led to the justification of transforming these specialized banks into authentic 
state-owned commercial banks as the economy progressed along a market-
oriented path.   
  
The state-owned commercial banks had to undergo a paradigm shift when they 
were transformed to commercial entities. The new business measurements 
included running the banking operations on commercial bases (sharing the profit 
and taking the responsibility of losses), adhering to risk management, and assets 
and liabilities ratio management. The banks also ventured into “uncharted” 
businesses previously not allowed. While the niche sector of the Bank of China 
had previously been in the foreign exchange area, the other three state-owned 
commercial banks could now also compete for the same business as the Bank of 
China.  
 
                                                 
5 These are the Agricultural Development Bank, the Export and Import Bank of 
China, and the State Development Bank which was later renamed as China 
Development Bank.  
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To further emphasize on the need to create a sound and intact financial sector 
environment, which also entailed a strong and powerful central bank and a level 
playing field for all competing financial institutions, a financial legislative 
framework became necessary. This led to the formalization of two important laws 
in 1995, and these were the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
People’s Bank of China” and the “Commercial Banking Law”. This was landmark 
recognition by the authorities that the rule of law or having a legal framework is 
critical in financial supervision and regulation (Tokley and Ravn, 1997; Wan, 
1999). 
 
While the “Commercial Banking Law” protects the lawful interests of the key 
players in the banking industry, namely, the commercial banks, the depositors and 
other customers, the “Law of the People’s Bank of China” was issued to 
“confirm” the PBC as the country’s central bank. The law formalizes its monetary 
policy management role, strengthens its supervisory administration of the 
financial sector, and legalizes non-interferences from any local governments. The 
strengthening of these roles of the central bank was deemed necessary, 
particularly as a financial supervisor and regulator, and also especially after a 
spate of bankruptcies that occurred as a result of increasing non-performing loans 
and unhealthy banking practices (Lardy, 1998b; Xu, 1998). 
 
With the development of the policy banks and the commercialization of the state-
owned banks, China’s “Comprehensive Banking System” (see Figure 1.1) now 
 27
consists of the central bank, the “big four” state-owned commercial banks, other 
national commercial banks, regional commercial banks, city commercial banks, 
policy banks, foreign banks and the non-bank financial institutions. A discussion 
on the commercial banks’ differences in their organizational structures and the 
sectors they service is found in CHAPTER THREE. Many of these banks are 
effectively controlled by government bodies or by enterprises and organizations 
that are themselves government-controlled. The non-bank financial institutions 
include the trust and investment companies, insurance companies, finance 
companies, financial leasing companies, securities companies, rural credit 
cooperatives and urban credit cooperatives. As for the foreign banks, the 
advantages of setting a footprint in the huge Chinese marketplace convince the 
foreign financial institutions that they should not forgo getting a slice of the 
lucrative pie, particularly after China gained membership into the WTO in 










People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
! 
                       _____________________________________ 
                       !                                                                        ! 
        Commercial Banks                                       Non-Bank Financial       
                                Institutions (NBFIs) 
                       !                                                                         ! 
State-owned commercial banks                            - trust & investment   
                                                                                     companies   
- Agricultural Bank of China                                   - insurance companies  
- Bank of China                                                        - finance companies  
- Construction Bank of China                                   - financial leasing companies  
- Industrial and Commercial Bank of China             - securities companies 
                                                                                  - rural credit cooperatives  
                                                                                  - urban credit cooperatives   
Other commercial banks                                          
- national commercial banks                                        
- regional commercial banks                                                             
- city commercial banks                                            
Policy banks                                                                
- Agricultural Development Bank  
- China Development Bank  
- Import & Export Bank of China  
Foreign financial institutions  
- representative offices    
- branches  
- wholly-owned banks  
- joint ventures  
- finance companies   
Figure 1.1: Comprehensive Banking System  
 
Source: Adapted from the People’s Bank of China (2000) 
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The mandatory credit-quota plan, where the central bank set the lower limit for 
new loans allocated annually to specific sectors, mostly to loss-making state-
owned enterprises, was abolished in late 1997. Banks were now allowed to lend 
according to commercial considerations, provided that their lending was in line 
with the asset/ liability ratios and monetary policy targets of the central bank. 
Hence with a relatively more efficient allocation of credits, loan default and non-
performing loans were expected to be reduced.  
 
A series of measurements were undertaken in 1998 and 1999 to maintain the 
soundness of the financial sector. These included the PBC taking an active role in 
recapitalizing the troubled state-owned commercial banks through the issuance of 
RMB270 billion special treasury bonds by the Ministry of Finance. It also 
coordinated some restructuring, merger deals and closing down of some of the 
banks and non-bank financial institutions that experienced substantial financial 
risks, as illustrated by Table 1.8.  
 
There was also a major restructuring at the PBC, along the line of the United 
States of America’s Federal Reserve System. In November 1998, a nine-regional 
branch network replaced the 31-provincial branch framework. These branches 
perform defined central bank functions of the PBC in their respective regions. 
This change was expected to empower the PBC, and free it from administrative 
interferences, particularly from the local governments, and strengthen its 
independence in financial supervision (Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 
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1999). Four asset management companies6 were established, between April and 
October 1999, to take over more than RMB1 trillion of non-performing loans 
from the state-owned commercial banks and helped them restructure. Finally, the 
promulgation of the “Provisional Regulations on Prevention and Dissolution of 
Financial Institution Payment Risks” to guide the process of market exit for the 
financial institutions was a significant step forward in the development of 
financial regulation in China (Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 1999; 












                                                 
6 The asset management companies taking over the non-performing loans of the 
state-owned commercial banks were the Great Wall for the Agricultural Bank of 
China, Orient for the Bank of China, Cinda for the China Construction Bank, and 
Huarong for the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Currently they play 
multiple roles such as loan recovery agencies, asset holding companies and also 
venture capitalists as they get involved in the restructuring of the state-owned 
enterprises.   
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Table 1.8: Summary of closure of financial institutions in China  
Face value on closing 
date (RMB billion) 
 
Closed institutions Closing date 
Assets Liabilities 
 
5 UCCs in Hainan 06/12/97 5.4 5.9 
 
Hainan Development 
Bank          
       
21/06/98 16.9 16.6 
 
UCC in Luchuan, 
Guangxi 
                
16/06/98 0.2 0.2 
 
Hongye UCC in Qinghai      
 
12/07/98 0.0 0.0 
 
12 UCCs in Beihai, 
Guangxi 
             
26/10/98 1.5 1.8 
 
20 UCCs in Pingen, 
Guangdong 
        
07/12/98 8.5 8.3 
CATIC          04/01/97 30.1 31.4 
 
CVIC   06/98 10.3 10.4 
 
GITIC  06/10/98 35.9 34.1 
 
Total   108.8 108.8 
 
 
Source: Liu, S. (1999)  
 
1.4.1  Issues and implications  
 
During this period, the implementation of the banking reforms hit more glitches 
even when the new financial measures were announced. The major banks, in 
particular the state-owned commercial banks, not only lacked good credit 
allocation skills, but were required to continue funding the unproductive and loss-
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making state enterprises for social and political reasons. They were functioning on 
a non-commercial basis, while being expected to be commercially-run, having to 
bear the responsibility of financing the state-owned enterprises for developmental 
purposes; and thus became unprofitable. The banks and the non-bank financial 
institutions’ unsound financial status could easily trigger a financial crisis in the 
foreseeable future if the government does not intervene to eradicate the root 
problems. These problems point to the workings of the enterprise, social security 
and budgetary systems under the old regime, which prove difficult to revamp; and 
the central bank’s incapability in managing the financial sector due to a lack of 
independence in its decision-making process. The issues and implications of the 
implementation of banking reforms during the 1994-2003 period are as follows:  
 
Firstly, the state-owned commercial banks were “stifled” on all fronts by two 
main areas, namely, by the need to fulfill fiscal obligations and by the strong 
influence of the local party and governments in funding their local developmental 
projects. While the reasons behind the creation of the policy banks were well- 
intended to fulfill developmental objectives, they seemed not effective as the 
state-owned commercial banks continued to bear the fiscal responsibilities while 
at the same time, were expected to perform as commercial entities. In reality, they 
were used to facilitate any macroeconomic adjustments needed to drive the 
economy. The loss-making and inefficient state-owned enterprises were primarily 
the benefactors. These enterprises were obligated to provide a broad range of 
social services that should be financed from the government budget, and were to 
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avoid creating high levels of unemployment and social unrests. There was a 
dramatic decline in fiscal subsidies to the state-owned enterprises, from about 
RMB58 billion in 1990 to RMB22 billion in 2004 (as illustrated in Table 1.9).  
The subsidies decreased from 25.29 per cent of fiscal revenue in 1985, to 2.08 per 
cent in 2000, 1.04 per cent in 2003, and 0.83 per cent in 2004. Likewise, they 
decreased from 5.66 per cent of GDP in 1985 to 0.16 per cent in 2004. Many of 
the state-owned enterprises had to borrow from the state-owned banks instead. 
However, many of them were unable to service their debts and this, in turn, was a 
major contributor to the insolvency of large parts of the banking system.     
 
Table 1.9: Subsidies to loss-making state-owned enterprises   
 


















































Source: State Statistical Bureau of the People’s Republic of China (2005) 
 
Indeed the state-owned commercial banks had difficulties in allocating the 
efficient use of capital. The local party and governments had more influences over 
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these banks than the central authorities. Their interests often superceded the state-
owned commercial banks’ business interests. Moreover, the staff of these banks 
was “beholden” to the local governments in the Chinese “rice-bowl” environment, 
depending on the governments for their welfare needs, which included housing, 
medical and children’s education. This eventually led to adverse selections, that 
is, biased excessive lending to unproductive local projects, with their 
accompanied moral hazard issues.   
 
Secondly, the state-owned commercial banks were poor business performers, due 
to their incompetent financial intermediary skills and being under the 
government’s close guidance in the allocation of funds, mainly to fulfill its high 
growth policy. Table 1.10 shows that by September 2003 they had combined 
market shares in assets, loans and deposits of 62.3 per cent, 61.2 per cent and 64.9 
per cent, respectively (Barnett, 2004). However, their incompetence and 
inefficiency in intermediation led to their worsening financial performances. 
Lending was excessive and for unproductive purposes, with domestic loans 
outstanding relative to GDP rising from 19 per cent in 1993 to 25 per cent in 2003 
(Lardy, 2004). A significant portion of the resources were being misallocated. The 
financial resources were being channeled into unproductive real estate and 
property development in cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen. There 
were also excess production capacity across a broad range of industries. Hence 
these resulted in low levels of capacity utilization and a massive buildup of 
inventories (Lardy, 2003).  
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Table 1.10: Market Shares of Financial Institutions, September 2003 (in 




Total Assets   
 








15.0 14.9 14.7 
Rural credit 
cooperatives 
   




 1.3  1.0  0.4 
Other 
 
10.9 11.6 8.1 
 
Source: CEIC database (Barnett, 2004) 
 
The root causes of the state-owned commercial banks’ reckless and excessive 
lending could also be traced to weak bank regulation and supervision. Banking 
supervision was mostly administrative and random. Many of the borrowers, 
mainly the state-owned enterprises, were unable to repay the loans, contributing 
to the banks’ high non-performing loans ratios. The four pillar banks had a 
combined RMB1.8 trillion of bad loans or 26 per cent of the total loans of 
RMB6.8 trillion as of end October 2001 8 , and this was slightly reduced to 
RMB1.77 trillion as of September 20029, according to the central bank (Barnett, 
2004; China Knowledge Press, 2005). Table 1.11 shows that the state-owned 
                                                 
7  Defined as claims on the non-financial sector, claims on other sectors, or 
domestic credit. 
8 Straits Times, 4th December 2001. “WTO puts China at risk of major financial 
crisis.” Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.  
9 Bloomberg, 11th November 2002. “China's top 3 banks plan share sales by 
2005.” Business Times, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.  
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commercial banks’ non-performing loans ratio continued to decline from 26 per 
cent in 2002 to 20 per cent in 2003. The non-performing loans as a percentage of 
GDP have also declined from 20 per cent in 2002 to 16 per cent in 2003. 
However, these figures are still high compared to the joint-stock commercial 
banks’ having a non-performing loans ratio of 8 per cent and non-performing 
loans as a percentage of GDP at 2 per cent in 2003. These calculations are based 
on the banks’ adhering to the new five-tier loan classification system which 
reflects accurately the level of real risk for the bank loans.10 The growth in the 
stock of loans – that is, the denominator of the non-performing loans ratio, could 
be a factor contributing to the decline of the state-owned commercial banks’ non-
performing loans ratio. The current new loan classification system and the 
requirement for the state-owned commercial banks to publish the balance sheets 
and the ratio of non-performing loans on a quarterly basis are clearly steps taken 












                                                 
10  The five-tier classification system classifies loans as performing (including 
pass, special mention) and non-performing (including standard, doubtful and loss) 
based on the risks involved. It classifies the entire amount of overdue loan as a 
non-performing loan whereas the four-tier classification system only considered 
the overdue portion (that is, the missed principal payments) as a non-performing 
loan. 
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Table 1.11: Non-performing loans based on the five-tier classification system  
 
 In percent of total loans 
 
In percent of GDP 











12  8  2 2 
Policy banks  
 
20 17  3  3 
 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission (Barnett, 2004) 
 
There is an ongoing recognition that the establishment of the four asset 
management companies to take-over the non-performing loans of the state-owned 
commercial banks, so as to give these banks a clean slate to start functioning 
again as commercial banks, is not a “solve all” solution. The probability of 
achieving high rates of recovery from the liquidation of assets purchased by the 
asset management companies is low due to institutional constraints such as the 
“flawed” bankruptcy procedures giving priority to meeting pension and social 
welfare obligations of employees in state enterprises that are liquidated. This asset 
management companies-approach does not also help prevent the creation of more 
bad loans. Rather it is the lack of effective mechanisms to stop producing bad 
loans. Hence the relative efficiency of the banks are compromised, an area that we 
will further explore in CHAPTER THREE.  
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Thirdly, growth in China has actually been driven by savings in the banking 
system. As highlighted in Table 1.12, China has one of the highest savings rate in 
the world compared to other countries. Its gross domestic savings in 1990 and 
2003 are higher than most of the developed countries’ such as Canada, France, 
Germany, and the United States of America as well as the other emerging 
economies such as India and the Russia Federation. However, they are 
comparable to Hong Kong and Japan in 1990, and Singapore in 2003. In their 
studies on the twenty-first century challenges faced by the Asian economies, Ariff 
and Khalid (2005) reiterated that the reforms initiated during the 1991-1995 
period helped raise China’s domestic savings to GDP ratio from 34 per cent in 

























Table 1.12: Comparison of China’s gross domestic savings with other 
countries’ 
 












France   22 21 
 
Germany  24 22 
 






Japan  34 
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Source: World Development Indicators (2005) 
 
Moreover, as in the 1979-1993 period, the central government in Beijing had a 
strong hand in mobilizing deposits of state banks in wealthier provinces and 
reallocating them to provinces that required greater subsidization. This was 
reflected in the loan-to-deposit ratios of banks in the affected regions. Tsai (2002) 
quoted Henan in northern China as the recipient of bank credits while Fujian and 
Zhejiang from the wealthier southern part of China have been net suppliers of 
state capital since 1991. This was also highlighted in the earlier section on 
 40
“Assessments and implementation issues” of the reforms during the 1979-1993 
period. 
 
Thus it also becomes clear that the authorities have adopted a bank-dominated 
financing strategy to propel economic development. The high growths that the 
country has experienced for many years may not be sustainable if the current 
fragile banking system continues to be the financial driver of the Chinese 
economy. Several of the major banks are already considered insolvent by Western 
accounting standards’ due to their low level of capital adequacy, small loan-loss 
reserves and huge magnitude of non-performing loans. The households’ 
depositing of funds to their savings accounts has helped these banks to remain 
liquid and hence a financial crisis has been avoided. In the future, the bank-
dominated-financed economy is unlikely to be sustainable and hence the 
authorities have been paying attention, in recent years, to developing the capital 
markets as an important alternative financing vehicle.  
 
Fourthly, despite the organizational restructuring and replacing the previous 31-
provincial branch framework with a nine-regional branch network, the central 
bank is still incapable of monitoring and controlling its local branches and 
financial intermediaries in the allocation of credit to productive uses. The PBC 
lacks independence and is perceived to function as a “hollow” institution. The 
root cause of its poor supervision and regulation over the banking industry lies 
with the relationship between the government, at both the central and local levels, 
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and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The government is entrenched with 
party politics involving party coalitions and communist elites representing various 
interest groups. Thus the infiltration of party politics of the one-party state has 
challenged the relationships between the PBC and the other players, such as the 
banking industry, the local governments, and the state-owned enterprises. The 
crucial ingredient to effective central banking is true independence, whether 
politically, legally, or financially. The analysis in CHAPTER FOUR endorses 
nonparty intervention in the workings of the PBC and all other government 
institutions, where party sentiments often juxtapose the policy-making decisions 
of these institutions with that of the central bank’s for vested interests. The PBC 
needs to be independent, enabled, and empowered to make radical changes. This 
not only requires the will and clout of the upper echelons to push the 
recommended resolutions through, but also transparency in governance and 
disclosure. That means both the legal system and enforcement agencies need to be 
well developed to handle the checks and balances of “nonconformists,” which 
also include the local governments and financial institutions. Otherwise, the 
central bank may not be able to withstand the weight of a complex and 
challenging post-WTO China environment where there will be increased 
monetization and financial depth (Chung and Tongzon, 2004).  
 
Finally, the growth of both the domestic and foreign banks would propel with the 
accession of China to the WTO. The restrictions in the scope of business, such as 
the marketing of local currency product and service offerings; and other 
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operational issues, such as entry, number of branches, capital requirements and 
credit exposure limits; prevented the foreign banks from participating 
competitively with their domestic counterparts. Accession of China to the WTO 
had to be the solution to the foreign banks’ dilemma. There were few doubts that 
both the domestic and foreign banks would benefit tremendously from China’s 
entry into the WTO. The benefits to the foreign banks include access to the high 
savings of an estimated combined USD1.6 trillion11 stashed away in domestic 
banks by retail and institutional customers; changes in the scope of business, 
relaxation of rules and procedures, marketing of local currency products and 
service offerings; and participation in local banks, either in joint partnerships or 
equity forms. The expected increase in foreign direct investments (FDI), about 
USD50 billion per year12, with WTO accession help to reaffirm the need for more 
foreign financial and banking services in China. The domestic banking would 
gain from the transfer of banking, investment and management skills, the new 
sources of foreign funds, the breadth of competitive products and services, and the 
wide international network connections. The allocation of scarce funds could also 
be allocated to the most productive use, particularly to small and medium-sized 
firms in the non-state sectors, which have often been denied the funds. 
                                                 
11  Straits Times, 11th December 2001. “China in WTO: China lifts curbs on 
foreign banks in two cities.” Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.  
12 The country is expected to attract some USD50 billion in FDI per year after its 
entry into the WTO. This was an assessment by Supachai Panitchpakdi, WTO 
Director General Designate. Straits Times, 6th November 2001. “China seen 
attracting US$50b FDI/yr after joining WTO: Supachai.” Singapore Press 
Holdings Ltd., Singapore.   
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A new environment is expected with the WTO membership. It is inevitable that 
the authorities have to build up a modern financial architecture to enjoy the 
benefits of WTO membership. The Chinese financial sector, or the banking 
industry in particular, will now experience a higher level of banking. There will 
be improved quality and quantity of product and service offerings; customer-
driven competition not only between both the domestic and foreign banks but also 
among the domestic banks. The domestic banks are also expected to implement 
performance-driven management techniques. The discussion in CHAPTER FIVE 
assesses the implications of China’s accession to WTO on domestic banking, and 
also the major strategies that the banks could embark on to counter the problems 
that might impair their competitiveness in a post-WTO setting. An attempt is also 
made to give a crystal ball picture of the new Chinese post-WTO banking 
environment in the immediate future.     
 
China hopes to reduce bad debts in its financial system before the country is fully 
opened to foreign banks under the WTO agreement. It has already taken steps to 
solve the problem, such as setting up of the asset management companies to 
handle bad debts, strengthening bank supervision, and imposing reforms in state-
owned commercial banks. However, these measures barely match the scale of the 
problem as the profitability of these banks is not enough to allow them to write 
off bad debts. Thus the central bank has announced plans to implement a public 
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listing of the state-owned commercial banks by 200513, in particular the Bank of 
China, China Construction Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China which are the three top banks in China (with combined deposits of more 
than RMB5.5 trillion), to raise money to cover the bad loans, which stood at 
RMB1.9 trillion in 2003 (Barnett, 2004; China Knowledge Press, 2005). These 
banks, together with fourth-ranked Agricultural Bank of China, are required to 
reduce their ratio of bad loans from 25 per cent to 15 per cent by 2005, with all 
bad debt fully provisioned for by reserves. The shares will be sold both 
domestically and overseas.   
 
1.5 Conclusion  
 
The structure of the banking system has changed from a Soviet-style 
“monobanking” system to that of a “western-style” structure, embedded with 
“Chinese Characteristics”, as the country evolved from a command economy to 
that of a market-based one. This chapter explores the institutional changes and 
developments that took place in the banking system from the late 1970s and right 
through the 1990s and early 2000s when China experienced high economic 
growth rates. The changes involved included, amongst other areas, the 
introduction of new financial intermediaries and institutions, and new banking 
laws and regulations for a country that wants to “catch-up” with time and the rest 
of the world so as to partake its share of the global economic growth. While it is 
                                                 
13 Bloomberg, 11th November 2002. “China's top 3 banks plan share sales by 
2005.” Business Times, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.   
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recognized that the banking system has undergone remarkable changes over the 
period, deep-seated structural problems still exist which will continue to pose a 
challenge to the industry. This, in particular, pertains to asset quality, capital 
adequacy and profitability of the financial intermediaries. The banking system 
still suffers from a huge volume of bad loans, since many lending decisions are 
not made on a commercially sound basis in an attempt to pursue macroeconomic 
stabilization.   
 
During these two periods under analysis, the financial system was visibly bank-
dominated as the capital market was still not well developed. Banks and other 
financial institutions, and in particular the four state-owned commercial banks, 
were the driving force in meeting the financial needs of the real economy. The 
workings of the enterprise, budgetary and social security systems under the old 
regime put brakes to the effective implementation of the reform measures. Until 
they are restructured to fit the new China economic environment, the banking 
reforms would continue to face obstacles in their implementation.    
 
The key question now is what if China fails to complete the transformation of the 
banking system it has started since the beginning of the reform period? Its failure 
would result in the continued inefficiencies in the financial institutions’ 
intermediation of funds between savers and borrowers, and inadequate financial 
resources in industry and commerce to overcome physical constraints to growth 
(such as environmental deterioration, sustaining an adequate rate of growth of 
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agricultural output, and infrastructure shortages, Lardy (1998b, pp.186-193)), 
hence leading to a slowing economy. Even if the PBC is being given true central 
bank independence, its empowerment to manage the fluctuations in economic 
activity would be limited by a weak banking system. Likewise, the development 
of the capital market to play a supplementary role in financing economic 
development would be impeded. More importantly, the instrumental role that 
household savings play in China’s impressive growth rates would be undermined. 
In addition, a sound banking system is necessary for China to achieve full 
convertibility of the domestic currency.        
 
In retrospect, the process of the reform in the financial sector in general and the 
banking industry in particular, along with the dynamic growth of the economy 
and strong foreign trade, have allowed China’s financial sector to experience a 
remarkable growth during the 1990s. CHAPTER TWO will help to affirm the 
impact of financial deepening, made possible through banking reforms, on 
China’s overall economic growth. The financial sector reform process has helped 
to facilitate reforms in the real sector although the progress of the state-owned 
enterprises’ reform program still falls short of its target. The strong government 
intervention and “closeness” of the financial sector have helped to shelter the 
economy from the full impact of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The crisis has 
also made it even more critical that the Chinese banking industry takes further 
steps to fine-tune its reform program. Despite China’s success story in the 
development of the banking industry, there are still valid criticisms of its lethargic 
 47
handling of major issues, such as the separation of commercial lending and policy 
lending, corruption cases, mismanagement of funds, low productivity, poor assets 
quality, poor allocation of scarce financial resources, and high non-performing 
loans. Still as the industry liberalizes, it needs to continue to improve upon its 
operational and management capabilities to take on the challenges posed by 
China’s accession to the WTO. Manageable and progressive steps must be taken 
to steer the industry to fruition, instead of a “Big Bang”’ approach which may be 
unmanageable and lead to unpredictable results affecting the overall stability of 















Whither the impact of financial deepening on China’s economic growth 25 
years on? 
 
2.1 Introduction and motivation  
 
This chapter recognizes the importance of the banking industry in China’s 
economic growth process since the country embarks on a modernization program 
in 1979. Among a series of important banking reform measures were the 
restoration of the independence of the central bank, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC)1, the establishment of a comprehensive banking structure with four pillar 
state-owned commercial banks, the creation of new financial intermediaries, the 
decentralization of the credit management system, increase in savings or 
investments channels for the individuals and enterprises (Dipchand et al., 1994; 
Gang, 1994; Lardy, 1998b; Xu, 1998; Lau, 1999; Lou, 2001), and the 
liberalization of the banking industry with China’s accession into the WTO on 
11th December 2001 (Wong and Liu, 2000; Bonin and Huang, 2002).  
 
                                                 
1 The issue of the PBC’s gaining independence is being challenged by critics such 
as the academia, and the public and private sectors. An in-depth discussion on the 
PBC’s lack of independence is found in CHAPTER FOUR of the thesis, “A 
paradigm shift for China’s central banking system” (pp. 146-182), where I 
acknowledge that the PBC has gained operational independence rather than 
complete independence. 
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In recent years, however, much scrutiny has been directed at the country’s major 
banks due to their high non-performing loans (estimated by various quarters to be 
between 15 per cent and 50 per cent of the total bank loans), and the costly 
government-driven recapitalization of the country’s pillar banks to avoid a 
possible financial distress (Dornbusch and Giavazzi, 1999; Lardy, 1999; Mo, 
1999). It is therefore timely and appropriate to revisit and do an assessment of the 
impact of financial deepening, through the development of the banking industry, 
on the Chinese economy 25 years on, since 1979. Financial intermediation in 
China will continue to play an important role in the near future, aiding the process 
of rapid economic development in this transitional market economy.         
 
A retrospective analysis approach is taken to address the question posed by the 
title of this chapter, that is, “Whither the impact of financial deepening on China’s 
economic growth 25 years on?”. This study seeks to find answers to some 
important policy-related questions concerning the impact of financial 
intermediation on China’s overall economic development. These questions 
include the following: 
- Does banking industry development help explain China’s economic 
growth in the reform era or vice versa? 
- What was the state of financial intermediation in the first two and a half 
decades of reform? Was it inefficient? What account for the 
inefficiencies?  
 50
- Who have been the main beneficiaries or rather, who continue to benefit 
from the banking industry for the past 25 years? Is it the state sector or the 
non-state sector, or both? Are they most deserving during the initial years 
of economic “openness”, and 25 years on?  
- How level is the playing field for all the state enterprises and non-state 
enterprises as they both compete for financial resources? Or has the 
playing field “tilted” against the non-state enterprises during the reform 
era, with due recognition that the non-state sector has progressively 
become the most important engine of growth of the Chinese economy?  
- Does financial intermediation include the role of informal finance or curb 
market financing in private sector development (Tsai, 2002; Bai, et al., 
2003)?  
 
The study also evaluates the role played by the central bank in minimizing or 
eliminating the negative effects of financial deepening. Do its current 
organizational and operational mechanisms help play a positive role or do they 
exacerbate the problems already faced by the banking industry? The analysis 
concludes that while the PBC faces many challenges in its central banking 
endeavor, the efforts it makes in changing the rules of operation for effective 
central bank management are only cosmetic in nature. The chief obstacle to the 
PBC serving its roles effectively as a monetary policy manager, financial 
regulator and supervisor is its lack of independence. It needs to undergo a 
“paradigm shift” in its overall undertaking so as to call the “shots” in all central 
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banking decisions, in particular in the supervision and regulation of the financial 
institutions. The PBC needs to back down on local parties’ and local 
governments’ demands to extend loans to unviable projects and ensure that any 
subsidies for policy lending are financed through the budget rather than borne by 
the banking system. 
 
The study highlights that the authorities need to re-assess if the banking industry 
should continue to be the one of the important financial driver of the Chinese 
economy. Should they also focus on the financial markets as these would add a 
new dimension to the financial deepening process and help steer strong economic 
growth for the country in the twentieth-first century?    
 
Finally, the study concludes that the more productive non-state sector should not 
be overlooked in the financial deepening process as it will be the new engine of 
growth for China in the foreseeable future. In addition, future research could 
include the informal financing or curb market in the financial deepening equation 
as this would allow for a more realistic understanding of the situation in China. 
 
To address the questions posed above, the chapter is organized as follows: Section 
2.2 highlights the literature review on the relationship between financial 
deepening and economic growth, while Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 address the 
relationship between China’s banking industry development and economic growth 
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in the reform era. Section 2.5 addresses the other important policy-related 
questions posed in the introductory section, and Section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2 Financial deepening and economic growth  
 
The relationship between the financial system and economic growth has received 
considerable attention in a large number of studies, such as those that focus on the 
roles as well as the channels of the effects of financial intermediation on 
economic growth. Many economists have explicitly expressed the role of 
financial development as a means of accelerating economic growth, in particular, 
of developing countries. Levine (1997) reiterates that the financial system helps to 
facilitate the pooling of risks, allocate resources, monitor managers, mobilize 
savings and facilitate the exchange of goods and services; while Schumpeter 
(1934) highlights that it induces technological innovation by financing 
entrepreneurs in bringing new and innovative products to the market as the supply 
of funds has favorable expectations and psychological effects on entrepreneurs 
enabling them to “think big” (Patrick, 1966, pp. 176).  
 
Although many economists have also attempted to analyze the relationship 
between financial deepening and economic growth using either cross-section 
studies (Jao, 1976; King and Levine, 1993a, 1993b; Demetriades and Hussein, 
1996; Singh and Weisse, 1998) or time-series studies (Fritz, 1984; Jung, 1986; 
Odedokun, 1996; Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998; Sinha and Macri, 1999), there is 
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still arguably room for improvements either in the conceptual or model 
framework; or new studies are needed for “untapped” transitional market 
economies such as China, which is an emerging player in the global financial 
arena. In recent studies such as Ariff and Khalid (2005), the authors emphasized 
the twin and inter-connected themes of liberalization and growth” (ibid, pp. xiii), 
including financial liberalization, in their informative country studies of eight 
Asian countries, including China. This study makes use of an appropriate 
empirical model befitting China’s current financial intermediary marketplace.         
 
A large and diverse body of theoretical and empirical literature has investigated 
the importance of the financial sector for economic growth. Theoretical studies on 
this subject included the recognition of real money balances as a vital ingredient 
in the production process (Friedman, 1959), as it “release labour and capital from 
exchange and distribution efforts, and save costs of information”, and hence 
“consistent growth in real balances should contribute to higher real output” (Jao, 
1976, pp. 49). The “McKinnon-Shaw” hypothesis, supported by the “financial 
repressionists” led by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), posits that a more 
liberalized financial system will not only stimulate savings but also discriminate 
more efficiently between alternative investments, thereby promote economic 
growth. Here, the vehicle for promoting economic growth is an appropriate rate of 
return on real cash balances. Studies done in this area included those of Ahmed 
and Ansari (1995, 1998) for Bangladesh, and Khan and Hasan (1998) for 
Pakistan.  
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The “financial structuralists”, on the other hand, believe that the creation of 
financial institutions and development of a diversified array of financial 
instruments will have positive effects on the saving-investment processes and 
hence, on growth. Recent literature incorporates the stock market and capital 
flows as measures of financial development (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Singh and 
Weisse, 1998). Lately, economists have employed the endogenous growth models 
to analyze the relationship between financial intermediation and economic 
growth, such as the general equilibrium model and an overlapping generations 
model. The findings affirm the important role of financial intermediaries in the 
growth process. While savers place an increasing proportion of their savings with 
them (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990), intermediaries help to reduce savings 
held in unproductive liquid assets and channel them to productive use via capital 
stock, thereby inducing economic growth (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991); and they 
have the ability to fund innovative products and processes due to prior 
undisclosed knowledge on the quality of individual projects, and thereby inducing 
economic growth (King and Levine, 1993b).  
 
Some empirical studies suggest a positive association between financial 
deepening and growth and others tend to focus on the casual nexus between them, 
indicating either a bi-directional causality relationship between these two 
variables or a uni-directional one. While Patrick’s (1966) theory focuses on the 
“supply-leading” and “demand-following” phenomena, Goldsmith (1969) poses a 
debatable thought as to whether financial development is truly an engine of 
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growth or just a sign of the evolution of the whole economy due to other 
independent factors. Jung (1986) even attested to Patrick’s (1966) qualification 
that the direction of causality may change over the course of development, 
postulating a supply-leading–demand-following sequence.  
 
Studies supporting a finance-led economic development include those of King 
and Levine (1993a, 1993b), Wachtel and Rousseau (1995), Kwan et al. (1998) 
and Choe and Moosa (1999). In addition, Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) reaffirm 
that “output does not Granger-cause intermediation” (ibid, pp. 658) in their study, 
while the intermediation variables played a leading role in real sector activity, and 
Ram (1999) does not subscribe to the theory that “where enterprise leads, finance 
follows” (Robinson, 1952, pp. 86). One key reason for this is that causality 
patterns do vary across countries, which also highlights an important weakness of 
cross-section country studies. The statistical inference based on such studies tends 
to implicitly treat different countries as homogenous entities (Demetriades and 
Hussein, 1996). Neusser and Kugler (1998) note the importance of different 
countries’ historical and institutional factors, and the interaction between the 
industrial and the financial sectors while Levine et al.‘s (2000) study affirms that 
“cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems help account for 





2.3 Data analysis  
  
To address the critical first question of whether banking industry development 
helps explain China’s economic growth in the reform era, or vice versa, a Granger 
(1969) causality econometric test is employed. This section first highlights the 
bank-dominated system of the Chinese financial sector, the main indicators of 
financial deepening and economic growth that are used in many of the current 
theoretical and empirical literature, and finally the choice of indicators applicable 
to this study of the Chinese environment. The next section, Section 2.4, explains 
the empirical test and results.  
 
2.3.1  The Chinese financial sector is dominated by the banking system 
 
Since the Chinese government has finally opted for economic “openness” in 1979, 
the banking system has played a key role in facilitating the country’s market- 
driven transitional process. During this reform era, the state monopolizes the 
banking operations to meet its various objectives for economic development, with 
instructions to partake bank financial resources given either at the central 
government or local government level. The financial statistics are revealing. The 
main vehicles for the dissemination of funds for developmental purposes and 
budget deficits are the four main state-owned commercial banks, even though this 
responsibility was later transferred to the three policy banks set up in 1994. The 
latter policy implementation has not proven totally effective as the banking 
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system is not able to mask its role as a fiscal agent of the state (Chung and 
Tongzon, 2004). Other financial institutions involved in the financial 
intermediation businesses include other smaller commercial national, regional and 
city banks, non-bank financial institutions, and the agricultural and urban credit 
cooperatives.  
 
The increasing number and expanding scale of financial intermediaries have 
provided plentiful funds for economic development. Since the early 1980s, banks 
have supported enterprise investments with a low interest rate policy, which is 
being pursued by the state in order to satisfy the needs of rapid economic 
development. Despite the development of the stock and bond markets more than a 
decade ago, their roles in resource allocation remains almost insignificant. Table 
2.1 illustrates that in 2003, the increase in domestic and foreign currency loans 
made by financial institutions was 26 percent of GDP. The funds raised through 
the stock markets and corporate bond issuance stood at 1 per cent and 0.3 per cent 
of GDP, respectively. At the end of 2003, the stock of bank loans stood at 145 
percent of GDP, while the total stock market capitalization of the stock markets 












Table 2.1: Sources of funds in 2003   
 
Sources of funds  
 




Stock markets  
 
0.136 1 




Source: Barnett (2004) 
 
Financial intermediaries thus became the new sources of funds for economic 
development. Bank-dominated financing has also been made easier due to the 
country having one of the highest savings rate in the world. As highlighted earlier 
in Section 1.4.1 of CHAPTER ONE, that is, on “Issues and implications”, reforms 
initiated during the 1991-1995 period helped raise the China’s domestic savings 
to GDP ratio from 34 per cent in 1981-1990 to an average of 40 per cent since 
then (Ariff and Khalid, 2005). Banks, in particular the state-owned commercial 
banks, being “safe havens” under the umbrella of the government’s protection in 
the event of any financial crisis, become depository grounds as alternative savings 
and investments channels are either not readily available or are still in their 
infancy “unsafe” stages. By September 2003 the state-owned commercial banks 
had combined market shares in deposits of 64.9 per cent (Barnett, 2004). Indeed 
the financial intermediaries have also faithfully remained the main sources of 
finance, as direct financing has been repressed for a long period. It is only in 
recent years that the rules governing direct financing become less controlled, and 
hence a heightened interest in direct financing appears.  
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2.3.2 Indicators of financial deepening and economic growth 
 
The growing literature on the relationship between financial deepening and 
economic growth has highlighted many indicators of financial deepening which 
are generally accepted as reflecting the development in the size of the financial 
system, which could be instrumental in facilitating economic growth. The two 
financial intermediation variables used as proxies in Jao’s (1976) examination of 
the relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth were the 
growth rate of real balances per capita and the ratio of monetary liabilities to 
GDP, while Jung’s (1986) two explanatory variables were the currency ratio 
(defined as the ratio of currency to the sum of currency and demand deposits) and 
the monetization variable (that is, the ratio of broad money to nominal gross 
national product (GNP) or GDP). 
 
Cheng (1980) proposes that the study of the degree of financial intermediation in 
Pacific Basin countries be measured by the ratio of total assets held by the 
nations’ financial intermediaries to national output. Thornton (1996), on the other 
hand, uses the ratio of total bank deposits to nominal GDP to measure the degree 
of financial deepening in 22 Asian, Latin American and Caribbean developing 
economies. 
 
Ariff and Khalid (2005) use the ratio of M3 to GDP (measuring monetary depth) 
to confirm that financial reforms have helped to improve the securitization in and 
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the depth of the money and capital markets of eight Asian countries. Table 2.2 
shows that the monetary depth has almost doubled in the early reformers (such as 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) from 54 per cent in 
the 1960s to 95 per cent in 1996-2000. Late reformers such as India and Pakistan 
also experienced a significant increase of around 53 per cent by 2000. China’s 
monetary depth doubled from 69 per cent in 1981-1990 to 123 per cent in 1996-
2000. This was especially due to the high savings in the domestic sector and the 









































Money depth ** 
 
   
1961-70 
  
53.45 32.84 - 
1971-80 
 
50.82 41.26 - 
1981-90 
  
64.34 50.47 68.55 
1991-95 
 
78.75 56.39 95.09 
1996-2000 
 




   
1961-70 
  
14.96*** 14.72 - 
1971-80 
 
31.84 20.69 - 
1981-90 
  
51.58 27.25 - 
1991-95 
 
69.32 27.86 - 
1996-2000 
 
85.85 26.65 - 
 
Source: Ariff and Khalid (2005) 
 
Note: **  Figures not available for Malaysia; 1961-70 figure is average for South 
Korea and Thailand only; 1971-1980 figure is an average for South Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand only. 
         *** Average for South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand only.   
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Ariff and Khalid (2005) also use the financial intermediation ratios (private) 
(FIRs)2 to measure how much of the assets of an economy are held in the form of 
securities in the financial institutions (see Table 2.2). The FIRs have also 
improved in all these countries with the rate increasing almost six-fold in early 
reformers and two-fold in India and Pakistan. The authors highlighted that China 
only started reporting private FIRs in 2002, and its private sector FIR was 155 per 
cent, surpassing all countries in the early reformers group. They concluded that 
“financial liberalization in all these countries appears to have improved capacity 
in the financial sector to handle the greater volume of economic activities, and 
with it, greater financial activities” (ibid, pp. 20).              
 
With regards to analyzing economic growth, the measurements commonly used 
include real GNP or GDP, or the rate of growth of per capita real GNP or GDP 
(Jao, 1976; Jung, 1986; Thornton, 1996; Sinha and Macri, 1999). Gupta (1984) 
uses the industrial output data to study the issue of causality between financial 
deepening and economic growth. However, this indicator for economic 
development is questionable as industrial output represents only a small portion of 
total output in most developing countries.  
 
The next section highlights the statistical methodology and techniques employed 
to facilitate the empirical analysis. A scrutiny of the impact of banking industry 
                                                 
2 Goldsmith’s (1969) broad definition of financial deepening using the FIR refers 
to the ratio of total financial assets to that of national wealth, that is, an indicator 
of the degree of institutional maturity in the financial market.   
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development on China’s economic growth is done in Section 2.5, and where the 
questions posed earlier in Section 2.1 are also addressed.           
 
2.4  Empirical test and results 
 
Unlike most empirical studies, alternative financial and growth variables, and 
hence test alternative hypotheses, are used to demonstrate the direct influences of 
the banking industry on the development of the Chinese economy. The time series 
data refer to two Chinese economic growth indicators and four financial 
deepening indicators for the period 1978 to 2003.3 The data is derived from the 
China Statistical Yearbook (State Statistical Bureau of the People’s Republic of 
China, 1978-2004) and the International Financial Statistics Yearbook 
(International Monetary Fund, 1979-2004). As China experiences erratic price 
fluctuations particularly in the 1980s and early 1990s, all data selected are 
expressed in “real” rather than “nominal” terms, with 1995 being the base year. 
These financial and growth variables are also expressed in “growth” terms, rather 
than “absolute” values, as they give a more accurate picture of the situation in this 
transitional market economy. As highlighted by Abeysinghe and Rajaguru (2004) 
there are serious concerns about the accuracy and veracity of China’s annual GDP 
figures especially since the mid-1990s. While Rawski (2001) pointed out the 
“highly exaggerated and unrealiable” GDP growth figures since 1998, Wang and 
                                                 
3  Chinese quarterly data for all the variables (for the 25 years) were either 
unavailable, incomplete or unreliable. This was especially so from 1978 to the late 
1980s. As such the study has to make use of annual data, which may have an 
impact on the results due to small sample bias. 
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Meng’s (2001) argued that such large exaggerations have occurred since 1992. 
They argue that this is largely due to insufficient deflation of nominal figures. The 
empirical study makes use of the Granger (1969) technique to assess any causal 
relationship between each of the economic growth variable with each of the 
financial deepening variable.   
 
The study attested the “real balances effect” with the growth rate of real money 
supply (M1) to real GDP and the growth rate of real broad money (M2) to real 
GDP; and the “intermediation effect” with the growth rate of real quasi-money 
supply to real GDP.4 M1 refers to the sum of currency and demand deposits; 
quasi-money supply includes time, savings and currency deposits, and M2 is the 
sum of M1 and quasi-money supply. The analysis on quasi-money supply reflects 
how extensive bank deposits are being used. These definitions are the same as 
employed by the International Financial Statistics (IFS). The fourth variable is the 
growth rate of real domestic credit to real GDP. As a break-down of the domestic 
bank credit to either the public sector or private sector for the whole study period 
was not easily derived, mainly due to limited access to complete and reliable data, 
                                                 
4 This empirical study of the Chinese economy uses variables in growth rate form. 
It seeks to evaluate the extent of the impact of banking industry development on 
China’s economic growth, that is, for example, by analyzing whether the growth 
rate of real M1 to real GDP is likely to have a positive influence on the growth 
rate of real GDP. In reviewing the literature on the empirical studies which 
analyze the impact of financial deepening on economic growth, it is noted that the 
authors have used the relevant data either in level or growth rate forms as 
indicators for both financial deepening and economic growth. The studies that use 
data in level form include those of Cheng (1980), Jung(1986), Thornton (1996), 
and Ariff and Khalid (2005), while those that use the data in growth rate form 
include the works of Jao (1976), Lanyi and Saracoglu (1983), Choe and Moosa 
(1999), and Sinha and Macri (1999).  
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this study thus works with this information relating to the two sectors combined. 
Finally, the barometers for China’s economic growth are demonstrated by the 
growth rate of real GDP and growth rate of real fixed assets investments.5    
    
Figure 2.1 displays plots of the data for all the six time series. Each time series 
appears to be stationary, and this characteristic is reaffirmed by the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981) method. This technique is 
applied to determine whether to test for a unit root in the levels, first or second 
differences forms. The ADF statistics are selected based on the number of lags 




















                                                 
5  The China Statistical Yearbook (State Statistical Bureau of the People’s 
Republic of China, 1978-2004) describes fixed investments (or fixed assets 
investments) as investments made in capital construction in the urban and rural 
areas; real estate development; the individuals’ housing investments in urban 
areas, industrial and mining areas; and in national defense projects, and civil 
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-3.083202 ** (5)    
Fixed assets investments 
 
-3.290741 ** (5)    
 
Note: 
1. All variables are expressed in real and growth terms 
2. * and ** denote rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the one 
per cent level and five per cent level, respectively 
3. The number in parenthesis reflects the number of lags included, 
using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), when the ADF 
statistic was selected     
 
All the series (in growth terms) are stationary (I(0)) as demonstrated by the ADF 
test. The unit root hypothesis, that is a non-stationarity situation, is rejected either 
at the one per cent level (for growth rates of real M1 to real GDP, real M2 to real 
GDP, real quasi-money to real GDP, and real domestic credit to real GDP) or at 
the five per cent level (for growth rates of real GDP and real fixed assets 
investments, both at lag 5). The ADF test results therefore affirm the stationarity 
characteristic of all the time series as illustrated by the graphs in Figure 2.1. 
 
Since all the variables are stationary, alternative hypotheses are tested to 
demonstrate the direct influences of the banking industry, via the financial 
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deepening indicators, on the development of the Chinese economy, as measured 
by the growth indicators such as the real GDP and real fixed assets investments. 
The Akaike Information Criteria is then used to determine the number of lags 
used in the subsequent Granger-causality test. Table 2.4 illustrates the pairwise 




















Table 2.4: Pairwise Granger Causality tests between financial deepening and 
economic growth indicators  
 
Null Hypothesis  F-statistic Probability 
 
M1/GDP does not 
Granger Cause GDP    
2.79432 (2) 0.08773 
GDP does not Granger 
Cause M1/GDP    
1.28577 (2) 0.30064 
M2/GDP does not 
Granger Cause GDP    
3.38414 (2) 0.05654 
GDP does not Granger 
Cause M2/GDP    
0.03852 (2) 0.96230 
Quasi-money/GDP does 
not Granger Cause GDP    
2.39659 (3) 0.10883 
GDP does not Granger 
Cause Quasi-money/GDP    
0.56065 (3) 0.64914 
Domestic credit/GDP does 





GDP does not Granger 
Cause Domestic 
credit/GDP    
0.03283 (2) 0.96776 
M1/GDP does not 
Granger Cause FAI    
2.92019 (4) 0.06704 
FAI does not Granger 
Cause M1/GDP    
1.82166 (4) 0.18953 
M2/GDP does not 
Granger Cause FAI    
3.75413 (2) 0.04338 
FAI does not Granger 
Cause M2/GDP    
1.95271 (2) 0.17080 
Quasi-money/GDP does 
not Granger Cause FAI    
0.10227 (1) 0.75228 
FAI does not Granger 
Cause Quasi-money/GDP    
0.03290 (1) 0.85780 
Domestic credit/GDP does 
not Granger Cause FAI    
4.25619 (1) 0.05169 
FAI does not Granger 
Cause Domestic 
credit/GDP    
0.50668 (1) 0.48441 
  
Note: 
1. FAI refers to fixed assets investments 
2. The number in parenthesis reflects the number of lags included,            







The Granger-causality test outcomes reveal that that there is a “supply-leading” 
causality relationship between the two financial deepening indicators, that is, both 
the growth rate of real M1 to real GDP, and the growth rate of real M2 to real 
GDP, and the economic growth indicator, that is, the growth rate of real GDP. 
While there is also a causal relationship between the growth rate of real quasi-
money to real GDP, and the economic growth variable of real GDP growth, it is 
not the case for the relationship between the growth rate of real domestic credit to 
real GDP, and the growth rate of real GDP.  
 
With the exception of the growth rate of real quasi-money to real GDP, the 
empirical test also demonstrates a similar “supply-leading” causal relationship 
between all the other financial deepening indicators and the growth rate of real 
fixed assets investments. The empirical outcome therefore illustrates that China’s 



















2.5 The role of financial deepening in a growing Chinese economy  
 
This section addresses the other important policy-related questions highlighted in 
the introductory section by revisiting and evaluating the tough challenges that the 
authorities need to handle, with regards to the role of financial deepening in a 
growing Chinese economy that has room for even higher growths in the near 
future. Of prime importance is the efficiency of the allocation of financial 
resources to the beneficiaries of China’s economic development during the last 
two and a half decades; that is, the important questions are how and where were 
the financial resources channeled to? Have the scarce financial resources been 
distributed in an efficient and/or fair manner between the state sector and the non-
state sector? Has the percentage of allocation of the financial resources between 
the two sectors changed during the initial years of economic “openness” and 25 
years on?  
 
2.5.1   The growing importance of the non-state sector to China’s economic 
growth  
 
The past 25 years have been years of spectacular growth for this transitional 
economy. From a macroeconomic perspective, the growing GDP, fixed assets 
investments and gross industrial output, as illustrated in Table 2.5 speak volumes 
of China’s impressive journey to economic “openness” and development. On 
closer analysis, as illustrated by Table 2.6, the non-state sector, which is defined 
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as all production units not directly owned or controlled by the state and 
comprising collective enterprises, private enterprises and enterprises of other 
ownership forms6, has been the main contributor to industrial output over the 
years, with its growth outpacing that of the state sector. Its share of China’s total 
industrial output rose from about 35 per cent in 1985 to about 62 per cent and 65 
per cent in 2003 and 2004, respectively. The state-owned enterprises on the other 
end, maintained a share of about 65 per cent of the country’s industrial output in 
1985, and this declined to about 38 per cent and 35 per cent in 2003 and 2004, 
respectively. Likewise Table 2.7 shows that the non-state sector plays an 
increasingly important role in the provision of non-agricultural employment. Its 
share increased over the years from 30 per cent in 1985 to about 73 per cent in 
2003 and 75 per cent in 2004, while the state sector’s share decreased from 70 per 









                                                 
6  “Other enterprises” include foreign-invested companies and shareholding 
enterprises without government as the major shareholder, and joint-ventures 
between the state-owned enterprises and foreign investors.  
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Table 2.5: Statistics on China’s GDP, Fixed Assets Investments and Gross 
Industrial Output (RMB 100 million)    
  
Year  GDP   Fixed  Assets 
Investments   
Gross Industrial 




4,517.80 910.90 5,154.26 
1985 
 
8,964.4 2,543.20 9,716.47 
1990 
 
18,547.90 4,517.00 23,924.00 
1995 
 
58,478.10 20,019.30 91,894.00 
2000 
 
89,468.10 32,917.70 85,673.66 
2001 
 
97,314.80 37,213.50 95,448.98 
2002 105,172.30 43, 499.90 110, 776.50 
 




136,875.90 70,477.40 187,220.70 
 



































1985 64.90 32.10 1.80 1.20 
 
1990 54.60 35.60 5.40 4.40 
 













10.53 9.18 35.86 
2002 
 
40.78 8.68 11.69 38.85 
2003 
 
37.54 6.65 14.75 41.06 
2004 
 
35.24 5.65 16.50 42.61 
 







                                                 
7 For data prior to 1996 on the share of state-owned enterprises in total industrial 
output includes those enterprises with controlling share held by the state. From 
1997, the gross industrial output includes only state enterprises and non-state-
owned industrial enterprises with an annual sales income of over RMB 5 million. 
8 “Other enterprises” include share-holding cooperative enterprises, share-holding 
enterprises, foreign funded enterprises and enterprises with funds from Hong 
Kong, Macau and Taiwan.   
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Table 2.7: Share of non-agricultural employment by the state sector and non-
state sector (per cent) 
 




1985 70.00 30.00 
 
1990 62.30 37.70 
 























Source: State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China (2000, 2005) 
 
2.5.2   Bias in credit allocation      
 
While Table 2.6 shows a decline in the state sector’s contribution to industrial 
output, it has, however, continued to be the main recipient of financial resources 
for its investment in fixed assets, rather than the non-state sector. Are they most 
“deserving” of such funds? The allocation of resources between the two sectors is 
questionable. Table 2.8 reiterates that during most of the economic transition era, 
the state sector obtained more funds for fixed investments than the non-state 
sector. This re-affirms the state banks’ bias in credit allocation in favor of the 
enterprises in the state sector, with artificially-low-interest-rates loans that do not 
exhibit high prospects of being repaid, even though their contribution to output 
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diminished dramatically. While the state sector needed much capital during the 
initial years of economic “openness”, such financings have gone “overboard” 
over the years, with a disproportionately low amount of bank credit being 
allocated to a potential important engine of growth of China’s economic 
development, that is, the non-state enterprises. It was only in recent years that 
total investments in fixed assets in the non-state enterprises increase.   
 
There has been much publicity, from the academia, public and private sectors 
alike, on the reasons why the state sector continues to be the an important 
recipient of financial resources from the state banks, in particular the four pillar 
state-owned commercial banks. While these banks need to engage in “policy 
lending” to state-owned enterprises in industries targeted by the government as 
development priorities, the main reason points to the difficulty of eliminating (and 
in a “Big Bang” manner) the “legacy” inherited from the communist’s era of 
providing “protection” to the state-owned enterprises to avoid potential political 
and social upheavals. These enterprises have provided their employees with “iron 
rice bowls” and to stop financing them “abruptly”, especially when an appropriate 
post-1979 pension plan is not in place, would surely result in political and social 
“suicides”. The authorities have thus taken a “gradual” approach in reforming the 
enterprise and the social security systems. This move is no enviable task but has 
certainly being implemented at the expense of the resource-deprived non-state 
sector. Meanwhile, many loss-making but deemed politically important state-
owned enterprises continue to be financially supported even as their performances 
slacken.    
 79
Table 2.8 Distribution of total investments in fixed assets by sector (per cent)   




1980 81.89 18.11 
 
1985 66.08 33.92 
 
1990 66.11 33.89 
 




















Source: State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China (2005) 
 
2.5.3     Non-state enterprises “thriving on a tilted playing field”  
  
Bai, et al. (2003) point out that the non-state enterprises, especially the indigenous 
and small private enterprises, have been “thriving on a tilted playing field” (ibid, 
pp.104), and that legal and bureaucratic restrictions to entry to certain high profit 
and high growth potential industries, credit restriction, and poor legal protection, 
have prevented the non-state sector from growing at its full potential. However, 
they believe that fiscal and intra-governmental decentralization, the vague and 
ambiguous property right arrangements, and information decentralization help 
account for the rapid spectacular growth of the non-state sector in the past two 
decades although they were being discriminated against by the central authorities. 
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The non-state’s provision of employment opportunities and increased retainable 
tax revenues allow the local governments to benefit from the fiscal and intra-
governmental decentralization. Likewise having a government agency as their 
partner, particularly in the early stages of their business development, and 
yielding some benefits and control rights to the former, the non-state enterprises 
could avoid many of the financial, administrative, and legal difficulties that 
usually prevail in any business undertaking. Also information independence 
limited the ability of government agencies to collect arbitrary taxes and fees from 
the non-state enterprises. While these “transitional institutions” play a significant 
role in the outstanding performance of the non-state sector, they are unlikely to 
adequately provide support for its continued rapid growth (ibid, pp.100). These 
transitional institutions, however, have helped to facilitate the provision of funds 
to the non-state sector by a much “neglected” and important financial 
intermediary vehicle, namely the informal curb market.      
 
2.5.4     The role of the curb market financing   
 
The empirical outcomes do not demonstrate a true picture of the workings of 
financial deepening, as they do not take into account the contribution made by the 
informal financial intermediaries. The fact remains that financial intermediation 
through the state banking system has gone predominantly to the least productive, 
least efficient part of the Chinese economy, that is, the state sector. The argument 
would have made sense if financial deepening and formal financial intermediation 
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have been serving the most productive sector of the economy, that is, the non-
state sector. This is not the case, however. Hence the primary shortcoming of this 
empirical test is that it completely ignores the role of the curb market financing in 
non-state sector development.    
 
The non-state enterprises, that is, mainly the private entrepreneurs, rely primarily 
on self-financing for their initial investments. The vast majority of them rely 
creatively on the curb market. These informal and illegal financing practices take 
various forms such as interpersonal borrowing and trade credit among business 
people to more institutionalized mechanisms such as rotating credit associations 
and grassroots credit cooperatives. Tsai (2002), in her research on back-alley 
banking, highlights that given the fact that the state banks are not available to 
most non-state businesses (including the illicit diversion of official bank credit 
from state units to the curb market), it is estimated that during the first two 
decades of reform, curb market activities accounted for “at least one-quarter of all 
financial transactions” and “up to three-quarters of private sector credit” (ibid, pp. 
36-37). Thus the informal financial sector as a percentage of the Chinese 
economy is “similar to the scale of informal finance in Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Korea during their respective postwar decades of rapid economic growth” (ibid, 
pp.36). Such is the importance of curb market financing to China’s economic 




2.5.5    Growth is driven by China’s high savings rates   
 
Growth in China has actually been driven by savings in the banking system, as 
contemporary China has one of the highest savings rate in the world. As 
highlighted in CHAPTER ONE, there was an increase in the growth rate of 
domestic savings to GDP in particular after 1994, averaging 40 per cent, and this 
was largely due to the reforms that were initiated during the 1991-95 period (Ariff 
and Khalid, 2005). 
 
Moreover, the central government also exercises greater financial capacity over 
the state banks by mobilizing deposits in wealthier provinces and reallocating 
them to areas that require greater subsidization. As illustrated in Table 2.9, which 
highlights the loan-to-deposit ratio of banks in three different regions, Henan in 
northern China is the net recipient of bank credits while Fujian and Zhejiang, 
from the richer coastal south, have been net suppliers of state capital since 1991 









Table 2.9: Comparison of loan-to-deposit ratios of state banks: Henan, 
Fujian, and Zhejiang, 1988-1999 
 
Year  Henan Province  Fujian Province  Zhejiang 
Province  
 
1988 1.48 1.23 1.26 
 
1989 1.42 1.18 1.19 
 
1990 1.36 1.07 1.05 
 
1991 1.28 0.96 0.97 
 
1992 1.25 0.88 0.93 
 
1993 1.20 0.95 0.92 
 
1994 1.16 0.90 0.90 
 
1995 1.12 0.83 0.81 
 




1.13 0.75 0.77 
 




1.12 0.79 0.74 
 
 
Source: Tsai (2002), pp. 40, Table 2.7 
 
 
2.5.6    Role of the central bank in mitigating the negative effects of growth in 
indirect financing    
 
Although the empirical study highlights that China’s banking industry 
development helps explain its economic growth in the reform era, this situation 
has also led to some negative ramifications. Poor credit allocations and 
unqualified risk management capabilities resulted in adverse selections, moral 
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hazards, poor asset quality and state banks’ huge non-performing loans (as they 
have difficulty enforcing loan repayment by state-owned enterprises, the so-called 
“soft budget constraint”). The irony here is that both lenders (banks) and 
borrowers (enterprises) are in the public sector, and the former, in particular the 
state-owned commercial banks, bear most of the financial risk. There was also a 
leakage of funds from the formal banking system for unproductive uses, such as 
speculation in real estate and the stock market; unethical business practices such 
as “connected borrowing” and bribery. Many of these issues have to do with the 
close-knit relationships among the three key layers in the marketplace, namely, 
the banking system, the local governments and the state-owned enterprises, which 
influence the way how financial resources are to be channeled to and used.  
 
Under such situations, what role does the central bank, the PBC, play in 
minimizing these negative effects from the financial deepening process, which 
ultimately affects its monetary policy management? Chung and Tongzon (2004) 
concluded that the lack of independence of the PBC exacerbates the problems 
already faced by the banking industry, particularly in the areas of supervision and 
regulation of the financial intermediaries. The fundamental problem lies with the 
relationship between the government, at both the central and local levels, and the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The government is entrenched with party 
politics which challenges the relationship between the PBC and the banking 
system, the local governments, and the state-owned enterprises. The pervasive 
stronghold that the CCP has over the central bank negates the many efforts made 
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in changing the rules of operation for effective central bank management, which 
are only cosmetic in nature. The central bank itself needs to undergo a “paradigm 
shift” in its overall undertaking not only in its role in monetary policy 
management but also in the supervision and regulation of the banking industry. 
Independence is the “cornerstone” for an effective China’s central banking 




The study has taken the approach to delve further beyond what the empirical 
outcomes have to offer in analyzing the impact of financial deepening on China’s 
economic growth during the last two and a half decades. Critical questions were 
put forth relating to the role played by financial deepening in a fast-growing 
Chinese economy. While the econometric tests were able to offer some analyzes 
and arouse debates on the relationship between financial deepening and economic 
growth, it could not be denied that the banking industry was instrumental to 
China’s growth for the past 25 years. It has been a bank-dominated financing 
strategy adopted by the authorities to propel economic development. This leads to 
the question of whether a possible crisis in the banking industry, thereby affecting 
the financial sector in general, would put brakes to growth. In such a scenario, 
should the banking industry continue to be one of the important, and if not the 
most important, financial driver of the Chinese economy? The authorities have 
not wasted time in recent years to develop the capital markets as an important 
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financing mechanism to further the growth’s agenda. A similar causality 
examination of the relationship between financial deepening, incorporating both 
the contributions of a post-WTO banking industry and the financial markets, and 
economic growth done a decade later may offer some interesting insights.      
 
Likewise, an examination of the relationship between financial deepening and 
economic growth, incorporating the influence of the non-state sector, may offer 
new insights to the study. The non-state sector will be the new engine of growth 
in the foreseeable future. As it is, by late 2004 the country had 3.8 million private 
enterprises, a rise of 26 per cent from a year earlier. It is forecasted that over the 
next decade, private entrepreneurs are likely to account for 60 per cent of the total 
increase in national wealth.9 It would then be necessary and lucrative for both the 
formal financial intermediaries and the financial markets to channel funds to the 
non-state sector. Till then, financial deepening would have a greater impact on the 
non-state sector than on the state sector. 
 
 
                                                 
9 AFP, 12th February 2005. “One-third of capitalists in China are communists.” 
Straits Times, Singapore Holdings Pte. Ltd., Singapore.   
CHAPTER THREE 
 
Evaluating the efficiency of Chinese banks: a non-parametric approach 
 
3.1 Introduction and motivation  
 
The banking industry has played an instrumental role in China’s overall effort to 
transform a centralized economy into a market-driven economy since 1979. While 
there are many enlightening discussions among the academics and practitioners in 
both the public and private sectors on the banking industry in general, there is a 
dearth of information on the measurement of the relative efficiency of the 
domestic banks with respect to their financial intermediation roles, in particular. 
This area remains relatively under researched, in comparison to the vast amounts 
of research into the efficiency of banks outside China. Hence I note the important 
contribution of my thesis in attempting to analyze the relative efficiency of the 
Chinese banks in 2002, that is, twenty four years on after China “reopened” its 
“closed” economy.  
 
There are two important reasons why an examination of the efficiency of the 
domestic banks is useful. Firstly, China’s bond and equity markets are not well 
developed and this thereby increases the importance of the banking industry in 
propelling the country’s economic growth. Secondly, the domestic banks will 
experience intense competition with the entry of foreign banks when China 
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adheres to the WTO rulings to deregulate the banking industry. Many of these 
foreign banks place high importance on efficiency by adhering closely to 
international standards on credit and risk assessments, liquidity management, 
asset and liability management, and capital adequacy management. A timely 
analysis on the efficiency levels of the domestic banks will help bring forth 
solutions to increase their efficiency levels and thereby on ways to counter foreign 
competition.    
 
There exist a number of popular techniques to assess the efficiency of banks such 
as the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), the traditional financial ratios analysis 
approach and the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a non-parametric approach. 
The SFA approach implies that a specification of the production function and 
accurate input prices are required. However, it is not possible to produce an 
accurate measure of the Chinese labor input price as data on both the costs of the 
labor input and the number of employees for the banks is both not readily 
available and unreliable. In addition, a major weakness of Li et al.’s (2001) work 
using the financial ratios analysis approach for Chinese data is that the changing 
nature of the banking industry makes evaluation criteria such as “profits, liquidity, 
asset quality, attitude toward risk, and management strategies” (Yue 1992, pp.31) 
even more difficult. This study selects the DEA approach to assess the efficiency 
of Chinese banks as it is a more flexible alternative form of financial analysis and 
does not require the specification of a particular functional form for the cost, 
profit or production function. 
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DEA has been used in a variety of ways to analyze the efficiency of banks in the 
financial sector. While it is suitable for dealing with multiple output banking 
units, the analysis is further enhanced by delving into the relative performances of 
the selected Chinese banks by their organizational status, that is, under the 
categories of state-owned commercial banks, nation-wide banks, regional banks 
and city commercial banks. An assessment of their performances is made under 
two different models, that is, where the customer deposits serves either as an input 
or an output variable, respectively. The study analyzes if they offer differing 
efficiency outcomes for the sample of Chinese banks. 
  
Some important questions are asked as the analysis progresses, such as the 
following:  
- what are the main causes of the banks’ overall technical 
inefficiency (“technical inefficiency”)? 
- are they due to the inefficient operations of the banks (“pure 
technical inefficiency”) or by the disadvantageous conditions 
under which the banks are operating (“scale technical 
inefficiency”)? 
- what are the sources of scale inefficiency and does size play an 
important  role in the relative efficiency of these banks? 
- how are the findings different for the different banking segments 
and what  must the inefficient banks do to meet efficiency 
standards? 
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Last but not the least important, what do the study results imply for the operation 
of the Chinese banks and for the process of deregulation of the Chinese banking 
industry? Does it serve as a good reference for the other transitional economies 
which may be considering adopting a pro-deregulation approach? As such, 
measuring the efficiency of their banks is of prime importance. Results indicate 
that overall relative inefficiency of the domestic banks should make both the bank 
executive management and policy-makers further implement serious drastic 
measures to improve the banks’ efficiency levels, when evaluating their 
competitive viability.    
  
The chapter unfolds as follows: Section 3.2 gives a literature review of the DEA 
technique. Section 3.3 delves into the DEA methodology. Section 3.4 analyzes the 
selected data and gives a profile of the sample banks belonging to the four 
organizational forms, that is, the state-owned commercial banks, nation-wide 
banks, regional banks and city commercial banks. Section 3.5 highlights the major 
empirical findings and section 3.6 concludes.  
 
3.2  Literature review  
 
There are different measures used in analyzing the efficiency of organizations, 
firms or decision-making units (DMUs), a term coined by Charnes et al. (1978). 
An X-efficiency study of a DMU refers to analyzing both its technical and 
allocative efficiencies. A production plan is technically efficient if there is no way 
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to produce more output with the same inputs or to produce the same output with 
fewer inputs. Allocative or “price efficiency” (Farrell, 1957), on the other hand, 
reflects the ability of a bank to optimally use the inputs, given their pricing 
information and the production technology.  
 
The main approaches commonly adopted in the academic studies on costs and 
efficiency in the banking industry are the parametric and non-parametric 
techniques. The parametric stochastic frontier approach (SFA), which is also 
sometimes referred to as the econometric frontier approach, requires the 
specification of a functional form for the cost, profit or production relationship 
among inputs and outputs. DEA, on the other hand, does not require the 
specification of a particular functional form for the cost, profit or production 
function. This technique is more straightforward, and it is aimed to determine an 
envelopment surface, and the frontier is derived by “enveloping” the observed 
data in the input-output space in which case there is no way to produce more 
output with the same inputs or to produce the same output with fewer inputs. 
Hence the technique is known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).   
 
The SFA approach produces measures of X-efficiency, which is composed of 
both technical and allocative efficiency, and requires the specification of a cost 
function. This implies that accurate input prices have to be made available. 
Unfortunately data on both the costs of the labor input and the number of 
employees for the Chinese banks are not easily and readily available and, are also 
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unreliable. Thus it is not possible to produce an accurate measure of the Chinese 
labor input price. Therefore this thesis does not consider allocative efficiency and 
instead, the DEA approach is used as even without the data on input prices, the 
technique is able to analyze both the technical efficiency and scale efficiency of 
the banks. Scale inefficiency arises when a bank is experiencing non-constant 
returns-to-scale, which differs from a constant returns-to-scale situation that 
characterizes a long run, free entry competitive equilibrium.  
 
The DEA technique has its own limitations. Fukuyama (1993) highlights that it 
assumes the non-existence of the “measurement error and statistical noise” (pp. 
1102), unlike the SFA approach. Drake and Hall (2003) reiterate that the absence 
of the random error term implies that DEA may “overstate the true level of 
relative inefficiency for some units” as it treats “any deviation from the efficient 
frontier as being purely associated with inefficiency” (pp. 897).  
 
DEA has been used in a variety of ways to analyze the efficiency of banks in the 
financial sector. It is used to analyze country-specific banking data such as for 
Japan (Fukuyama, 1993; Drake and Hall, 2003), United Kingdom (Drake, 2001) 
and the United States of America (Miller and Noulas, 1996). In his study of a 
1990 sample of 143 Japanese banks, Fukuyama (1993) found that scale 
inefficiencies were mainly due to increasing returns-to-scale. Drake and Hall 
(2003) examined 1997’s data for 149 Japanese banks with possible large scale 
mergers among some of these banks. The DEA results showed that the larger 
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banks have limited opportunity to gain from eliminating X-inefficiencies as they 
are operating above the minimum efficient scale. On the other hand, there were 
potential significant economies of scale for the smallest banks. Drake (2001) 
employed panel data sample covering United Kingdom’s banks over the period 
1984 to 1995, and found that smaller banks exhibited increasing returns-to-scale 
while the big four clearing banks (such as Barclays, Lloyds, National West and 
Midland) showed strong evidence of decreasing returns-to-scale. DEA results for 
a sample of 201 large banks in the United States of America (Miller and Noulas, 
1996), for the period 1984 to 1990, confirmed that the larger banks were also 
experiencing decreasing returns-to-scale and have higher levels of technical 
efficiency. The DEA technique is also used for addressing the operating 
efficiency of domestic bank branches as demonstrated in the works of Sherman 
and Gold (1985) and Oral and Yolalan (1990).  
 
The DEA technique has been used as an effective tool in making international 
comparisons between the efficiency of banks in different countries, such as Berg 
et al.’s (1993) work on the relative competitiveness of the banking industries in 
three Nordic countries, namely Finland, Norway and Sweden. The study found 
the average Swedish bank to be much more efficient than the Finnish and 
Norwegian average banks. Sathye (2001) made a comparison of the X-efficiency 
(which consists of both technical and allocative efficiencies) of Australian banks 
with that of banks in Europe and the United States of America using 1996 data. 
The study found that technical efficiency is more important than its allocative 
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counterpart among the 29 Australian banks. Oliveira and Tabak (2005) measured 
banking efficiency based on the appreciation of the bank stocks of 41 countries in 
the period between 1995 and 2002. The empirical study concluded that on 
average, the banking efficiency was not largely different among developed and 
emerging countries. There are also research studies analyzing whether the 
domestic banks are more or less efficient than foreign-owned banks located in the 
host countries, and the implications on government policies regarding 
deregulation and mergers (Sathye, 2001, 2003).  
 
In the case of China, there are not many studies using DEA or other techniques to 
evaluate the efficiencies of Chinese banks.  Li et al., (2001) used financial ratios 
analysis to evaluate bank efficiency and profitability of the Chinese banks in 1996 
and 1997. Some of the financial ratios used include return on equity (ROE), return 
on assets (ROA), net interest margin, net non-interest margin, net profit margin, 
asset utilization and earning spread. The study found that the low profitability of 
the state-owned commercial banks resulted from their higher ratio for non-interest 
expenses and lower interest margin (that is, ratio of interest income to total assets) 
than joint-equity banks. This lowered the banks’ ROE and ROA even though their 
assets were utilized more efficiently and they had higher financial leverage. In 
general, the Chinese banks generated lower returns with higher financial risks 
compared to banks elsewhere, such as those in the West. There were, however, 
some difficulties encountered in assessing bank performance. These included the 
lack of information on bank performance by lines of business and at the regional 
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levels, and there was no detailed information on the quality of investment and 
loan portfolios. In addition, Yue (1992) believes that the changing nature of the 
banking industry makes evaluation criteria such as “profits, liquidity, asset 
quality, attitude toward risk, and management strategies” (pp. 31) even more 
difficult. This therefore increases the need for more flexible alternative forms of 
financial analysis, such as the DEA technique.        
 
Studies using the DEA technique to evaluate the efficiencies of the local Chinese 
banks include those of Zhao et al.’s, (2001) who found the efficiency levels of 
state-owned banks to be low, and Zhao’s (2000) who reiterated that the overall 
technical and allocative efficiencies were not as low as we expected them to be. A 
recent study by Chen et al., (2005) examined the cost, technical and allocative 
efficiency of 43 banks over the period 1993 to 2000, using the DEA technique. 
These included the state-owned banks, regional joint-equity banks and investment 
banks. The objective of the study was to examine whether bank efficiency of the 
major banks had improved with the implementation of the deregulation program 
in 1995. The results indicated that the performance of the banks appeared to have 
improved especially early in the deregulated period. The large state-owned banks 
and smaller banks were also more efficient than medium-sized banks, and that 
technical efficiency consistently dominated the allocative efficiency of these 
Chinese banks. As data on the input costs for the Chinese banks are not readily 
available and unreliable, the applicability of both Zhao’s (2000) and Chen et al.’s, 
(2005) DEA studies are therefore being questioned. Unlike both these authors, 
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this study focuses on both the pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency of a 
sample of Chinese banks.  
 
3.3  DEA methodology 
 
The DEA represents a mathematical programming methodology that can be 
applied to compute the “relative” efficiency of a variety of institutions in 
transforming inputs into outputs in relation to its peer group in the industry. The 
model was initially developed by Charnes et al. (1978) based on the concept of 
technical efficiency of Farrel (1957). It was further developed by Banker et al. 
(1984), Färe et al. (1985), and Byrnes et al. (1987).The DEA technique solves 
linear programming problems to “fit” non-statistical or non-parametric ”best-
practice frontiers” by “enveloping” the observed data of homogenous decision-
making units (DMUs). Sherman and Gold (1985) were the first to apply the DEA 
technique to the banking industry (Molyneux et al., 1996). 
 
Charnes et al.’s (1978) CCR (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes) model assumes that a 
constant returns-to-scale (CRS) technology exists. DEA compares the mix and 
volume of output and the inputs or resources used by each bank with all the other 
banks in the sample. The relatively “most efficient” banks become the “efficient 
frontier”, which is generated when a mathematical algorithm is used to calculate 
the efficiency score for each bank. The degree of the inefficiencies of the other 
banks relative to the “efficient frontier” are then determined. These relatively 
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“most efficient” banks are rated to have an efficiency score of one, while the less 
efficient banks score between zero and one. The efficiency scores are only 
relevant to the sample that is being studied. A change in the sample, such as the 
inclusion of new banks, or change in the inputs and/or outputs, will result in the 
calculation of new efficiency scores. Therefore the results of efficiency of a 
certain sample are not comparable to the results of different samples.  
 
Charnes et al.’s (1978) CCR input orientation model tries to answer to what extent 
the quantity of input could be reduced, without altering the quantity of output 
produced, for the bank to be considered efficient. The initial objective is to build a 
convex linear frontier by “enveloping” the observed data in the input-output space 
in which case there is no way to produce more output with the same inputs or to 
produce the same output with fewer inputs. The diagram in Figure 3.1 shows an 
example.  
 
Suppose that each bank (A, B, C, D and E) uses two inputs (x1, x2) to produce the 
output y and the coordinates of the diagram represents the quantities of inputs in 
relation to the level of output. Each point illustrates the combination of the two 
inputs required by each bank to produce the same output. The derived “efficient 
frontier” is made up of convex combinations of the points A, B, C and D (that is, 
representing banks A, B, C and D, respectively) that are considered efficient. Point 
E (that is, Bank E) is considered inefficient because it is away from the frontier – 
there is a point E′ situated between the points B and C inside the frontier that can 
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produce the same output using less inputs than E. The ratio OE′/OE measures the 
technical efficiency of E and it means the proportion of OE that is really needed 




Figure 3.1:  Piece-wise Linear Convex Unit Isoquant (adapted from Coelli et 
al., 1998, pp.143) 
 
According to Charnes et al. (1978), the measure of efficiency used by the DEA is 
the ratio between the weighted sum of the outputs (also termed as “virtual” 
outputs) and the weighted sum of the inputs (also termed as “virtual” inputs), 
subject to the condition that similar ratios for each bank are not bigger than one. 
The term “virtual” is used for both outputs and inputs as both their respective 
weights1 have yet to be determined. These “weights” in DEA are derived from the 
data instead of being fixed in advance. The mathematical formulation of the 
(relative) efficiency measure for a bank in a group of banks would be as follows:  
                                                 
1 They differ from customary weightings (eg. as in index number constructions) 
so sometimes the term “multiplier” is used to distinguish DEA from other 
commonly used approaches. 
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Suppose N DMUs (banks) that can transform I inputs into J outputs. Consider also 
that I can be bigger, smaller or equal to J, subject to the restriction that the 
output/input ratios of all the banks are smaller or equal to one. Let y jn and xin 
denote the jth output and ith input of the nth bank, respectively. The CCR model 
measures the maximum efficiency, e, of each bank, such as for Bank B (that is, eB, 
where B ranges over 1, 2, …., N), by solving the fractional programming 
objective function specified in the following equation.   
                          J               I 
Maximize eB  = ∑ujB y jB / ∑ viB xiB                                                                        (1)        
                          j=1          i=1    
 
subject to:  
 
 J            I 
∑uj y jn / ∑ vi xin ≤ 1,        n = 1, …., N                                                                                                             
j=1        i=1    
 
uj, vi ≥ 0,         i = 1, …I; j=1, ….J        
 
where ujB is the weight placed on jth output and viB is the weight placed on the ith 
input of Bank B.  The output weights uj and input weights vi are parameters to be 
estimated.   
Equation (1) allows the generation of positive weights that maximize the 
output/input ratio of each bank in relation to other banks, and hence providing the 
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efficiency score for each bank. The objective is to assign the highest possible 
value to eB by comparing the observed outputs and inputs of all the banks such 
that none of the banks has an efficiency score greater than 1. This feature 
conforms to the economic assumption that the nature of production is such that 
the output(s) cannot be more than the input(s). If the efficiency score reaches the 
maximum value of one, Bank B satisfies the necessary condition to be DEA 
efficient; otherwise, it is DEA inefficient.   
The linear fractional programming model above can be transformed into a linear 
programming model when the denominator of the objective function is equal to 
one:  
                         J 
Maximize eB = ∑ujB y jB                                                                                         (2)        






∑ viB xiB   = 12,                                                                          







                                                 
2As a fractional number is invariant under multiplication of both numerator and 
denominator by the same nonzero number, we set the denominator of the 
objective function in equation (1) to 1, move it to a constraint as done in equation 
(2) and maximize the numerator, resulting in the linear program.  
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J              I 
∑uj y jn – ∑ vi xin ≤ 03,        n = 1, …., N                                                                                                           
j=1         i=1    
 
uj, vi ≥ 0,         i = 1, …I; j=1, ….J                                                                                           
 
A complete DEA solution would require one such linear program to be solved for 
each bank, yielding N different (ujn, vin) weight sets.  
The problem with the original model is that its use is appropriate only when used 
in an optimum scale (Coelli, 1996). However, a bank may not be functioning in 
the desired optimum scale due to imperfect competition or financial restrictions. 
Therefore the use of a constant returns-to-scale technology operating in a non-
optimum scale may lead to measures of technical efficiency being confused with 
measures of scale efficiency. Banker et al.‘s (1984) BCC (Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper) or variable returns-to-scale (VRS) model includes the concept of variable 
returns-to-scale to the original model, that is, the BCC model supposes that the 
evaluated banks present variable returns-to-scale. This allows the calculation of 
technical efficiency without the effects of scale efficiency. This paper adopts the 
                                                 
3 Under the nonzero assumption of u and v > 0, the denominator of the constraint 
of the fractional program is positive for every n, and hence obtain    
J               I 
∑uj y jn  – ∑ vi xin ≤ 0,  by multiplying both sides of                                                                                       
j=1         i=1    
 
J            I 
∑uj y jn / ∑ vi xin ≤ 1, by the denominator.        




VRS model as China’s banking sector is not fully developed and hence perfect 
competition is unlikely.        
The BCC’s variable returns-to-scale model modifies the original CCR’s constant 
returns-to-scale model by adding a new restriction ϋ4 that represents the variable 
returns-to-scale. This means that when differentiated returns to scale are assumed 
throughout the frontier, the model allows the efficiency to vary according to the 
scale of production. As ϋ is not subject to the restriction of positive values, it can 
assume values smaller than zero:   
                         J 
Maximize eB = ∑ujB y jB – ϋ                                                                                  (3)                                     
                         j=1            
such as  
 
 I 




J               I 
∑uj y jn – ∑ vi xin – ϋ  ≤ 0,        n = 1, …., N                                                                                                    
j=1         i=1    
 




                                                 
4 It is also known as the “convexity” constraint.    
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Assuming that (xB,yB ) is on the “efficient frontier”, the following conditions 
identify the situation for returns to scale at this point5, 
 
(i)   Increasing returns-to-scale prevails at (xB,yB ) if and only if ϋ < 0  
(ii)  Decreasing returns-to-scale prevails at (xB,yB ) if and only if  ϋ > 0 
(iii) Constant returns-to-scale prevails at (xB,yB ) if and only if ϋ = 0 
 
Finally, in investigating the sources of inefficiency that a bank or any other DMU 
might have, Cooper et al. (2000) make comparisons of the (input-oriented) CCR 
and BCC efficiency scores. The CCR model assumes the constant returns-to-scale 
production possibility set. As such, the radial expansion and reduction of all 
observed banks and their nonnegative combinations are possible. In addition there 
is no account of any scale effect. Therefore the CCR score is called global 
technical efficiency (“TE”). The BCC model, on the other hand, assumes the 
convex combinations of the observed banks as the production possibility set, and 
the BCC score is called local pure technical efficiency (“PTE”), under variable 
returns-to-scale. A bank with full BCC efficiency but a low CCR score is said to 
be operating locally efficiently but not globally efficiently due to the scale size of 
the bank. As illustrated later, it is reasonable to characterize the scale efficiency of 
a bank by the ratio of the two scores.           
 
                                                 
5 For inefficient banks, we identify returns-to-scale with the projected point on the 
efficient frontier, such as point E' in Figure 3.1.  
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Therefore, based on the CCR and BCC efficiency scores, we define scale 
efficiency of Bank B as follows: 
  
SEB = eB (CCR)/ eB (BCC)                                                                                     (4) 
 
where eB (CCR) and eB (BCC) refer to the efficiency scores derived from the CCR 
and BCC models, respectively. The relationship shown in equation (4) therefore 
demonstrates a decomposition of efficiency as:   
                  
Technical Efficiency (TE) 
 = Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) X Scale Efficiency (SE)                              (5)  
 
It also depicts the sources of inefficiency, that is, whether it is caused by 
inefficient operations (PTE) or by the disadvantageous conditions displayed by 
the scale efficiency (SE) or both. Figure 3.2 illustrates a single input and single 
output scenario. For the BCC-efficient Bank A with increasing returns-to-scale, its 
scale efficiency is given by  
 
SEA = eA (CCR)  = LM/LA < 1, 
 
Here Bank A is operating locally efficiently (PTE = 1) and its overall inefficiency 
(TE) is caused by the scale inefficiency (SE) expressed by LM/LA.      
 105
For Bank B and Bank C, their scale efficiency is one, that is, they are operating at 
the most productive scale size (where both banks are fully efficient in both the 
CCR and BCC scores). For the BCC-inefficient Bank E, we have  
 
SEE = [PQ/PE]  X   [PE/PR] = PQ/PR, 
 
which is equal to the scale efficiency of the input-oriented BCC projection R. The 
decomposition of efficiencies for Bank E is  
 
TEE       = PTEE X SEE     or  
PQ/PE = [PR/PE] X [PQ/PR] 
 
This means that Bank E’s overall inefficiency is caused by its inefficient 
operations and at the same time by the disadvantageous conditions it faces.   
 
The next section illustrates the analysis of the relative efficiency of a sample of 
Chinese banks using the DEA input-oriented approach and under the assumption 
of variable-returns-to-scale, in 2002. With the aid of a software application 
generator, DEA-Solver (Cooper et al., 2000), the technical efficiency (“TE”), pure 
technical efficiency (“PTE “) and the scale efficiency (“SE”) scores of each bank 
are derived. Their returns-to-scale situations are also identified.  






















Figure 3.2: Pure Technical and Scale Efficiency (Cooper et al., 2000, pp.137) 
 
3.4  Data Analysis  
 
This section discusses the intermediation approach taken in evaluating the relative 
efficiency of the Chinese sample banks, based on the selected input and output 
variables. As academics have diverse views on whether customer deposits should 
be included as an input, this study adopts two intermediation models, that is, 
where customer deposits is selected as an input variable in Model A, and as an 
output variable in Model B. An attempt is made to analyze if the two models offer 






3.4.1  The sample banks  
 
As highlighted in Section 1.3 of CHAPTER ONE, “Banking reforms: policy 
changes, implementation issues and implications”, China’s “Comprehensive 
Banking System” consist of the central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), 
three policy banks 6 , the four state-owned commercial banks, nation-wide 
commercial banks, regional commercial banks, city commercial banks and the 
non-banking financial institutions. The non-banking financial institutions include 
trust and investment companies, insurance companies, finance companies, 
financial leasing companies, securities companies, rural credit cooperatives and 
the urban credit cooperatives. The study focuses only on the commercial banks, 
that is, the state-owned commercial banks, nation-wide banks, regional banks and 
the city commercial banks. There are some differences in the organizational 
structure and the sectors they service. Within the banking segment, though, they 
compete for the same customer set and provide almost similar product and service 
offerings.    
 
While the banks in the four banking segments have similar commercial 
inclinations, they differ in size, ownerships, locations and target customers. The 
state-owned commercial banks are China’s pillar banks that account for 54 per 
cent of the banking sector’s total assets at the end of September 2004 (China 
                                                 
6 These are the Agricultural Development Bank, the Export and Import Bank of 
China, and the State Development Bank which was later renamed as China 
Development Bank. 
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Knowledge Press Private Limited, 2005). In 1979, the Agricultural Bank of 
China, the Bank of China, and the China Construction Bank 7  re-established 
themselves as specialized banks, as they were during the pre-reform period. The 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China was established on January 1984 and 
took over the central bank’s general banking businesses. The Agricultural Bank of 
China provided loans to the agricultural and rural sectors, the Bank of China 
focused on international businesses, the China Construction Bank provided the 
financing for construction and infrastructural projects and, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China served the industrial and commercial sectors. By 
1994, these banks were allowed to have overlapped customer bases, across the 
four niche markets, and served by hundreds of thousands of branches across the 
country. In 1995 they operated a total of about 158,000 offices but this was 
reduced to about less than two-thirds the size by the end of 2002 (Lardy, 2004). 
The state-owned commercial banks’ main customers are mainly the huge national 
state-owned enterprises.  
 
Other national commercial banks or nation-wide banks and regional banks were 
established to meet the increased financing demand, in particular, from the 
smaller state-owned enterprises and private small-and-medium enterprises. These 
banks are the second tier of China’s banking system that are legally organized as 
shareholding companies. They were created in “two waves: 1987-88 and 1992-
95” (Lardy, 2004, pp. 99). Unlike the state-owned commercial banks which are 
                                                 
7 Previously known as the People’s Construction Bank of China. 
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wholly state-owned, they have a large number of owners. Most of these owners 
are government entities, with two exceptions. Non-government entities control 70 
per cent and 72 per cent of the China Minsheng Bank and the regional Shenzhen 
Development Bank (Lardy, 2004), respectively. The other banks’ dominant share 
owners are the government entities.  
 
These joint-stock commercial banks are smaller in terms of assets size when 
compared to the state-owned commercial banks. They account for about 14.6 per 
cent of all banks’ assets at the end of September 2004 (China Knowledge Press 
Private Limited, 2005). Unlike the nation-wide banks, the regional banks operate 
within certain geographical areas and thus have less opportunity to diversify their 
investments. They have close ties with the state-owned enterprises and 
governments in the regions where they are located, such as Shenzhen in southern 
China, and Shanghai and Fuzhou in the east. They are thus involved in financing 
many of the projects initiated by the state-owned enterprises and local 
governments in these regions.    
 
Lastly, the city commercial banks form the third tier of the banking system. They 
were established in 1990s through the merger of individual urban credit 
cooperatives. As of the end of August 2004, there were 112 city commercial 
banks (China Knowledge Press Private Limited, 2005). Local governments exert 
great influence over these banks and have majority ownership in many of them. 
Non-government entities have only 30-40 percent ownership of these banks 
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(Lardy, 2004). Some foreign institutions have a minority stake in some of these 
banks, such as the Bank of Shanghai. The city commercial banks form the 
smallest banking segment in terms of assets size and income. By the end of 
September 2004, they accounted for only 5.2 per cent of all bank assets (China 
Knowledge Press Private Limited, 2005). Their business scope is limited to the 
city where they were founded. They serve mainly the small-and-medium 
enterprises, in the private sector, in particular.  
 
The thesis focuses only on these domestic commercial banks. Many of these 
banks provide basic banking services, such as deposit-taking, lending, and 
payment and clearance. Other more sophisticated and higher value-added product 
and service offerings, such as cash management, treasury services, securities 
clearance, credit cards, and housing mortgages, are beginning to be offered by 
some large banks, such as the state-owned banks and nation-wide banks. 
However, their volumes remain small. Overall, the lack of technical and 
managerial expertise, financial innovations, technology-driven banking industry 
infrastructure, such as a well-established consumer credit information system, has 
impeded the rapid expansion of new products and service offerings.  
 
This study will examine the operational efficiency of the domestic commercial 
banks in 2002. The banks’ data for the year 2002 reflect the financial intermediary 
status of the banks in recent times. Based on data availability and data 
completeness, the study has the necessary information on some of China’s largest 
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banks based on total assets, that is, 28 major banks. They consist of four state-
owned commercial banks, five nation-wide banks, four regional banks, and 15 
city commercial banks.8 These banks are segmented according to function rather 
than size (such as by total assets or net income) although their categorization 
somewhat strongly coincides with their size, except for a few banks. A few 
regional banks, that is, the China Merchants Bank and the Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank, are as big as the nation-wide banks such as the China 
International Trust & Investment Corporation Industrial Bank and the China 
Everbright Bank. The sample banks’ financial information is derived from their 
annual reports and from the electronic database “Bankscope” 
(http://bankscope.bvdep.com). This is available from Bureau van Dijk. 
“Bankscope” data sources include FitchRatings, Factiva, Capital Intelligence, 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Moody’s Standard and Poor’s and FinInfo.  
 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 present some preliminary information on the asset and net 
income profiles of the sample banks (in descending order), organized by their 
respective segments. Acronyms are used to identify the banks in the diagrams, 
due to the lack of space. Table 3.1 shows the actual names of these banks. They 
                                                 
8 Data for the majority of the city commercial banks were either unavailable or 
incomplete. The 15 selected ones are major players in the marketplace and their 
input and output variables are also available and complete. The empirical study, 
however, recognizes that this small sample bias may have an impact on the 
results. On the other hand, the rule of thumb established by various authors for the 
appropriate number of banks to be tested for efficiency is that the sample should 
be larger than the product of the number of inputs and outputs or at least three 
times larger than the sum of the number of inputs and outputs. Hence the Chinese 
sample size met these requirements (section 3.4.3 on “The choice of input and 
output variables”, pp. 116-119). 
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are organized according to their total asset size (in descending order) within the 
segment. Figure 3.3 highlights the amount of total assets on the vertical axis while 
the horizontal axis identifies the four banking segments. The first segment refers 
to the state-owned commercial banks’ segment whose total assets range from 
RMB2,976,566 million (Agricultural Bank of China) to RMB4,776,773 million 
(Industrial and Commercial Bank of China). This is followed by the next three 
segments, that is, the nation-wide banks, regional banks and city commercial 
banking whose assets range from RMB178,146.5-335,162.6 million, 
RMB164,768.4-371,659.9 million, and RMB4,757.3-168,600 million, 
respectively. Figure 3.4 illustrates the net income of the sample banks. They range 
from RMB2,897-10,924 million for the four state-owned commercial banks, 
RMB271.6-1,416.3 million for the five nation-wide banks, RMB386.9-1,734.3 
million for the four regional banks and RMB12.1-800 million for the 15 city 












Table 3.1: The four banking segments and their respective banks used in the 
sample 
 
(I) State-owned commercial banks (4) 
 
(IV) City commercial banks (15) 
1. Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC) 
 
14. Bank of Shanghai (BOS) 
2. Bank of China (BOC) 
  
15. Beijing City Commercial Bank (BJCCB) 
3. China Construction Bank (CCB) 
 
16. Tianjin City Commercial Bank (TJCCB) 
4. Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 17. Hangzhou City Commercial Bank   
      (HZCCB) 
 
(II) Nation-wide banks (5) 18. Dongguan City Commercial Bank 
      (DGCCB)  
5. Bank of Communications (BOCOMM) 
 
19. Nanjing City Commercial Bank (NJCCB) 
6. China International Trust and Investment 
Corporation Industrial Bank (CITICIB) 
  
20. Xian City Commercial Bank (XCCB)  
7. China Everbright Bank (CEB) 
 
21. Dalian City Commercial Bank (DLCCB)  
8. China Minsheng Bank (CMSB) 
 
22. Wuxi City Commercial Bank (WXCCB) 
9. Hua Xia Bank (HXB) 23. Wuhan United Commercial Bank  
      (WHUCB) 
 
(III) Regional Banks (4) 
 
24. Ningbo Commercial Bank (NBCB) 
10. China Merchants Bank (CMB) 
  
25. Jinan City Commercial Bank (JNCCB) 
11. Shanghai Pudong Development Bank  
      (SPDB) 
  
26. Chongqin Commercial Bank (CQCB) 
12. Industrial Bank (IB) 27. Qingdao City Commercial Bank  
      (QDCCB) 
 
13. Shenzhen Development Bank (SZDB) 28. Zhenjiang City Commercial Bank  
      (ZNJCCB) 
 
 














Banks (according to segments)
Total assets (RMB million)
State-owned commercial banks Nation-wide banks Regional banks City commercial banks
Legend
 








Banks (according to segments)
Net income (RMB million)
State-owned commercial banks Nation-wide banks Regional banks City commercial banks
Legend
 
Figure 3.4: Net income profile of the banks 
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3.4.2 The intermediation approach 
 
There are different approaches taken in analyzing the efficiency and productivity 
of banks in the financial arena. Studies that opt for X-efficiency (which consists 
of both technical and allocative efficiencies) analyzes include those of Sathye’s 
(2001, 2003). Some authors even narrow their studies to just technical efficiency 
(that is, referring to both pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency) and these 
include works done by Rangan et al. (1988), Yue (1992), and Miller and Noulas 
(1996). Other research works differentiate their analyzes based on either taking an 
“intermediation” approach or a “production” approach. While the “production” 
approach (Sherman and Gold, 1985) highlights the role of financial intermediaries 
as “producers” of financial offerings, and utilizing resources such as labor and 
capital to create marketable product offerings such as loans and services; the 
“intermediation” approach (Yeh, 1996; Yue, 1992; Siems, 1992) examines the 
banks as financial intermediaries whose roles are to transfer funds from lenders to 
borrowers. This study adopts the “intermediation” approach.    
 
The effective use of DEA to test the quality of banks can also be demonstrated by 
analyzing their financial data through different dimensions such as in the areas of 
operational or service efficiency (Oral and Yolalan, 1990; Parkan, 1987), 
profitability (Hancock, 1989), and capital adequacy, asset utilization and liquidity 
(Yeh, 1996). This allows DEA to be used as an alternative bank management tool 
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to the traditional financial ratio analysis to provide a comprehensive assessment 
of bank operating efficiency.   
 
3.4.3  The choice of input and output variables 
 
In the empirical analyzes on bank efficiency highlighted above, there are some 
areas of concern that deserve attention in any new study. These include the choice 
of inputs and outputs used and, the sample size. The proper selection of inputs and 
outputs when using DEA to evaluate bank efficiency is important as it allows the 
management tool to provide important information about a bank’s financial status 
and management performance. Such information serves as an early-warning 
signal to the top decision-makers on the overall state of the bank’s business 
operations.  
 
The choice of inputs and outputs used by the different studies, however, depend 
on the approaches taken in DEA in analyzing bank efficiency. For many of the 
studies that focus on the “production” or “service-efficiency” approaches (Oral 
and Yolalan, 1990; Parkan, 1987), labor, capital and the number of accounts 
(commercial accounts and savings accounts) are the obvious choice for inputs 
while the number of the various transactions (general service, credit, deposit or 
foreign exchange transactions) measured in number or time serve as outputs. In 
testing for the standard “intermediation” approach, inputs such as fixed assets 
(which serve as a proxy to capital resource), interest and non-interest expenses 
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(general and administrative expenses which serve as a proxy to labor resource, 
which are typically dominated by personnel expenses) are used to intermediate 
deposits into outputs such as loans (commercial and industrial loans, consumer 
loans or real estate loans) and other earning assets. In many cases, the use of the 
proxy is necessary due to the unavailability of data, for example on employee 
numbers, across many banking samples. The critical ingredients used for 
assessing the quality of banking management usually include the number of 
employees, asset values, interest and non-interest expenses and purchased funds 
as inputs; while deposits, earning assets and interest income are used as outputs 
(Siems, 1992).     
 
Some variables are put under closer scrutiny as to whether they should be 
included as inputs, such as interest expenses, or whether they should serve as 
either inputs or outputs, such as deposits. Under the operational or service 
efficiency approach, the interest expenses are excluded as inputs as they are not 
considered expenditures “directly” generated by the bank operating process (Yeh, 
1996). While some studies assume deposits as inputs since they are another 
source of funds like non-transaction deposits, Siems’s (1992) position is that core 
deposits are an intermediary output as they are produced by the bank operations. 
For this matter, this study adopts two models, that is, one using customer deposits 
as an input variable and the other, as an output variable. In China the combined 
households and corporate savings deposits have become one of the most 
important sources of funds for the financial institutions. In fact they were 
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instrumental to the high economic growth, as high as 12.7 per cent in 1994, that 
the country experienced since it undertook economic reforms in 1979. The 
country’s domestic savings to GDP ratio rose from 34 per cent in 1981-1990 to an 
average of 40 per cent since then (Ariff and Khalid, 2005).  
 
The empirical study therefore consists of Model A which has non-interest 
expenses (general  and administrative expenses), fixed assets and customer 
deposits as inputs, and net loans (that is, taking account of non-performing loans) 
and non-interest income as outputs; and Model B has non-interest expenses and 
fixed assets as inputs, while customer deposits, net loans and non-interest income 
serve as outputs. Table 3.2 displays the summary statistics of both the input and 
output data of the sample. All variables are measured in millions of Chinese 
currency, that is, Renminbi (RMB). The table includes the means (MEAN), 
standard deviations (S.D.) and extreme values for each variable (MIN for 
minimum and MAX for maximum).  
Table 3.2: Descriptive summary statistics on the input and output data, 2002 
(RMB million)      
 




    511,999.3000 
 




   6,657.2464 
  
      13,189.0000      63.1000       47,943.0000 
Fixed assets      11,496.2786 
 
      23,729.8558      58.7000       75,236.0000 
Net loans    365,986.1107 
 
    736,802.5679 2,828.0000 2,988,755.0000 
Non-interest 
income 
   
       1,120.0300         2,639.0100       1.4000       12,136.0000 
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Lastly, there are various rules of thumb given for the appropriate number of banks 
or DMUs to be tested for efficiency using DEA. As recounted by Sathye (2001), 
Soteriou and Zenios (1998) and Dyson et al. (1998), they believe that the sample 
size should be larger than the product of the number of inputs and outputs while 
Nunamaker’s (1985) opinion is that it should be at least three times larger than the 
sum of the number of inputs and outputs. As mentioned in Section 3.4.1 on “The 
sample banks”, the Chinese sample consists of 28 major banks, and this number 
met the requirements as highlighted by the various authors. The efficiency of each 
of these banks is measured using the input-oriented “intermediation” approach 
and under the assumption of variable returns-to-scale. Using a menu-driven 
application software called “DEA-Solver” (Cooper et al., 2000), the “variable 
returns-to-scale” option generates reports on the banks’ relative technical 
efficiency ratings. The technical efficiency (“TE”) and the pure technical 
efficiency (“PTE”) scores are generated, which are then used to derive the scale 
efficiency (“SE”) scores. The “DEA-Solver” application software also identifies 
the returns-to-scale situation for each bank, that is, whether it is experiencing 
constant returns-to-scale, increasing returns-to-scale or decreasing returns-to-
scale. In addition, it highlights the percentage reductions in inputs usage that the 






3.5  Empirical results   
 
The DEA technique allows us to calculate the relative efficiency measures for the 
28 major commercial banks under two different models, where the customer 
deposits serves either as an input or an output variable, respectively. The study 
makes a comparative analysis of the empirical results of Model A and Model B 
using summary statistics, and highlights whether the main causes of the banks’ 
overall technical inefficiency are attributable to the inefficient operations of the 
banks (“pure technical inefficiency, PTE”) or by the disadvantageous conditions 
under which the banks are operating (“scale inefficiency, SE”). The analysis also 
uncovers the sources of their scale inefficiencies, that is, whether these banks are 
operating under increasing returns-to-scale or decreasing returns-to-scale, and 
relates the findings to their current business operations. Importantly, the study 
seeks to confirm if size does play an important role in the relative efficiency of 
these banks. A further attempt is made to analyze the relative efficiency of the 
banks across the four banking segments, that is, the state-owned commercial 
banks, nation-wide banks, regional banks and the city commercial banks. Of equal 
importance in this exercise is the recommendations made on what the inefficient 
banks should do to meet efficiency standards. In the concluding section of this 
chapter, the study assesses what the empirical results imply for the operation of 
the Chinese banks and for the process of deregulation of the Chinese banking 
industry.  It also notes whether the analysis of this thesis is applicable to the other 
transitional economies which are considering adopting a similar deregulation 
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approach. The detailed results of the study are included in the Appendix (pp.273-
276).   
 
3.5.1  Evaluating the efficiency of the sample of Chinese banks  
 
The following table, Table 3.3, provides summary statistics on the overall 
technical efficiency (“TE”), pure technical efficiency (“PTE”) and scale 
efficiency (“SE”) for the full sample. The table illustrates the means (MEAN), 
standard deviations (S.D.) and extreme values for each efficiency measure (MIN 
for minimum and MAX for maximum). A rating of “1” demonstrates full 
efficiency, while a score of less than “1” depicts relative inefficiency. The 
empirical results show that there are eight efficient banks using Model A’s input-
output criteria and Model B churns out only three efficient banks. 
Consequentially, Model B produces more inefficient banks than Model A. From a 
macro perspective, it is clear that all the three relative efficiency measures are 
lower for Model B compared to Model A. In other words, the inefficiencies are 
























































































The sample means under Model A and Model B are 0.8201 and 0.7311, 
respectively. This implies that the majority of these financial intermediaries could 
make significant reductions in their input usage (given output levels) and in so 
doing, significant cost savings could be achieved. It is interesting to note that 
more than one third of the sample banks are below the average technical 
efficiency level, accounting for 42.86 per cent under Model A, and 46.43 per cent 
under Model B. The Agricultural Bank of China and the China Construction Bank 
are the two state-owned commercial banks that have below average technical 
efficiency scores under both models. The Hua Xia Bank is the only nation-wide 
bank having below average technical efficiency ratings under Model A while it is 
joined by the China Everbright Bank under Model B. While none of the regional 
banks attains below average technical efficiency scores, the city commercial 
banks are the worst-faring banks with 32.14 per cent of the sample not having 
above average technical efficiency scores under both models.     
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The bulk of the overall technical inefficiency is attributable to pure technical 
inefficiency rather than scale inefficiency; as relative to the constructed frontiers, 
the average pure technical efficiency for all banks in the sample is 0.8716 and 
0.8331 under Model A and Model B, respectively. This implies that banks could, 
on average, have produced the same level of outputs with fewer resources than 
they actually employed, that is, banks could use approximately 13 per cent fewer 
resources under Model A and likewise, 17 per cent fewer resources under Model 
B.  
 
The average scale efficiency under Model A and Model B are 0.9388 and 0.8745, 
respectively; meaning that, on average, inefficiency from the minimum efficient 
scale is less than seven per cent under Model A and 13 per cent under Model B. 
On closer scrutiny, the findings reveal that under Model A, only 28.6 per cent 
(eight banks) exhibit constant returns-to-scale, as highlighted in the previous 
paragraph, meaning that the remaining 20 banks experience scale inefficiency. 
That is, roughly 71.4 per cent of all banks exhibit non-constant returns-to-scale. 
Among the scale inefficient banks, about 65 per cent of them are operating with 
increasing returns-to-scale, while 35 per cent are operating with decreasing 
returns-to-scale. On the other hand, under Model B, 89.3 per cent (25 banks) of 
these banks experience scale inefficiency and only 10.7 per cent of them (three 
banks) exhibit constant returns-to-scale. 60 per cent of the scale inefficient banks 
attain increasing returns-to-scale and the remaining 40 per cent experience 
decreasing returns-to-scale.    
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The above findings reveal that in general the sample Chinese banks’ relative 
inefficiency is largely due to poor performing cost-income ratios (such as the 
minimum pure technical efficiency ratings of 0.4881 and 0.4525 under Model A 
and Model B, respectively, should give bank management a cause for concern); 
and comparatively, to a lesser degree a lack of competitiveness among the banks 
due to the nature of the production, a broad range of product deliverables (but 
which lack product differentiation and niche markets), excessive headcount, 
branching, to name a few reasons. The Spearman’s Rank Correlation Analysis 
technique is used to assess the relationship between size (using two size 
definitions, that is, total assets and net income) and the pure technical efficiency 
and scale efficiency measures across the spectrum of sample banks. Table 3.4 
highlights the coefficients for each of the two efficiency measures against the 
values of total assets and net income. The results show that under both Model A 
and Model B, pure technical efficiency is negatively related to either total assets 
or net income, and this relationship is statistically significant at the five per cent 
level. This relationship is particularly true for the city commercial banks with size 
of total assets between RMB14,866 to RMB24,742.9 million (banks falling into 
this category include Chongqin Commercial Bank, Ningbo Commercial Bank, 
Wuhan United Commercial Bank, Wuxi City Commercial Bank, Xian City 
Commercial Bank, Nanjing City Commercial Bank, and the Dongguan City 
Commercial Bank) and, between  RMB279,300.7 and RMB371,659.9 million 
(and RMB2,976,566 million under Model B) for some of the bigger banks (such 
as the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, China Everbright Bank, China 
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Merchants Bank, and the Agricultural Bank of China). Likewise there are similar 
dips in efficiency as net income increases between RMB22.0 to RMB151.9 
million for the city commercial banks (such as the Chongqin Commercial Bank, 
Wuxi City Commercial Bank, Ningbo Commercial Bank, Wuhan United 
Commercial Bank, Xian City Commercial Bank, and the Dongguan City 
Commercial Bank), and between RMB884.6 to RMB2,897 million for the bigger 
banks (such as the China Minsheng Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, 
China Merchants Bank, and the Agricultural Bank of China). A positive 
relationship exists between scale efficiency and both the size definitions under 
both the models. This relationship though, is statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 3.4: Spearman’s Rank Correlation Analysis  
 
Model A Model B By Size Definition  
PTE SE PTE SE 
Assets -0.6065* 0.0722 -0.5211* 0.0985 
Net Income -0.5036* 0.1992 -0.5331* 0.1511 
 
* Significant at the five per cent level 
 
The next section analyzes whether the above findings apply when the banking 
industry is categorized into four different segments; and also discusses what DEA 




3.5.2  Evaluating the efficiency of the banking segments 
 
From a micro perspective, that is, when a breakdown of efficiency across banking 
segments is done, it is clear from Table 3.5 that for either model, no bank 
category forms the most efficient segment in the Chinese banking industry. None 
of the banking segment exhibits both pure technical and scale efficiency, and 
thereby overall efficiency. Among them, the state-owned commercial banks attain 
the second lowest overall technical efficiency rating, after the city commercial 














































0.8488 0.1082 0.7320 1.0000 0.7796 0.1489 0.6060 1.0000
PTE 
 
0.9805 0.0332 0.9220 1.0000 0.9018 0.1015 0.7668 1.0000
SE 
 
0.8649 0.0985 0.7320 1.0000 0.8584 0.0825 0.7903 1.0000
 




0.8927 0.1019 0.7373 1.0000 0.8255 0.1342 0.6664 1.0000
PTE 
 
0.9126 0.1000 0.7378 1.0000 0.8725 0.1265 0.6704 1.0000
SE 
 
0.9783 0.0265 0.9438 1.0000 0.9456 0.0509 0.8818 1.0000
 
(III) Regional banks 
TE 
 
0.9182 0.0548 0.8653 1.0000 0.7993 0.0424 0.7433 0.8614
PTE 
 
0.9264 0.0529 0.8699 1.0000 0.8350 0.0529 0.7654 0.9100
SE 
 
0.9910 0.0100 0.9800 1.0000 0.9579 0.0100 0.9465 0.9711
 




0.7620 0.1830 0.4289 1.0000 0.6685 0.1982 0.3740 1.0000
PTE 
 
0.8143 0.1694 0.4881 1.0000 0.8011 0.1959 0.4525 1.0000
SE 
 
0.9315 0.0624 0.8102 1.0000 0.8329 0.1077 0.5292 1.0000
 
Although these large banks attain a higher pure technical efficiency rating than 
the other segments, they are nevertheless not at full efficiency. This inefficiency 
could be a manifestation of or, it is accentuated by the banking problems they are 
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facing in their business operations, such as their weak financial fundamentals, that 
is, having low profitability levels. The root causes of the latter include poor asset 
quality and inadequate capitalization, the need to continue to fulfil fiscal roles, the 
ballooning growth of non-performing loans (Lardy, 1999; Lau, 1999) and high 
fiscal costs involved in cleaning them up 9, the strong influence of provincial 
governments on the banks’ lending and the overall lack of competitiveness of 
these banks. The banks find themselves caught in the middle of conflicting 
pressures from the government. On the one hand, they are supposed to clean up 
their balance sheets and stop making poor quality loans, as they prepare to list 
their stocks on both domestic and foreign exchanges. On the other hand, they 
must preserve jobs by propping up unprofitable state-owned enterprises which 
employ and provide housing and welfare benefits to tens of millions of the 
population. Until an appropriate and workable social safety net is firmly in place, 
the shut-downs of these enterprises would be disastrous for a big country like 
China, and therefore, for the state-owned commercial banks to abruptly stop 
financing them would result in potentially serious social problems as massive 
unemployment and social unrests would be the likely outcomes. 
 
Obviously these pillar banks need to improve the cost structure of their business 
operations to stay competitive such as continuing to close branches which are not 
economically viable, and cutting surplus staff. These banks each has more than 
                                                 
9The Goldman Sachs Group Inc. estimated the banks’ clean-up could cost the 
government USD373 billion (Business Times, 16th December 2002. Singapore 
Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore).   
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100,000 employees and tens of thousands of branches. Like the state sector they 
have nurtured, the banks' development has been driven more by job creation 
rather than profit, such that by the end of 2002, the China Construction Bank has 
been an employer to 306,809 staff at 21,608 branches while the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China has a headcount of 405,000 at 22,105 branches.10 In 
the next section, I highlight the percentage reduction in input usage recommended 
by DEA, such as in personnel expenses and branches, for the inefficient state-
owned commercial banks to attain full efficiency (see Table 3.6). 
 
The state-owned commercial banks’ overall inefficiency is attributable to scale 
inefficiency rather than pure technical inefficiency. Many of these banks face 
issues relating to operations management, the use of technology, human resources 
management (in the areas of skills development in product knowledge and 
promotion, and customer relationship management), and the lack of competitive 
product offerings. The sources of scale inefficiency cannot be ignored as under 
both models three of the state-owned commercial banks experience decreasing 
returns-to-scale, with the Bank of China being the exception. The state-owned 
commercial banks’ decisions on reinvestment of profits to expand their scale of 
production are under the control of the Ministry of Finance (Chen and Shih, 2004). 
This would have an impact on their efficiency levels. Among the four of them, the 
relatively fully efficient Bank of China is likely to be the one making the furthest 
                                                 
10 http://bankscope.bvdep.com 
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leap into the new post-WTO economy.11 It embraces changes to its organizational 
structure and demonstrates willingness to change in response to the oncoming 
competition. It also benefits tremendously from its international subsidiary in 
Hong Kong, in many areas, such as skills transfer in human resource management, 
use of the latest technology-driven banking software applications (for both front-
office and back-office) and the implementation of customer-driven marketing and 
sales techniques.  
 
Unlike the state-owned commercial banks, the technical inefficiency of the other 
three bank segments is mainly due to pure technical inefficiency rather than scale 
inefficiency. Under Model A, the nation-wide banks demonstrate having higher 
average technical efficiency at 0.8927 compared to the state-owned commercial 
banks and city commercial banks, but lower than the regional banks’ mean 
technical efficiency score of 0.9182. However, under Model B, this segment 
attains the highest overall average technical efficiency rating amongst all the bank 
categories, that is, at 0.8255. Although this segment of five banks exhibits the 
second highest scale efficiency ratings (after the regional banks’ segment), only 
two banks, Bank of Communications and the China International Trust and 
Investment Corporation Industrial Bank, experience constant returns-to-scale 
under Model A, and only Bank of Communications under Model B. The only 
                                                 
11 The Bank of China was listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in early 2006. 
Its initial public offering (with the deal valued at USD92.4 billion) was the 
world’s largest by a financial institution. The proceeds from the deal will be used 
to build its capital base and expand its business .(Straits Times, 25th May, 2006, 
Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore)     
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bank that encounters increasing returns-to-scale under both models is the Hua Xia 
Bank, the smallest nation-wide bank based on size of total assets and the second 
smallest based on net income. The other “bigger” medium-sized banks, the China 
Everbright Bank and China Minsheng Bank, and China International Trust and 
Investment Corporation Industrial Bank under Model B, experience decreasing 
returns-to-scale.  
 
The regional banks experience the highest and second highest relative technical 
efficiency level under Model A (at 0.9182) and Model B (at 0.7993), respectively. 
In addition, among all the banking segments, they attain the highest average scale 
efficiency scores and the source of scale inefficiency for many of these banks 
(two under Model A and all four under Model B), however, appear to be due to 
decreasing returns-to-scale. The Shenzhen Development Bank is the only 
technically efficient bank in this banking category.  
 
Unlike the state-owned commercial banks whose risk is ultimately borne by the 
state12, the joint-stock nation-wide and regional banks’ risk is ultimately borne by 
the shareholders. The revenue growths, and thereby efficiency levels, of these 
banks have been restricted by conditions such as geographical locations, limited 
business scope (such as traditional deposits, loans and settlements), limited scale 
of operations (due to lack of funding) and corporate governance issues (as the 
demarcation of responsibility between the Party Committee, the Board of 
                                                 
12 This is before the overseas public listing of the China Construction Bank in 
2005.    
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Directors and the senior managers is unclear for these banks). Other challenging 
problems the joint-stock banks face include a lack of clarity in market positioning, 
and a failure to achieve differentiation from other banks (Chen and Shih, 2004). 
Some of these banks sought stock market listings in order to overcome the 
restrictions imposed by the limited scale of operations. This undertaking not only 
helps to reduce their non-performing assets and increase their capital adequacy 
ratios, it also forces the banks to respond to the requirements of the market and 
the external environment, and to be driven to perform profitably (by focusing on 
internal reorganization and reforming their current systems and mechanisms) and 
be held accountable to their shareholders. Their business dealings would then 
have to be transparent and professionally managed.   
 
While the overall technical efficiency levels are much lower for the banking 
segments under Model B than for those under Model A, this is considerably more 
so for the city commercial banks, whose average technical efficiency scores are 
below the sample average technical efficiency scores under both models. The 
situation here is that just like most of the banking segments, pure technical 
inefficiency is instrumental to the low average technical efficiency scores. The 
city commercial banks are controlled by the local government authorities as they 
have majority ownership in many of these banks. The level of operational risk is 
even higher than that of the state-owned commercial banks and the joint-stock 
nation-wide banks. Accumulation of non-performing assets has reduced the 
banks’ liquidity and the proportion of their assets which are profitable, thus 
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affecting their competitiveness. Increasing losses, low capital adequacy levels, 
and inability to pay off debts have also affected the operations of these banks 
(Deng, 2001; Song, 2002). In addition, scale inefficiency is a result of many of the 
city commercial banks experiencing increasing returns-to-scale, particularly so 
under Model B. Not surprisingly, given that they are very much smaller than the 
regional banks (with the exception of Bank of Shanghai, in terms of total assets 
and, including Beijing City Commercial Bank and Tianjin City Commercial Bank 
in terms of net income), they are characterized by increasing returns-to-scale.      
 
3.5.3  Percentage reduction in input usage recommended for the inefficient 
banks 
 
Thus far, in the previous subsections, the relative efficiency performance of the 
Chinese banks were scrutinized at both the macro and micro levels. The question 
now remains as to how the inefficient banks can achieve full efficiency or move 
to the “efficient frontier”. As highlighted earlier, the DEA input orientation 
model, using the “DEA-Solver” application software, is able to calculate the 
percentage reductions in inputs usage that the identified inefficient banks must 
make in order for them to move to the “efficient frontier”. Table 3.6 illustrates the 
percentage reductions in the input usage recommended for the inefficient banks in 
the sample (by banking segments). Model A has non-interest expenses, fixed 
assets and customer deposits as inputs while Model B works with non-interest 
expenses and fixed assets only.         
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Under Model A, the relatively inefficient state-owned commercial banks included 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and the 
Agricultural Bank of China. While the DEA identifies that the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China has only to make a 9.90 per cent reduction in all the 
three input areas, the China Construction Bank and Agricultural Bank of China 
have to make between 23.78 per cent and 28.92 per cent reductions in their input 
usage. Under Model B, the reductions required are more significant for these 
banks, that is, between 17.72 per cent and 57.66 per cent. 
 
The results reaffirm that the China Construction Bank and Agricultural Bank of 
China require closer management supervision. Under Model B, the China 
Construction Bank needs to make a 31.06 per cent reduction in non-interest 
expenses and 41.62 per cent reduction in fixed assets to achieve full efficiency. 
Likewise the Agricultural Bank of China needs to make a 39.40 per cent reduction 
in non-interest expenses and 57.66 per cent reduction in fixed assets. The non-
interest expenses refer mainly to the high personnel expenses incurred due to the 
excess headcount at the hundreds of thousands of branches across the country.  
 
The inefficient nation-wide banks identified in Table 3.6 are the China Everbright 
Bank, China Minsheng Bank, Hua Xia Bank, and the China International Trust 
and Investment Corporation Industrial Bank.  The China Everbright Bank needs 
to reduce all its inputs by 17.69 per cent under Model A and 29.35 per cent under 
Model B. As for the China Minsheng Bank, it needs to reduce its three input 
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usage areas by 9.67 per cent under Model A, while it requires a bigger reduction 
in non-interest expenses (at 20.87 per cent) and fixed assets (at 23.70 per cent) 
under Model B. The results also show that in order to attain full efficiency, the 
Hua Xia Bank needs to cut down all its inputs usage by 26.27 per cent and by a 
third of total usage under Model A and Model B, respectively. The China 
International Trust and Investment Corporation Industrial Bank has to reduce its 
non-interest expenses by 3.67 per cent and its fixed assets by a higher percentage, 
that is, 22.03 per cent, under Model B.  
 
As for the regional banks, the DEA technique recommends that under Model A, 
only the China Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, and the 
Industrial Bank need to reduce their input usage by amounts ranging from 6.26 
per cent to 13.47 per cent. On the other hand, all the four banks in the sample 
need to implement bigger input reductions under Model B, ranging from 13.86 
per cent of non-interest expenses incurred by the Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank, to 42.77 per cent of fixed assets usage by the Industrial Bank. 
 
Eleven city commercial banks have been identified as inefficient under Model A 
with recommendations for input usage reductions ranging from 9.59 per cent (for 
Bank of Shanghai) to as high as 64.55 per cent (for Wuhan United Commercial 
Bank). An additional three banks were included under Model B, with the 
recommended percentage of input reductions ranging from 1.66 per cent (for 
Bank of Shanghai) to 77.18 per cent (for Wuhan United Commercial Bank). An 
 136
example of a city-based bank that needs to make significant input reductions so as 
to achieve overall technical efficiency is the Dongguan City Commercial Bank. It 
has to make a 61.13 per cent reduction in non-interest expenses, 61.47 per cent 
reduction in fixed assets and a 57.11 per cent reduction in customer deposits 
under Model A. Under Model B, the Dongguan City Commercial Bank has to 
make a 62.60 per cent and 70.64 per cent reductions in non-interest expenses and 
fixed assets, respectively.  
 
It is visible that amongst all the four banking segments, many of the city 
commercial banks are highly inefficient as noted by the higher percentages of 
input reductions recommended by the DEA technique. Nevertheless there is a 
need for each of the inefficient bank to engage in costs cutting, improving 
productivity through improved human resource management and use of 
technology, and overhauling many of the existing operational systems. These 
operational systems include credit and risk assessments, liquidity management, 
and asset and liability management. The central bank introduced strict controls 
which required the four state-owned commercial banks to achieve capital 
adequacy ratios of 8 per cent in 2002 (Chen and Shih, 2004). The results given by 
the non-parametric technique for the four banking segments are useful not only 
for improving all the banks’ current operations but also for their future strategic 
growth planning endeavors. 
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The next section concludes and discusses what the empirical results imply for the 
operation of the Chinese banks, particularly in a post-WTO era where the banking 














































Table 3.6: Percentage reduction in input usage recommended for inefficient 


































                                  
(I) State-owned commercial banks  
 
ICBC  9.90 9.90 9.90 
 
ICBC  17.72 22.34 
CCB  
 
23.78 28.92 23.78 CCB 31.06 41.62 
ABC 
  
26.80 26.80 26.80 ABC  39.40 57.66 
 




17.69 17.69 CEB 29.35 29.35 
CMSB 9.67 
 
9.67 9.67 CMSB 20.87 23.70 
HXB 26.27 
 
26.27 26.27 HXB 33.36 33.36 
  
 
  CITICIB 3.67 22.03 
 
(III) Regional banks  
 
CMB  13.01 
 
13.01 13.01 CMB 19.15 19.15 
SPDB 6.26 
 
6.26 6.26 SPDB 13.86 26.72 
IB 13.47 
 
13.47 13.47 IB 25.67 42.77 
  
 
  SZDB 21.59 21.59 
 
Source: Results are generated by the “DEA-Solver” application software (Cooper 
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9.59 20.96 BOS 1.66 1.66 
TJCCB 46.37 
 
52.54 46.37 TJCCB 50.12 63.57 
HZCCB 45.10 
 
16.74 16.74 HZCCB 41.35 12.35 
DGCCB 61.13 
 
61.47 57.11 DGCCB 62.60 70.64 
NJCCB  51.64 
 
37.73 37.73 NJCCB 48.53 48.53 
XCCB 38.39 
 
38.39 38.39 XCCB 53.06 61.74 
WXCCB 31.09 
 
31.09 31.09 DLCCB 13.47 43.27 
WHUCB 43.01 
 
64.55 39.77 WXCCB 29.48 55.77 
NBCB 25.09 
 
28.74 25.09 WHUCB 51.63 77.18 
CQCB 38.31 
 
36.10 36.10 NBCB 36.39 49.18 
ZNJCCB 30.52 
 
18.98 18.98 JNCCB 20.84 70.39 
    CQCB 50.27 
 
50.46 
    QDCCB 19.51 
 
21.06 




Source: Results are generated by the “DEA-Solver” application software (Cooper 








3.6  Conclusion   
 
The empirical exercise, using the DEA technique, allows the identification of both 
the “relatively” efficient and inefficient banks among a sample of Chinese banks 
in 2002. Using the “intermediation” approach, an assessment of the relative 
technical efficiency of these banks were made under two different models where 
the customer deposits serves either as an input or an output variable, respectively. 
The empirical results provide a good insight to the performance of the Chinese 
banks both at the sample and banking segment levels. The DEA results reflect the 
differences in the Chinese managerial ability to control costs. Its 
recommendations on improving efficiency levels by cutting input usage can allow 
management to revisit the way resources are currently utilized, and the DEA 
results can also enable higher bank executive management to better plan for their 
organizations’ future. They also have implications on the banks’ strategic 
planning and the deregulation of China’s banking industry.     
 
At the sample level, the two models offer similar conclusions that the bulk of its 
inefficiency is attributable to pure technical inefficiency rather than scale 
inefficiency. Using two size definitions, that is, total assets and net income, the 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation Analysis test shows that pure technical efficiency is 
negatively related to either total assets or net income, and that this relationship is 
statistically significant at the five per cent level. In contrast a positive relationship 
exists between scale efficiency and both the size definitions. This relationship, 
however, is statistically insignificant. 
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The DEA empirical test uncovers that across four organizational forms, for either 
model, no bank category forms the most efficient segment in the Chinese banking 
industry. Unlike the other banking segments, the state-owned commercial banks’ 
overall inefficiency is attributable to scale inefficiency rather than pure technical 
inefficiency, with three of them experiencing decreasing returns-to-scale. The 
regional banks fare relatively well among the segments, attaining the highest 
average relative technical efficiency level under Model A, while the nation-wide 
banks demonstrate a similar performance under Model B. The city commercial 
banks-segment, on the other hand, is the worst-faring segment whose average 
technical efficiency scores are way below the sample average technical efficiency 
scores under both models. Lastly, the study highlights the recommendations made 
to all the inefficient banks to implement percentage reductions of their various 
input usage areas so as to attain full efficiency or move to the “efficient frontier”.  
 
As the Chinese authorities continue to deregulate the banking industry, primarily 
to fulfil the requirements laid out by the WTO for membership acceptance, the 
empirical results affirming the overall relative inefficiency of the domestic 
financial intermediaries should make both the bank executive management and 
relevant government authorities further implement serious drastic measures to 
improve their efficiency levels. With deregulation, the domestic banks need to 
handle a number of challenges that the new landscape brings. These include 
intense competition from foreign players and reduced profitability and market 
shares. Thus it is even more necessary for the banks to become more efficient as 
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they compete for the same customer base with the foreign banks. When the 
Chinese banks become more efficient, we might expect improved profitability, 
greater amounts of funds intermediated, better prices and service quality for 
consumers. This would also ensure greater soundness of the banking system, and 
avoiding any government bailouts if substantial losses are sustained, as currently 
experienced by many of the Chinese banks.      
 
While there is an urgent need for the banks to further engage in costs cutting, 
improving productivity in human resource management, using better technology, 
and overhauling many of the existing operational systems (such as in credit and 
risk assessments, liquidity management, asset and liability management, and 
capital adequacy management), they would also have to create innovative and 
quality products and services and cannot compete head-on with the foreign banks 
just on “plain vanilla” businesses of taking deposits and making loans. Some of 
the banks also need to recognize that they cannot compete on their own anymore 
based on their financial strength and existing customer base. There is thus an 
urgency to cooperate with others either through organizational mergers (such as 
the merging of some of the inefficient banks highlighted in this study, so as to 
enjoy greater economies of scale), acquisitions or implementing partnership 
programs. The relevant authorities should provide the support and encouragement 
to make such necessary set-ups possible.  
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The empirical analysis of Chinese banks' performance, however, is restricted by 
the reliability of the data. Assessing the financial status of the Chinese banks has 
proven to be difficult due to questionable accounting standards, inconsistent 
accounting practices, and poor disclosure. Although Chinese law and regulations 
call for a certain standard of financial reporting by banks and set the accepted 
accounting procedures to be employed, in details of implementation, however, 
these regulations and procedures have so much flexibility in interpretation. Thus 
this has an impact on the soundness of the conclusions we draw from the data. An 
example relates to the accrual of interest income. 13 The banks have officially 
committed to international standards of shortening the accrual period to 90 days in 
2002, which means that when interest on a loan remains unpaid for three months, 
it has to be backed out of the lender’s income statement (Lardy, 2004). In practice 
it is not easy to confirm that the banks have not counted interest due on loans as 
income even if they went unpaid for a longer period.    
 
Another issue relates to the banks’ non-performing loans, that is, in the way they 
are being accounted for. In China, the overdue loans (defined as loans that have 
not been repaid six months after the contracted maturity dates) are not considered 
non-performing (Feng, 1999). According to international practice, loans overdue 
for three months are considered as non-performing (Mo, 1999). The non-
                                                 
13  Before 1998, the central bank, that is the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
allowed banks to count interest due on loans as income even if it went unpaid for 
as long as three years. The accrual period was shortened from two years to one in 
1998, to 180 days in 2000 and to 90 days in 2002, which is the international 
standard.  
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performing loans are included in the analysis, under the variable “Net Loans”. 
The inclusion does not have a major effect on the measurement of efficiency as 
the official amounts are low, except for the four pillar state-owned commercial 
banks. The exact amount of the non-performing loans in the books of the state-
owned commercial banks, however, is far from transparent. Private-sector 
economists have disagreed with the amounts reported. The non-performing loans 
were underestimated using China’s accounting systems. The pillar banks had a 
combined RMB1.8 trillion of bad loans or 26 per cent of the total loans of 
RMB6.8 trillion as of end October 200114, and by the end of 2003, the bad loans 
amounted to RMB1.9 trillion (Barnett, 2004; China Knowledge Press, 2005). 
These amounts are expected to be much greater than what has been officially 
recognized as the country gradually adopts the international standards for banking 
supervision, as required by the Basel Committee.15  
 
In addition, as mentioned in Section 3.4.1 on the “The sample banks”, many of 
these banks are effectively controlled by government bodies or by enterprises and 
organizations that are themselves government controlled. This would have 
implications on the decision-making process of the senior bank executives as their 
                                                 
14 Straits Times, 4th December 2001. “WTO puts China at risk of major financial 
crisis.” Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.  
15 For a long time, the country employed an outdated four-category system of loan 
classification, consisting of “performing, overdue, idle and bad loans” (Paulson 
and Hu, 2003, pp. 51). In recent years, China has made important steps towards 
the recognition of non-performing loans by introducing a new, risk-based, five-
category classification system that is closer to the international standard. Still, 
monitoring changes in non-performing loans over time prove to be difficult as 
there was no effort made to use the new criterion consistently to re-grade loan 
books going back for several years (ibid, pp. 51).   
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livelihood and positions rest with the government. There is a lack of business 
empowerment among the executives in making major decisions involving human 
resource management (such as the shedding of personnel expenses), operations 
(such as reducing the number of branches), investments (such as avoiding high-
risk ventures) and loan-making (such as reducing loans to loss-making ventures 
by state-owned enterprises). These would definitely have implications on the 
efficiency levels of all the banks.             
 
In conclusion, despite the issues described above, the efficiency studies can be 
further applied to analyzing the branch efficiency of bank segments at specific 
locations, such as those along the eastern and southern parts of China where 
economic activity is vibrant compared to other parts of the country. Over time, a 
study can be done to analyze the effects of the level of sophistication of product 
and service offerings, and legal environment on the efficiency of the domestic 
banks. A comparison of the efficiency levels can also be made between the 
banking (including the rural credit cooperatives and foreign banks) and non-
banking industries in the financial sector. Non-banking entities include those in 
insurance, finance and leasing. Lastly, the analysis of this study is applicable to 
the other transitional economies which are considering adopting a similar 
deregulation approach, and hence making the measurement of the efficiency of 




A paradigm shift for China’s central banking system 
 
4.1 Introduction and motivation  
 
The chapter focuses on the administrative and operational structure of the Chinese 
central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), with the author’s advocating the 
central bank’s full independence as the main thrust of the chapter.1 I attempt to 
analyze if the PBC is indeed an independent institution as promulgated by the 
“Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China” 
(henceforth “Law of the PBC”), and describe how some of the manifestations of a 
truly independent PBC can overcome the impediments that it currently faces. A 
conscious effort is made to highlight the legal structure of the monetary system 
with the objective of illuminating its shortcomings and, in particular, the illusion 
of independence that the central bank law gives.  
 
I recognize that the problems the PBC faces do not just lie with the central bank 
financing bankrupted enterprises, local governments ignoring the monetary 
directives of the PBC, or the latter having to fulfill fiscal obligations. The 
fundamental problem lies with the relationship between the government, at both 
                                                 
1 An extract of this piece of political economic analysis has been jointly published 
in the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics (Fall 2004, Volume 27, Number 1) 
and was presented at the 8th Annual Harvard East Asia Society Graduate Students’ 
Conference held at the Harvard University, 4-6th March, 2005. 
 147
the central and local levels, and the Chinese Communist Party. The government is 
entrenched with party politics involving party coalitions and communist elites 
representing various interest groups. They play important roles in influencing 
policy changes in China’s economic transitional process.  
 
The infiltration of party politics of the one-party state has challenged the 
relationships between the PBC and the other players, such as the banking system, 
the local governments, and the state-owned enterprises. The pervasive stronghold 
that the party has over the PBC negates the many efforts made in changing the 
rules of operation for effective central bank management, which, I believe, are 
only cosmetic in nature. This poses the biggest bottleneck to the PBC’s 
performance as a genuine central banker. There is little doubt that the PBC is not 
totally independent. But probably few central banks are. I acknowledge that the 
PBC has gained operational independence rather than complete independence. 
 
I therefore conclude that the crucial ingredient to effective central banking is true 
independence, whether politically, legally, or financially. I note that even the 
promulgation of the “Law of the PBC” does not guarantee giving the PBC 
“autonomy” or “discretionary autonomy” due to party interferences. I advocate 
that the PBC needs to undergo a paradigm shift in order to succeed in effective 
central bank management so as to serve its roles well as a monetary policy 
manager as well as a financial regulator and supervisor, and in particular to handle 
the needs of the “new” monetary and financial environment in a post-WTO 
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China.2 However, I would like to qualify that some conditions need to be fulfilled 
in order for the PBC to make a successful paradigm shift. Of paramount 
importance is the fundamental issue on the entrenchment of party politics in the 
workings of the PBC. I endorse nonparty intervention in the workings of the PBC 
and all other government institutions as well, such as the Ministry of Finance, 
where party sentiments often juxtapose the policy-making decisions of these 
institutions with that of the central bank’s for vested interests. All these conditions 
may be easier said than done. Ultimately, it requires the will and clout of the 
upper echelons to push the recommended resolutions through, and these do not 
work effectively if there is still a lack of transparency in governance and 
disclosure. Therefore, the legal system and enforcement agencies need to be well 
developed to handle the checks and balances of “nonconformists,” which also 
include the local governments and financial institutions. Otherwise, the PBC may 
buckle under the weight of a complex and challenging post-WTO China 
environment where there will be increased monetization and financial depth.  
 
The next section gives a literature review on central banking while Section 4.3 
examines the dynamics in the effectiveness of the PBC’s monetary policies since 
reforms took place in 1979. In Section 4.4, I pose the question “Is the PBC an 
independent central bank?” and display its lack of clout in monetary policy 
management by highlighting several examples while in Section 4.5, I strongly 
advocate that the PBC undergo a paradigm shift in central bank management and 
                                                 
2 China became a member of the WTO on 11th December, 2001.  
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believe that the basic ingredient it needs is true independence. Section 4.6 
concludes.  
 
4.2 Literature review 
 
The considerable interest in central banking is evidenced by the amount of 
discussions and literature by the academia, and the public and private sectors, in 
particular whether the central bank should be an independent entity (Friedman, 
1962; Toniolo, 1998; Shull, 1995-1996). This “independent” characteristic of the 
central bank would have implications on its conduct of monetary policy 
(Bernanke and Mishkin, 1992; Alesina and Summers, 1993), accountability 
(Rymes, 1995-1996), relationships with other government agencies (such as the 
Treasury or Ministry of Finance) as well as the administrative and executive arms 
of the government machinery (Holtfrerich, 1988) and the macroeconomy at large.  
 
Advocates of central bank independence speak volumes on its correlation with 
price stability and the necessary disengagement of the incumbent government in 
mixing monetary policy with its political endeavor, such as promoting easy credit 
policies “when elections are in view” (Shull, 1995-1996, pp. 212) and financing 
budget deficits; while those who disagree (such as the Monetarists) hype on the 
central bank’s bias towards certain segments of the constituencies, in particular 
the banking community (Levy, 1995-1996), its activities being shrouded in 
secrecy (Havrilesky, 1995) and its focus on price stability “regardless of the 
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central government’s policy, is much less acceptable” (Carvalho, 1995-1996, pp. 
166). 
 
As the central bank of a country in transition, the PBC can perhaps take a leaf 
from the rich experiences of central banks worldwide, and put them to good use in 
its implementation of central banking. Although the PBC has made noticeable 
progress to restructure its organization, operations and management (Almanac of 
China’s Finance and Banking, 1999), its daily management affairs still invite 
much criticism. Some studies have attempted to study the workings of the PBC. 
However, most fall short on details and critique. Tokley and Ravn (1997) give a 
historical background of the PBC’s existence; Dipchand et al. (1994) draw up a 
“scorecard” for the PBC in its central banking role; Xu (1998) highlights the issue 
of its independence and monetary policy’s objectives; Lardy (1998b) extends the 
discussion further into areas of policy banking, banking supervision and 
prudential regulation; Cai (1999) recounts the major problems that the PBC 
encounters in financial supervision; Lou (2001) calls for its independence and 
autonomy and describes how the organizational restructuring at the end of 1998 
would help to facilitate more efficient bank regulation and supervision; White and 
Bowles (1996) advocate “autonomy” or “discretionary autonomy” for the central 
bank rather than “independence” as the latter would raise serious problems of 
political accountability if it implies “total insulation” (ibid, pp. 172); and Godeaux 
(1991), Volcker (1991) and Sergeant (1999) share some of the salient features of 
their countries’ central bank management for possible emulation by the Chinese 
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counterpart, although as Sergeant (1999) agrees that these countries are “at 
different stages of economic development; their financial sectors differ in 
structure and composition; and there is a different balance in public and private 
involvement” (ibid, pp. 183). However as China moves towards a market-based 
economy, I believe that there may be some elements of the other countries’ 
approach that may be relevant to China in spite of the differences between them.  
 
I wish to create an awareness of the workings and legal structure of China’s 
central banking and underscore the need for an independent PBC to steer the 
macroeconomy ahead as the country marches on aggressively in its banking 
reforms program, which is hastened by its eventual accession to the WTO in 
December 2001. I discuss the significance of central bank’s influence and 
autonomy and how independence can enhance the PBC’s capacity to perform its 
central banking functions. In so doing I endeavor to address some probing 
questions. Is independence necessary? What is the basis and nature of the PBC’s 
independence and what are the likely effects on the macroeconomy? Has the 
“Law of the PBC” granted the PBC sufficient independence to carry out its 
duties? Does the PBC possess decisional autonomy? I review some criticisms of 
the PBC’s behavior and performance, related to its independence trait or rather, 
lack of it. I ask what can be radically recommended for China’s central banking 
system. What does it take for the PBC to enjoy the full manifestations of true 
independence? The answers to these questions would definitely assist the PBC in 
making a successful paradigm shift from its current “controlled” role as a central 
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banker to one that would one day be managing one of the world’s largest reserve 
currencies and banking system, and be recognized as a regional and international 
“heavyweight” in monetary affairs.                 
 
4.3 Monetary policy management   
 
This section examines the dynamics in the effectiveness of the PBC’s monetary 
policies since reforms took place in 1979. The Chinese economy has undergone 
periods of mild to serious inflationary and deflationary pressures. There were two 
episodes of high inflation which exceeded 10 per cent. These occurred in 1988-
1989 and 1993-1995 (Woo, 2003). In 1988 the retail price index (RPI) rose by 
18.5 per cent and the consumer price index (CPI) rose by 18.8 per cent. In the first 
half of 1993, the RPI and CPI increased by 13.2 per cent and 14.7 per cent, 
respectively. Beginning in 1995, the inflation started to decline such that 
compared to 1996, the RPI rose by only 0.8 per cent in 1997 and the CPI by only 
2.8 per cent (Dong, 2003). Meanwhile the growth rate of GDP declined from 9.6 
per cent in 1996 to 8.8 per cent in 1997, 7.8 per cent in 1998, 7.1 per cent in 1999 
before it rose to 8.0 per cent in 2000, 8.3 per cent in 2002, 9.3 per cent in 2003 
and 9.5 per cent in 2004 (Asian Development Outlook, 2005). The PBC has 
experimented with both direct and indirect controls to manage money supply 
during these inflationary and deflationary periods, although the appropriateness 
and quality of the usage were questionable. New monetary policy instruments 
such as the required reserve ratio and interest rates were experimented upon and 
used to control, at least partially, the money supply and credit condition. However 
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their roles have been dwarfed by direct measurements which were heavily used 
during those crisis periods such as the credit-quota plan (Lu and Yu, 1998).  
 
By setting credit limits on state-run commercial banks, the PBC would be able to 
control money supply and influence aggregate demand. But the credit-quota plan 
was a relatively inflexible monetary instrument and difficult to adjust in the face 
of changing macroeconomic situations. There were also problems in its 
implementation. These included the opportunity that decentralization created for 
collusion between local governments, enterprises and the banks which facilitated 
the occurrence of leakages and diversion of funds, the deteriorating inter-agency 
coordination, and the declining coverage of the credit-quota plan due to the rapid 
pace of financial broadening and the growth of financial assets outside the formal 
banking system. It thus became progressively difficult to enforce and was 
abolished at the end of 1997. This gave way to asset-liability management and the 
indirect monetary policy instruments, such as the required reserve ratio, interest 
rates, central bank’s lending policy, rediscount policy and open market 
operations, thus became relevant as the country’s central banking system evolved.  
 
The required reserve ratio proved to be an important tool for monetary policy. The 
1992 Southern China’s trip by the late Chinese economic reformer Deng Xiao-
Ping triggered an acceleration in economic growth, whereby banks took the 
opportunity to withdraw “surplus reserves from the central bank and invested 
them in a range of ventures while the central government regulators looked the 
other way” (Naughton, 1993, pp. 232, line 15). Such ventures included 
 154
speculation in land and capital markets. The annual increase in loans outstanding 
relative to GDP rose from about 12.5 per cent in 1989 to a peak of 19 per cent in 
1993, causing unacceptably high levels of inflation and growing accumulation of 
risks in the banking system (Lardy, 2004). The PBC instituted a more restrictive 
monetary policy where the required reserve ratio was capped at 13 per cent (the 
same rate it had been since 1988 (Guo, 2002)) and as inflation fell to 6 per cent in 
1997, the ratio was adjusted to 8 per cent in 1998, and later to 6 per cent in 
November 1999 (People’s Bank of China, 1999).     
 
Although the use of the required reserve ratio had demonstrated its significant role 
on the performance of the macroeconomy, there were some reservations on its 
effectiveness. Many of the banks and the non-bank financial institutions started to 
find alternative ways to circumvent it. As happened in earlier periods, if the 
required reserve ratio was increased, the individual bank branches could find 
another avenue to obtain more funds, such as from within their own bank 
hierarchy, increase utilization of the money market (that is, through inter-bank 
borrowing), reduce their excess reserves, or increase loans from the central bank 
(Holz, 1992).  
 
Central bank lending or policy lending is another key instrument used to control 
money supply. Its implementation, however, had sent mixed signals. It had helped 
contribute to the inflationary pressures, and it had also helped to get the economy 
on its feet again. The overheating situation in the first half of 1993 was also fueled 
by policy lending to banks and other financial institutions to fulfill local 
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governments’ aggressive drive to increase their fixed asset investments. These 
investments increased by 61.8 per cent during that time (Dong, 2003). However, 
as deflationary pressures loomed since the beginning of 1995, the PBC’s lending 
to financial institutions was instrumental in improving these institutions’ liquidity 
and the economy in general. The PBC has been using this tool in a timely and 
controlled fashion to resolve financial risks and ensure financial stability, 
particularly having witnessed the Asian financial crisis happening elsewhere in 
1997.   
 
The replacement of budgetary grants with loans, as promulgated by the “Law of 
the PBC” in 1995, had resulted in the PBC passing the job over to the state-owned 
commercial banks to serve the government’s fiscal needs (Dipchand et al., 1994). 
These policy loans were refinanced at subsidized interest rates (Hofman, 1998). 
The reliance of the state-owned commercial banks on the PBC for “limitless” 
funds also reflected the central bank’s lack of control in monetary base 
management via its lending policy. The “omnipresence” of the PBC laid the 
grounds for “abuses” by the state banking system. The state banks could always 
rely on the central banking system for more funds, after earlier funds were 
diverted to unintended uses, and hence accounting for the undesirable growth 
rates of base money particularly during the inflationary periods. Moreover, the 
non-recovery of loans from the state-owned commercial banks became a regular 
feature of the banking system. It was without doubt that the central bank lending 
had played an indirect role in the ballooning growth of the state-owned 
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commercial banks’ non-performing loans, which was highlighted in CHAPTER 
ONE.  
 
The interest rate is another policy instrument used by the authorities. But its 
effectiveness is questionable as it is not completely determined by market forces. 
The PBC has historically fixed all interest rates for loans and deposits offered by 
commercial banks and other financial institutions. Beginning in 1990, banks were 
given some ability to price risk when they were allowed to make working capital 
loans at rates up to 20 per cent greater than the central bank’s posted rate (Lardy, 
2004). The overheating situation in the first half of 1993 led the central bank to 
raise interest rates to control the total amount of money supply and flows of 
funds, to channel credit directly through the central government to key 
enterprises, and in particular, to prohibit bank funds from investing in real estate 
markets (Dong, 2003). In 1996 the financial institutions were allowed to set their 
own interest rates within a 30 per cent band around a base rate set by the central 
bank. The specialized banks were also given more discretion to charge different 
interest rates to different enterprises based on business criteria such as their 
“demands for credit and speed of capital turnover” (Ariff and Khalid, 2005, pp. 
82). The PBC has cut interest rates several times since price deflation became 
obvious, such as in 1998 the interest rates were cut three times to stimulate 
growth (Dong, 2003). But it was not easy for banks to make loans as firms and 
consumers were not responsive to changes in interest rates and the real interest 
rate remains high. In addition, the then Prime Minister Zhu Rongji was 
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determined to improve the balance sheets of the state banks and to promote 
restructuring in the state-owned enterprises. He had “peremptorily dismissed bank 
managers when the proportion of non-performing loans in their banks has gone 
up” (Woo, 2003, pp. 23). This therefore instilled prudent lending in the entire 
banking system.     
 
The money market includes the inter-bank lending market, the treasury bill 
market and the PBC’s discount window. The money market plays a key role in 
the central bank’s open market operations. The inter-bank lending market allows 
the financial institutions to conduct short-term borrowing. However around 1993, 
many of them treated inter-bank lending as a long-term commitment for 
investments in real estate. This caused chaos in the inter-bank lending market and 
partially contributed to the 1993 inflation (Xie, 2001). In June 1996 the PBC 
allowed the inter-bank lending rates to be decided by the financial institutions. 
This boosted the inter-bank lending market in 1996-1997 (Guo, 2002). In the 
second half of 1997, in an effort to curb speculative stock trading, the PBC 
disallowed the commercial banks to trade Treasury-bonds on stock exchanges 
(China Knowledge Press, 2005). An inter-bank bond market was then established 
for this purpose. Although Ariff and Khalid (2005) believe that it will take some 
time for it to develop to full scale to support the open market operations, the inter-
bank lending market has developed rapidly since inception. In 1999 its average 
monthly trading volume was RMB28 billion and this rose to RMB56 billion in 
 158
2000 (Xie, 2001), and more than RMB15 000 billion in 2003 (China Knowledge 
Press, 2005).  
 
In 1996, while the PBC focused on interest rate targets and the required reserve 
ratio in its conduct of monetary policy, it had to quickly abandon open market 
operations because of the immaturity of the treasury market. The treasury market 
was simply too thin and shallow. In recent years, however, it has developed 
quickly. Guo (2002) highlighted that the total assets of the participants are 95 per 
cent of the total assets of the financial institutions and this represents more 
participation than the inter-bank lending market. As the treasury market became 
more liquid by end 1999, open market operations became a serious monetary 
policy tool (Kynge, 2000). However, for it to be effective, this will require much 
greater flexibility of interest rates, which are still not market-driven. The PBC 
also uses the discount loan to support small enterprises. By the end of August 
2001, discount loans totaled RMB108.6 billion (Guo, 2002) and most of them 
went to small financial institutions.  
 
As highlighted in Section 1.4 of CHAPTER ONE, “1994-2003”, an important 
aspect of the China’s financial supervisory and regulatory management is the 
legislation of a regulatory framework governing the central bank and financial 
institutions. Banks laws such as the “Law of the PBC” and the “Commercial 
Banking Law” were thus introduced in 1995 (Tokley and Ravn, 1997; Wan, 
1999). The banks are required to observe capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios 
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and limitations to exposure to risk. Other major developments include further 
restructuring of the regulatory framework for financial institutions, and the re-
organization of the PBC which frees it from administrative interferences and 
strengthens its independence in financial supervision. Other laws are also 
promulgated such as those that guide the process of market exit for the financial 
institutions (Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 1999; Lardy, 1999; Mo, 
1999). 
 
Lastly, the most fundamental problem, which this chapter wishes to address, is the 
question of central bank independence. The PBC operates under the close 
supervision of the State Council and the Ministry of Finance. Currently it 
manifests some operational independence but lacks clout in making major policy 
decisions in monetary policy, financial supervisory and regulatory areas. 
 
4.4 Is the PBC an independent central bank? 
 
The PBC was established on 1st December 1948, as the only required state-owned 
“monobank” deemed necessary for socialism to be achieved. It adopted a fairly 
similar Soviet-style banking operations. It was the only bank in China performing 
the functions of both a central bank and one of general banking from 1949 to 
1979. It was formed through the merger of three banks – the Bank of Northern 
China, the Bank of North Sea, and the Northwest Peasant Bank (Wan, 1999). On 
17th September 1983, the PBC was ordered to perform exclusively the functions 
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of a national central bank. It was to be relieved of its duties of performing the 
functions of industrial, commercial, and savings banking businesses. The “Law of 
the PBC” was passed in 1995, putting the PBC in charge of monetary policy and 
banking supervision. It is to “independently implement monetary policies” under 
the “leadership of the State Council” (“Law of the PBC,” Article 7).3 This was a 
landmark recognition by the authorities that the rule of law or having a legal 
framework is critical in financial supervision and regulation. Moreover, the 
strengthening of the roles of the central bank was deemed necessary, particularly 
as a financial supervisor and regulator, especially after a spate of bankruptcies 
that occurred as a result of increasing non-performing loans and unhealthy 
banking practices. The functions of handling insurance and securities sectors were 
hived off into separate bodies; that is, the Insurance Supervision Commission of 
China (ISCC) and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
respectively.     
 
The journey to achieving full independence by the PBC has been thwarted with 
obstacles, some of which are “deliberately positioned.” These are demonstrated 
by its organizational structure, operational and decision-making process, and 
credibility with financial institutions and local governments and the public at 
large. Xu (1998) makes a distinction between the PBC’s independence “from 
government” and “within government”; that is, autonomy; and factually states 
that the PBC’s independence “from the government” may not be “very relevant” 
                                                 
3 Refer to Tokley and Ravn (1997) for a review of the various Articles that are 
included in the “Law of the PBC,” as highlighted in this chapter.    
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as it functions as a government organ and it is “well known” that the PBC has 
“limited autonomy or independence in both formulating and implementing 
monetary policy” (ibid, pp. 144-145). This known fact is enough to give room for 
a debate on the issue as to how “relevant” the PBC’s current setup is, as its central 
banking role increases over time with the evolving real and financial sectors. In 
my opinion, such a “time” has arrived and the PBC needs to stay “relevant,” 
especially now that China has become a member of the WTO, and is fulfilling the 
membership requirements but has yet to experience the full impact of what 
membership brings on its macroeconomy in general, and central banking in 
particular. 
 
To understand how independence can enhance the PBC’s capacity to perform its 
central banking functions, I first discuss and address the issues arising from the 
PBC’s lack of independence, and in the process, I also uncover the legal 
intricacies of the central bank. These issues are mainly related to the PBC’s lack 
of political and policy independence, and financial independence. I then seek to 
understand the fundamental problem that gives rise to these issues; that is, the 
relationship between the government and the party.   
 
4.4.1 Political and policy independence     
 
There are four areas of concern regarding the PBC’s lack of political and policy 
independence. At the highest administrative level, the issue deals with the PBC’s 
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leadership appointments and boardroom decision-making process, which have 
implications on its central banking operations. These relate to the highly 
politicized appointment process as well as the pervasive arm of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) machinery, which seemingly runs the operations at the 
central bank. The other concerns relate to the resistance at the grassroots level and 
the PBC’s role in policy lending.  
 
4.4.1.1  Leadership appointments 
 
The “Law of the PBC” abolished the board of directors, whose previous 
representation had caused many conflicts of interests that made the PBC 
vulnerable to the Ministry of Finance. The new law called for a governor to take 
over the helm, being nominated by the Premier of the State Council and approved 
by the National People’s Congress  (NPC) or its Standing Committee, and 
subjected to appointment and removal by the president of the country (“Law of 
the PBC,” Article 9). Deputy governors whose appointments and removals are 
within the powers of the Premier support the governor in his or her work (Article 
10). The provisions contained in the central bank law allow for “loopholes” in the 
hiring and firing process. There are no specifications on the type of desired 
qualifications and terms of service for both the governor and deputy governors, 
and this gives way to strong hints on the political background and the CCP’s 
membership as some of the major criteria for selecting the PBC’s leadership. The 
State Council is thereby in a strong position to nominate or appoint persons who 
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are “loyal” to the government and easily dismiss nonconformists when necessary. 
Further, the office-bearers may give in under pressures from the government on 
monetary matters, as they are afraid of losing their positions and powers. Also, the 
absence of explicit restrictions on central bank officials after they leave office 
makes them susceptible to “private” incentives and political influence during their 
tenure with the PBC (Lou, 2001). 
 
4.4.1.2 Boardroom decision-making process 
 
The PBC was separated from the Ministry of Finance in 1984, and took on a 
status and role equivalent to a ministerial organization (“Law of the PBC,” Article 
2). While the “Law of the PBC” states clearly that the central bank shall 
“independently implement monetary policies” (Article 7), it operates under the 
“leadership of the State Council” (Article 7) and needs to seek “the State Council 
for approval prior to implementation” (Article 5). By simply not reporting to a 
finance minister or some other minister demonstrates the legal independence of 
the PBC, which will influence its standing and prestige within the government 
apparatus. However, before the official demise of the annual credit-quota plan at 
the end of 1997 (Lu and Yu, 1999), the PBC seemed to work in subordination to 
other central agencies, such as the State Planning Commission (SPC), as an 
instrument in carrying out the direct monetary policy tool.  
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Although it is to “independently implement monetary policies” (“Law of the 
PBC,” Article 7) through the establishment of the Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC) (Article 11), the latter’s role has been said to be undermined by another 
vehicle of the government, the 15-member Central Financial Work Committee 
(CFWC), a CCP cell that possesses the real decision-making power behind the 
policies advocated (Gilley and Murphy, 2001). The CFWC’s very existence and 
clout (such as setting interest rates, closing down banks, deciding the amount of 
loans the state-owned commercial banks should give to loss-making state-owned 
enterprises to prevent layoffs and social unrests) makes the PBC a hollow 
institution. This simply highlights the party’s desire to maintain full control. The 
12-member MPC comprises ministerial officials, regulators, and economists 
“whose functions, compositions, and duties shall be prescribed by the State 
Council” (Article 11). It was created as an establishment within the PBC and was 
understood to play a similar role as the United States of America’s Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC). In fact, it plays only a “consultative” role (Article 
11) and is not a policy-making institution. These provisions on the creation of the 
MPC obviously indicate that there are problems with the PBC institutional 
structure under the central banking law. It also demonstrates the permeating 






4.4.1.3 Resistance at the grassroots level  
 
The PBC faces the dilemma of reducing administrative intervention by local 
governments and relying on them to organize the implementation of monetary 
policy and the realization of macroeconomic goals and objectives. It exercises 
centralized and unified leadership and control over its branches (Article 12). 
However, being “free from any intervention by local governments or government 
departments at all levels, by public organizations or individuals” (Article 7) 
proves not to be so. The PBC faces challenges and resistance from the local 
leadership and financial institutions. The latter ignored directives on the dangers 
of excess credit (Dipchand et al., 1994) and it faces circumventions in many 
situations (Holz, 1992; Naughton, 1993). Its branches’ lending decisions are being 
put under the unduly influence of the local governments (Lardy, 1998b; Lu and 
Yu, 1999; Mo, 1999) to fund their pet projects or entities that they have with local 
businessmen. The PBC branch staff faces conflicts between monitoring the 
implementation of monetary policy directives by the local governments and 
branches of state banks, and keeping their “iron rice-bowl”; that is, their jobs, 
housing, medical, and other welfare benefits, as these are provided by the local 
governments. Such scenarios have hurt the image of the PBC and hence its 
credibility as a central bank.  
 
It would not have been an easy task to rein in the substantial powers of the local 
governments, financial institutions, and enterprises since the time that 
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administrative and economic decentralization (Chen, 1995) was endorsed by the 
central government as part of the reform process. The reorganization of the PBC 
in November 1998 (Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 1999) was 
intended, among other reasons, to reduce administrative intervention by the 
localities, thereby increasing the PBC’s power in pursuing monetary policies and 
financial supervision. Previously, the regional branches were established in 
parallel with the setup of the 31 administrative divisions. The new organizational 
structure involves the establishment of transprovincial branches in nine major 
regions, and supported by 20 financial supervisory offices. It is somewhat similar 
to the structure of the United States of America’s Federal Reserve System (FRS) 
although I admit, unreservedly, that the FRS is not totally faultless. Like each 
Federal Reserve district, which covers a number of states, each transprovincial 
branch covers a number of provinces under its jurisdiction. Being the regional 
arms of the PBC, they performed defined central bank functions in their 
respective regions (People’s Bank of China, 1999). However, I question the 
impact that the new structure has on monetary policy management as party 
politics, such as those involving the CFWC, continue to undermine the influence 







4.4.1.4 Role in policy lending 
 
Article 3 of the “Law of the PBC” clearly states that the aim of monetary policy is 
“to maintain the stability of the value of currency” and “thereby promote 
economic growth.” However, issues arise as these two principle objectives are 
always in conflict, as there are other aims that monetary policy is targeted to 
achieve. Xu (1998) notes that the government managed to make the PBC 
subordinate to its development tasks and high growth policy. As it was before the 
promulgation of the “Law of the PBC” in 1995, the conflict between these two 
objectives accounted for the macroeconomic instabilities in the periods from late 
1984 to 1985, from late 1987 to early 1989, and in the first half of 1993 while the 
country embarked on its modernization program. The conflict was exacerbated as 
the objective of promoting growth brought about demands for financial resources 
from both the central and local governments for various “top priority” 
developmental projects.  
 
When the PBC was instituted as a central bank in September 1983, and was 
supposed to gain “autonomy,” moving away from fiscal responsibilities to 
monetary ones, policy lending was still mainly skewed toward government 
priority projects. Fiscal authorities through budgetary appropriations should 
normally support these requests for funds. There was also no law to limit the 
government’s discretionary access to the PBC’s coffers to offset its budget 
deficits. While the PBC had to support both fiscal and industrial policies, it went 
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“overboard” in fulfilling its obligations and the dissemination of funds. As 
illustrated in Table 4.1, between 1991 and 1996, the policy loans accounted for 
about a third of the total state banks’ loans. There was, however, no denial that the 
PBC was instrumental in financing the growth of the Chinese economy, as 
evident by its continuous excessive lending.  
 
Table 4.1: Policy loans (RMB billion) 
 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  
 
Policy loans total  
 
6,781.7 7,410.9 9,322.6 11,485.2 14,159.7 16,440.1
Total loans by state 
banks  
 
18,044.1 21,615.5 26,461.1 32,441.3 39,393.6 47,434.7
Proportion of policy 
loans (per cent) 
 
     37.58      34.29      35.23      35.40      35.94      34.66
                            
Source: Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1998. 
“Aggregate Trend, Financial Risk and External Shocks: Analyze s of the Current 
Chinese Macroeconomic Situation.” Jingji Yanjiu, (Economic Research), March, 




Although the PBC was finally released from lending funds to the Ministry of 
Finance for funding government deficits as promulgated in the “Law of the PBC” 
in 1995, so that the budgetary grants be replaced by loans (Dipchand et al., 1994), 
it still indirectly fulfills this request by delegating the fiscal obligations to the 
state-owned commercial banks. This not only conflicted with these banks’ 
performance-oriented business goals but also defeated the government’s purpose 
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of creating three policy banks 4 to fulfill these fiscal duties. These loans were 
refinanced at subsidized interest rates, which were usually set below the deposit 
rates of the same maturity paid to households (Hofman, 1998), and were in fact 
subsidies for loss-making state-owned enterprises disguised as or “disbursed in 
the form of bank loans” (Lau, 1999, pp. 74). 
 
The state-owned commercial banks continued to be the main sources of credit, as 
the capital market was still not well developed. The inabilities of the inefficient 
and loss-making state-owned enterprises to repay their loans have resulted in 
ballooning non-performing loans for these banks (Dornbusch and Giavazzi, 1999; 
Lardy, 1999; Lau, 1999). This has serious implications on the financial sector in 
general, and the banking industry in particular. However, to stop financing the 
state-owned enterprises would result in potentially serious social problems as 
massive unemployment would be the outcome. Hence it has been debated in 
many quarters that monetary policy accommodates the fiscal policy (Xu, 1998). 
Until the reforms in the social security system, the enterprise as well as the 
government budgetary sectors, happen on a positive note, the PBC’s 
independence is compromised when it has to support both monetary and other 
government economic policies and, in particular, the fiscal and industrial policies.  
 
 
                                                 
4  These are the Agricultural Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of 
China, and the State Development Bank which was later renamed as China 
Development Bank.  
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4.4.2 Financial independence 
 
The PBC also demonstrates a lack of financial independence. The ability of 
central banks, as practiced in the rest of the world, to keep a small fraction of the 
money they make to finance themselves, provides a certain degree of 
independence and authority (Volcker, 1991). The PBC is financially dependent on 
the State Council’s budget appropriations. The “Law of the PBC” stipulates that 
“a budget of the People’s Bank of China shall be incorporated in the central 
budget after it has been examined and verified by the financial department of the 
State Council and shall be subject to budget implementation supervision by the 
finance department of the State Council” (Article 37). Moreover, the PBC has to 
“turn over to the State Treasury the entire net profit from its income for each 
fiscal accounting year minus annual expenditures after withdrawing funds for its 
general reserve at a proportion determined by the financial department of the State 
Council” (Article 38). This financial dependency characteristic in no small way 
makes the central bank beholden to political interferences.    
 
4.4.3  The relationship between the government and the party  
 
Up to this point, I have drawn attention to the PBC’s lack of clout in monetary 
policy management by highlighting several examples including that of being a 
reluctant vehicle for funding both fiscal and budgetary needs. It also has been 
taken to task to financing the decaying state-owned enterprises to prevent 
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bankruptcies. The latter would not only have implications on unemployment and 
social unrests but also on the stronghold one-party system. The central bank has to 
participate actively in such industrial or social policies, though the literature on 
macropolicy coordination does not deal with such intervention. I realize that even 
the promulgation of the “Law of the PBC” does not guarantee giving the PBC 
“autonomy” or “discretionary autonomy.” 
 
I believe that the fundamental problem lies with the relationship between the 
government, at both the central and local levels, and the incumbent party. The 
former is deeply entrenched with party politics. These involve party coalitions and 
communist elites representing competing group and institutional interests, and 
whose responses and actions have a definite impact on policy changes in the 
country’s economic transitional process. Among the party coalitions, the 
“reformers” embrace market-oriented reforms with or without a need to change its 
basic institution and political features, whereas the “conservatives” oppose both 
market-oriented economic and political reforms for fear of losing their powers 
and privileges. Some of the conservatives, though, are “willing to improve central 
planning and control by reducing the detail and scope of plans and directives” 
(Chen, 1995, pp. 78). Their primary concern is whether market-driven reforms, 
such as in central banking, would be compatible with a “socialist” system.  
 
The question on the PBC’s autonomy, let alone independence, is not an easy 
matter to resolve, as this involves powerful forces at work, at both the center and 
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the localities, and in both the government and the enterprises. The “competing 
interests of the center and the localities” (White and Bowles, 1996, pp. 163) 
continue to generate institutional changes in the financial system, such as those in 
the central bank, making enforcement of financial discipline by the center more 
difficult. One such example is the localities’ use of non-bank financial institutions 
to evade controls exerted through the banking system. Thus the political tug-of 
war between competing groups and the interplay of such political forces at all 
levels has challenged the PBC in its role as the country’s central banker.   
 
It becomes obvious that the PBC’s authority is emasculated by party politics. 
Such infiltration of party sentiments in most, if not all, government institutions 
take over policy-making decisions, making the latter hollow institutions. It 
challenges the relationships between the PBC and the other players, such as the 
banking system, the local governments, and the enterprises. The various 
government ministries are under the control of the party, such as the party’s 
Central Financial and Economic Leading Group being put in charge of financial 
and monetary affairs, including the PBC, before 1998. The real supervisory power 
later moved to the more conservative CFWC in 1998. It is thus not uncommon 
that bureaucratic and legislative decisions have to adhere to “party’s line, 
principles and policies as well as relevant instructions and decisions of the party 
Central Committee and State Council” (Gilley and Murphy, 2001, pp. 50), many 
of which run counter to the principles of monetary policy management as 
practiced in a market-driven economy, which the PBC aspires to acquire. The 
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PBC merely serves as an administrative organ for carrying out decisions made by 
the CFWC. The fact that the latter makes no qualms about its control over the 
country’s monetary and banking policies on a day-to-day basis, with the MPC 
playing only a consultative role, gives weight to the strong party sentiments in 
monetary policy affairs.  
 
While the central bank demonstrates a forthcoming attitude toward key issues, 
such as interest rate liberalization, local currency convertibility, liberalization of 
the banking sector, or state-owned commercial banks’ banking reforms, the 
CFWC displays a relatively dissembled one. Apparently, a competitive and 
vibrant banking sector and prudent monetary policy do not rank high on its 
agenda as compared to social and political stability. Again, the main issue is the 
PBC’s lack of independence, where it is key not only in promoting monetary 
stability but also in ensuring its effectiveness and efficiency and therefore 
establishing its credibility (Xu, 1998).  
 
Indeed the pervasive stronghold of the party over the PBC poses the greatest 
bottleneck to the central bank’s performance as a genuine central banker. It 
negates the many efforts made in changing the rules of operation for effective 
central bank management, such as those as demonstrated by the “Law of the 
PBC” and the restructuring of the PBC in 1998. I therefore question the 
authenticity of these rules and believe that they provide only a cosmetic layer over 
the skin-deep party-determined policies. I believe that such changes in the rules of 
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operation of the PBC or any other government institution are of secondary 
importance, and could even be ineffective, if the relationship between the 
government and the party is not changed first.  
 
4.5  A paradigm shift for the PBC  
 
In this section, I address some areas where independence can enhance the PBC’s 
capacity to perform its central banking functions by demonstrating some of the 
manifestations of an independent PBC. However, I also recognize that some 
conditions need to be fulfilled in order for the PBC to improve its performance in 
central banking. I see a strong need for the PBC to succeed in effective central 
bank management so as to serve its roles well as a monetary policy manager as 
well as a financial regulator and supervisor. It needs to experience the progression 
to a central banker that is empowered and market-driven so as to handle the needs 
of the “new” monetary and financial environment in a post-WTO China, where 
there will be increased financial deepening brought about by the influx of new 
financial instruments and foreign financial institutions, and increased growths in 
both the domestic banking sector and financial markets. Hence, I strongly 
advocate that the PBC undergo a paradigm shift in central bank management.  
 
I believe that the most crucial ingredient the PBC needs is independence. 
Independence will allow the PBC to exercise its task as a genuine central banker, 
emulating other central banks in market economies. From my discussions in the 
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section “Is the PBC an independent central bank?” I note that even the 
promulgation of the “Law of the PBC” does not guarantee giving the central bank 
“autonomy” or “discretionary autonomy”, the latter as recommended by White 
and Bowles (1996), mainly due to interferences from party coalitions and 
communist elites representing competing group and institutional interests. 
Independence should be the foundation of the PBC’s effectiveness. Operating the 
central bank with only “Chinese characteristics” can create loopholes for the 
infiltration of party politics. A “market-driven” monetary and financial 
environment in the twenty-first century information age would not operate 
effectively under the umbrella of a party-controlled PBC. This would have 
adverse implications for the macroeconomy at large. As it is, there is the 
possibility of the PBC’s managing one of the world’s largest reserve currencies 
and banking system, and having a voice in regional and international monetary 
affairs. An independent, enabled, and empowered PBC is needed to realize this 
Chinese vision.  
 
The PBC must have the will and power to make radical changes. I address the 
question of how independence can enhance the PBC’s capacity to perform its 
central banking functions by demonstrating some of the manifestations of an 
independent PBC. This includes the MPC having a direct role in policy-making 
instead of being a vehicle for consultation to the CFWC. The PBC’s political 
independence would allow it to manage the country’s monetary and banking 
system without any interference. It would have the authority to set interest rates, 
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end “perpetual” funding to the loss-making state-owned enterprises, liquidate 
shaky and non-performing financial institutions that pose a threat to the banking 
system, and allow competition to drive the financial sector. The PBC would also 
not be directly involved in credit allocation. It would ensure that credit is not 
provided to a particular sector through the process of money creation; it should be 
provided via the budget.  
 
The PBC would demonstrate power as an independent central bank. A powerful 
PBC would also be able to push through important policy reforms needed for a 
new post-WTO banking environment. These policies include the continual 
disposal of non-performing loans of the troubled state-owned commercial banks 
to debt-salvage companies, and the flotation of the domestic banks (in particular, 
the state-owned commercial banks) to transform the banking industry into a 
competitive and independent industry. They will also serve as part of the 
development of the capital market. The “corporatization” of these banks would 
also help ensure transparencies, accountability to shareholders, profit 
management, and professional management of the state-owned commercial banks. 
 
An empowered PBC would have the ability to ensure the full compliance of its 
monetary directives by local governments and financial institutions, and hence 
money supply would be manageable and predictable. It would also prevent 
macroeconomic instabilities like those experienced in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Likewise, the PBC would see to it that the actual implementation of severe 
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penalties be imposed on local governments and financial institutions that do not 
adhere to the PBC’s regulatory and supervisory directives.  
 
However, some conditions need to be fulfilled in order for the PBC to improve its 
performance in central banking functions, as those described above. These 
conditions include that the appointments to the PBC need to be based on technical 
competence and it must be seen to be “objective and nonpartisan.” The people 
holding top management positions should not be political appointees. The PBC 
must “be close to the political process but not part of it” (Godeaux, 1991, pp. 77). 
The PBC should also exercise financial independence, reducing its reliance on 
funds from the state budget to run its operations.  
 
A powerful central bank also needs to be well informed. A lack of prior 
knowledge is making supervision of the country’s banks increasingly difficult to 
deal with. The PBC should be given access to the books of banks on a frequent 
basis within a year, just like those practiced elsewhere in market economies. 
Otherwise, the authorities would never be aware of any banking problems until it 
is too late. This has major implications, especially when dealing with the 40,000 
rural credit cooperatives (RCCs), which holds about 12 per cent of the country’s 
total deposits (Gilley and Murphy, 2001).  
 
For the PBC to demonstrate influence and autonomy, public opinion also plays an 
important role. However, to garner such public support, it has to be earned. This 
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has to be done through its demonstration of expertise, professionalism, and 
accountability. This relies on the quality of the research that is performed at the 
PBC, a high-quality professional staff and a decision-making body that has the 
ability to communicate effectively. The PBC will have to build an infrastructure 
that can attract and keep the best people with a career-based organization and a 
reasonably competitive salary structure, and provide an environment for open 
discussion of issues within the bank. Currently, the PBC is losing its best staff to 
the financial sector, which is exacerbated by the WTO-led entry of foreign 
financial institutions, with unattractive compensation as the main push factor. In 
order to regulate foreign banks, the PBC needs people who are highly skilled, 
such as in international finance and capital flows. Although the PBC runs “20 
banking universities and another 15 general finance universities to train future 
staff for the country’s financial system” (ibid., pp. 52), the quality of the staff is 
still questionable.   
 
The PBC needs to demonstrate a strong sense of accountability by being 
transparent in its doings, make public disclosure a way of life, and articulate 
policies to the rest of the government and the general public. In particular, its role 
as an independent monetary policy manager has to be articulated to the nine 
regional centers, which were created in 1998 to reduce the interferences from the 
local governments. These regions can be instrumental in providing information 
about regional developments and in communicating with the public.  
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Of paramount importance is the issue of the entrenchment of party politics in the 
workings of the PBC. Although I recognize the efforts made by the PBC in its 
1998 restructuring endeavor to improve its central banking performance with new 
rules of operation, new processes, and reorganization, these changes are, however, 
nullified by the omnipresent CFWC, which has been positioned to “counter” the 
PBC’s desire for independent central bank management. The PBC should be freed 
from the institutional grip of the party. It should not merely serve as the 
administrative organ responsible for implementing the monetary and banking 
policies as directed by the pervasive and powerful CFWC. The higher authorities 
should not only recognize that the existence of party politics within the 
government put brakes to desired market-driven economic advancement, but they 
should also act on the dichotomy between country interests and party interests. 
 
The solution does not merely involve stripping local governments of their power, 
as recommended by Wong (1992). Instead, at the highest administrative level, 
until and unless factions within the party converge to a common understanding of 
an effective market-driven and independent central bank management, and even if 
the “Law of the PBC” is further amended (such as in the pertinent areas as 
highlighted in the section “Is the PBC an independent central bank?”) to give the 
central bank more independence, the PBC will continue to experience hurdles in 
its central banking role. Likewise, at the lower government level, with the central 
government eradicating the root problem of any party interferences to the PBC 
branch operations, such issues as local governments’ unreasonable demands for 
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funds to implement their pet projects would be unheard of. While I note that the 
fulfillment of these conditions does require the will and clout of the upper 
echelons of the Chinese administration to push these resolutions through, it is also 
equally important that this is backed by a well-developed legal system that can 
ensure the enforcement of a higher standard of transparency in governance and 
disclosure. Such an undertaking would help discourage the “nonconforming” 
behaviors of the local government and financial institutions. 
 
I believe that the above observations are necessary for the PBC in making a 
successful paradigm shift from its current position. Otherwise, a post-WTO China 
environment that manifests attributes of increased monetization and financial 
depth, may prove too complex and challenging for the PBC to fulfill its roles as 
the country’s central banker. 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
This thesis recognizes the challenges faced by the PBC in its central banking 
endeavor. The objective of the reforms was to restructure the PBC from its 
“monobanking” structure to that of a central bank serving both monetary policy 
management and financial regulatory and supervisory roles. However, the PBC 
has only gained some operational independence and not complete independence 
as a central bank. Even the promulgation of the “Law of the PBC” does not 
guarantee giving the PBC “autonomy” or “discretionary autonomy.” This leads 
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me to believe that the fundamental problem lies with the entrenchment of party 
politics within the government, which compromises the sound and effective 
operations of the PBC. I conclude that any efforts made in changing the rules of 
operation for effective central bank management are only cosmetic in nature and 
of secondary importance if the relationship between the government and party is 
not changed first.  
 
Although I recognize that it is not an easy task, reining in the substantial powers 
of party politics is the desired solution, which would translate to more 
independence for the PBC. This would give the PBC considerable autonomy vis-
à-vis other ministries under the State Council and above that of local governments 
to exercise effective monetary policy management and prudential supervision of 
the financial institutions, to back down on demands to extend loans to unviable 
projects, and to ensure that any subsidies for policy lending are financed through 
the budget rather than borne by the banking system.  
 
The PBC needs to make a paradigm shift from its current inhibited and controlled 
disposition to one that calls the “shots” in all central banking decisions. As China 
progressively opens to the rest of the world, it is timely that the PBC revisits its 
roles and functions and makes a quantum leap to genuine central bank 
management, as practiced in market economies. This is a critical move, as the 
possibility of the PBC’s managing one of the world’s largest reserve currencies 
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and banking system, and having a voice in regional and international monetary 



















Confronting the new Chinese banking environment post-WTO: implications 
and strategies 
 
5.1 Introduction and literature survey  
 
The pace of events in recent years leading to China’s accession to the WTO on 
11th December 2001 would prove to refute Dipchand et al.’s (1994) opinion that 
“foreign banking in China is still a “waiting game”’’ (ibid, pp. 188). The 
significance of China’s accession to the WTO does not justify that the foreign 
banks slack behind to partake bigger pieces of the Chinese pie. The advantages of 
setting a footprint in the Chinese marketplace could be eyeballing for some. These 
include the domestic and foreign banks’, other financial institutions’ and non-
bank financial institutions’ access to the huge corporate and households savings 
(estimated combined USD1.6 trillion) 1 ; domestic and foreign invested 
enterprises’ access to loans; corporate and retail customers’ access to attractive 
savings and innovative investment vehicles; domestic financial institutions’ 
access to foreign banks’ marketing, risk assessments and operational management 
techniques; the injection of competition and increase in efficiency in the 
allocation of monetary resources; and hence propelling the growth of the financial 
sector in general and banking industry in particular, which will drive the real 
                                                 
1 Straits Times, 11th December 2001.“China in WTO: China lifts curbs on foreign 
banks in two cities.” Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.  
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sector. These would ultimately contribute to overall economic development and 
help quicken the “take-off” of the Chinese economy. 
 
There are few doubts that the foreign banks will benefit tremendously from 
China’s entry into the WTO. However, gaining a big market share is no easy feat, 
as the domestic state-owned commercial banks are formidable competitors and 
are going all out to protect their lucrative customer base with improved product 
and service offerings. In fact some of the recent innovative marketing activities of 
these banks have alarmed some of their “branded” foreign counterparts who had 
set foot in China even before the pre-communist regime period in the 1950s, such 
as the United Kingdom’s Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) 
and the Standard Chartered Bank (Standchart). 
 
In many ways, the state-owned commercial banks have a clear advantage over the 
foreign banks. By September 2003, the “big four” banks, namely the Agricultural 
Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, accounted for about 62.3 per cent of the total banking 
assets (Barnett, 2004). The foreign banks, on the other hand, accounted for 1.8 per 
cent of the total assets by the end of the October 2004 (China Knowledge Press, 
2005). However, for all the foreign banks involved, even a small share of the 
China market will have a very significant impact on revenue and profit.2  
                                                 
2 By 2006, the total amount of local and foreign currency of the foreign banks 
was USD102.5 billion, accounting for 1.9 per cent of the total assets of all the 
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There are many reasons why the Chinese government imposed restrictions on the 
foreign banks in the pre-WTO era. Dipchand et al. (1994) cite the previous 
“domineering stranglehold” (ibid, pp. 175) that foreign banks had on the local 
economy in the pre-1949 communist era and the government’s need to prevent 
this from happening again in the post-1979 economic liberalization period. Zhang 
and Zheng (1993) cite the protection of local depositors (such as by restricting 
foreign banks’ customer base and imposing a 40 per cent ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets within China), and protection of local banks from strong competition 
(such as in the foreign currency loans and the international settlement businesses) 
as two compelling reasons for the restrictions imposed on foreign banks. Such 
competition from the financially strong foreign banks would weigh down the 
domestic banks, which are already having financial woes, mainly due to their 
“social obligations” in fulfilling fiscal duties. Even then, Duncan (1995) feels that 
foreign banks are unlikely to provide real competition for the Chinese banks until 
they are allowed to compete for local currency business. Dipchand et al. (1994) 
reiterate the fears of the domestic banks in areas such as losing their “more 
capable employees to the foreign banks” (ibid, pp. 187) which offer better welfare 
benefits and higher compensation plans, and the foreign banks’ better access to 
foreign exchange since they deal with a clientele base made up of mainly joint 
ventures and foreign-funded enterprises. Reynolds (1982) concludes confidently 
that although foreign banks have great potential in the Chinese marketplace, they 
do not have any chance or “repeating their former influence” (ibid, pp. 86), and 
                                                                                                                                     
financial institutions in the banking industry (http://en.ce.cn, China Economic 
Net, 18th December 2006. “WTO accession boosts China’s banking sector.” 
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perhaps this is precisely why the need for the imposition of restrictions on the 
foreign banks. His remark that “in the future, foreign banks will, if anything, be 
exploited rather than be exploiters in the path of China’s modernization” (ibid, pp. 
86) is, however, yet to be seen.      
 
Wong and Liu (2000) in discussing “China’s progress in banking reform and 
financial liberalization”, are forthcoming that China needs to build a “modern 
financial architecture in preparation for the further opening-up of its financial 
markets” (ibid, pp. 5), which comes about with China’s accession to the WTO. 
Yong (2002) gives his insight as to the reasons for the likely decline of 
commercial banking business in China. The introduction of financial innovations 
by the foreign banks that will create investments offering lower risk and high 
returns, the access to funding in foreign markets and the use of information 
technology by companies to sell securities directly to the public will ultimately be 
the pull factors causing a decline in the Chinese commercial banking business. 
Bonin and Huang (2002) however, conclude that foreign banking plays major 
roles in institutional building in the financial sector and the development of the 
inter-bank market as an important alternative source of funds, thereby facilitating 
the liberalization of interest rates.  
      
However, many of the authors were short on specific solutions on how exactly the 
banks can improve to increase profitability levels, increase customer satisfaction 
and market shares.  Most of the recommendations, if any, were short of strategies, 
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particularly on how to handle the onslaught of the international players. A few did 
mention why and how the domestic banks, especially the state-owned commercial 
banks, need to “clean up their act” or China needs to “put its financial house in 
order” (Wong and Liu, 2000, pp. 8). This is specifically so before the foreign 
banks’ grace period is over when the corporate and retail markets are opened to 
the foreign banks, that is, two years and five years after accession respectively. 
Even in a WTO-accession scenario, the foreign banks should not “expect plain 
sailing for the Chinese business” (ibid, pp. 9), as reiterated by Wong and Liu 
(2000). The domestic banks could capitalize on the five-year grace period to 
improve their competitive positions through measures such as mergers and 
forming alliances, although the nature of how such schemes work were not 
elaborated.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to assess the implications of China’s accession to 
WTO on domestic banking, and to analyze the major strategies that the banks 
could embark on to counter the problems that impair their competitiveness in a 
post-WTO setting. It will also attempt to give a crystal ball picture of the new 
Chinese post-WTO banking environment in the immediate future. The chapter 
notes that the domestic banks need to handle a number of challenges that the new 
banking landscape brings. These include intense competition from the foreign 
players, reduced profitability and market shares and “brain drain” of business and 
critical staff. However, the new climate also offers new revenue-generating 
business opportunities that require the domestic banks to “think out of the box” to 
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close those deals. A competitive and vibrant banking marketplace should ensue. 
The chapter also notes that to handle the formidable competitors, the domestic 
financial institutions, in particular the state-owned commercial banks, should 
consider and work on six strategies. These involve capitalizing on their current 
strengths, diversifying their products and service offerings, revisiting their market 
positioning postures, overhauling their current operations, implementing merging 
or alliance strategies with both the domestic and foreign financial institutions 
alike, and seriously considering a transformation of their organizational set-ups. 
 
Finally, the new banking climate in the near term will see the floatation of the 
domestic banks, in particular the state-owned commercial banks, so as to 
transform the banking industry into a competitive and independent industry. This 
will also serve as part of the development of the capital market. We are also likely 
to see the eventual formation and nurturing of domestic integrated financial 
groups that are capable of rivaling the likes of major international players like 
Citigroup Inc. and the HSBC Holdings. However, the new banking environment 
in the post-WTO era, ultimately will still be shaped by China’s trade and 
investment liberalization and overall economic reform program. The country is 
expected to attract some USD50 billion in FDI per year after it entry into the 
WTO.3 
                                                 
3 An assessment by Supachai Panitchpakdi, WTO Director General Designate. 
Straits Times, 6th November 2001.“China seen attracting US$50b FDI/yr after 
joining WTO: Supachai.” Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore. 
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The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 highlights the analytics of 
financial liberalization, while Section 5.3 analyzes the implications of WTO’s 
accession on domestic banking. Section 5.4 reviews the strategies that the 
domestic banks should consider to counter competition and Section 5.5 gives an 
insight to the new Chinese banking environment in a post-WTO era. Section 5.6 
has some concluding remarks.   
 
5.2 Analytics of financial liberalization  
 
According to McKinnon (1989), liberalization such as in the financial arena 
“remains the only game in town as far as successful economic development is 
concerned” (ibid, pp. 53). Financial liberalization is supposed to have positive 
effects on savings, investments, financial intermediation and thus economic 
development. The notion that liberalization enhances economic efficiency is 
derived from the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics (that competitive 
markets yield Pareto optimal equilibria), which argues that competitive markets 
are “efficient” and hence that capital controls are “inefficient”, combined with the 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis which portrays financial markets as efficient 
gatherers and transmitters of information (Malkiel, 1987). 
 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) claim that a repressed financial system will 
result in savings vehicles being underdeveloped and/ or negative or unstable 
returns on savings; the inefficient allocation of savings among competing uses 
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and firms are discouraged to invest due to poor financial policies that reduce the 
returns to investment. On the other hand, liberalization on the financial sector 
from interest rate ceilings and other restrictions facilitate economic development 
and growth, as higher interest rates will lead to increased savings and a more 
efficient allocation of capital.  
            
The policy prescription of financial liberalization entails a move towards a more 
market-oriented system, which typically involves allowing the interest rates to be 
market determined (thus controls on both deposit and lending rates are abolished 
or reduced) and reducing quantitative controls to allow financial intermediaries 
greater control over the use of their liabilities (subject to certain minimum 
controls maintained for prudential supervision) (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994). 
 
An important element in the liberalization of financial markets is the admission of 
new entrants, including foreign entrants into the financial services industry 
(Claessens and Jansen, 2000). Such competition can yield straightforward 
efficiency gains and innovation in terms of improved range of services, whose 
benefits will increase over time. However, the initial scrambling to retain or gain 
market share will see banks seeking new business in unfamiliar territory whose 
risks they often underestimated (Honohan, 1999). The new liberalized climate 
often see the incumbents responding to the threat of new entry with an efficiency 
drive and restructuring, and a contestable and low-margin equilibrium, without 
rents generated by the directed credit system. With a reduced franchise value, 
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banks in particular now had little room for error. In Pakistan and Uganda (Aleem 
and Kasekende, 2001), entrants opted for a less aggressive but very profitable 
high margin-low volume strategy, allowing high-costs incumbents to stay in the 
banking business often with higher gross margins than before liberalization. In 
this new competitive financial services industry, financial intermediaries began to 
be allowed new scope for their activities, such as universal banking, and such new 
opportunities could contribute to franchise value. On the other hand, the intensity 
of competition for existing lines, brought about by the breaking-down of barriers 
to competition between different institutions and across-the-board liberalization of 
restrictions on lines-of-business, often result in lower margins than had been 
anticipated (Caprio et al., 2001).   
 
5.3 Implications of WTO’s accession on domestic banking  
 
An early confrontation with the new banking environment will help prepare the 
domestic banks to handle the competition and new regulatory climate in the next 
five to ten years. The rules of the banking game will be totally different from 
those experienced in the “sheltered” years before. Management of these rules 
requires a complete change in mindset in handling a number of challenges that the 
new banking landscape brings. These include intense competition from the 
foreign players, reduced profitability and market shares and “brain drain” of 
business and critical staff. However, the new climate also offers new revenue- 
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generating business opportunities, and adding competition and vibrancy to the 
banking marketplace.   
 
It is obvious that the Chinese banks will face intense competition not only among 
themselves as each seeks to improve on its product lines and marketing strategies, 
but also from the domestic banks that have merged their organizations to gain a 
bigger market share, and the small and medium-sized joint-stock banks will face 
threats from both large domestic banks and foreign banking giants. The current 
China-based foreign banks will reorganize themselves to capitalize on the more 
liberalized banking environment to compete against the new entrants, which 
include new domestic banks formed by non-banking conglomerates or foreign 
players who have mathematically convinced themselves that they should partake a 
slice of the potential huge profitable pie in this emerging marketplace.  
 
Profitable businesses would include the merger business, which quadrupled to 
USD31.2 billion in 2002 compared to the previous year, and fund management, 
where the total funds managed were USD10 billion between 1998 to 2000. As 
China’s capital market progressively matures, investment banking is an area that 
will become lucrative. The capital market was valued at USD560 million in 2002 
and the Chinese government allows as much as 33 per cent foreign stake initially 
in ventures to manage domestic stock and bond sales. The sale of shares was 
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about USD9 billion in 2001.4 The foreign banks are also keen to tap into China’s 
securities firms, hoping to trade A and B shares in the huge Shanghai and 
Shenzhen share markets. Both of these markets have outstripped Hong Kong’s. 
As of March 2002, the market capitalization of the Shanghai and Shenzhen’s 
share markets was a combined RMB4,371 billion compared to Hong Kong’s 
HKD3,974 billion. 5  This resulted in more foreign banks keen to seize the 
investment banking opportunities there. 
 
In this new environment, the domestic banks will experience substantial business 
taken away by the other players, in particular by banks that newly positioned 
themselves as market-driven and customer-centric. There will be an outflow of 
both consumer and corporate deposits, a traditional and “taken for granted” source 
of funds, to more attractive and new investment vehicles offered elsewhere. This 
will have an impact on the banks’ asset transformation and hence profitability 
levels. Market shares will also shrink as new competitors invade upon the 
territories of the banks’ well-protected long-term customer base. In fact some 
customers have already moved their local currency deposits to some foreign 
banks as they are perceived to be better service providers and are financially 
sound.  
 
                                                 
4 Bloomberg, 13th December 2001. “More China access for foreign investment 
banks.” Straits Times, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.   
5 Business Times, 12th March 2002. “China Forays: HSBC keen to buy into larger 
China securities firms.” Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.  
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While more competition warrants the upgrading of current skills, it will also lead 
to “brain drain” situations where critical staff is poached by other banks, and in 
particular foreign banks. Most affected will be the middle management who will 
be enticed by the higher compensation plans and skills upgrading incentives 
offered by some of the renowned international foreign banks such as the Citibank 
NA (Citibank), the HSBC and the Standchart.  
 
One the other hand, more competition would also mean that the domestic banks 
need to seek out for more new revenue-generating opportunities. They would 
have to create innovative and quality products and services and cannot compete 
head-on with the foreign banks just on the “plain vanilla” business of taking 
deposits and making loans. Some of the banks also need to recognize that they 
cannot compete on their own anymore based on their financial strength and 
existing customer base. There is thus an urgency to cooperate with others either 
through organizational mergers, acquisitions or implementing partnership 
programs. Support and encouragement should come from the relevant authorities 
to make such necessary set-ups possible.    
 
The premier four state-owned commercial banks, such as the Agricultural Bank of 
China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, will have to deal with the increasing foreign 
competition as they are still beholden to the government and are instrumental to 
sustaining the inefficient and loss-making state-owned enterprises. The low 
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quality borrowers have a tremendous impact on the banks’ financial performance, 
and are accountable for the banks’ current high non-performing loans’ situation, 
deteriorating balance sheets positions and low credit rankings from international 
investment advisory firms such as Moody’s Investors Services and Standard and 
Poor’s Corporation. The banks’ capacity to control credit quality is constrained 
and this will affect their prospective investments, and ultimately their bottom- 
lines. Besides, it does not help that the strong financial standings of the foreign 
banks will glaringly emphasize the financial weaknesses of the Chinese banks. 
The top management does not deny that the banks need to refocus themselves on 
market-based performance objectives in order to survive in this new environment. 
This will be the greatest challenge for these banks that have all along been 
government-directed and not market-directed. 
 
To be market-driven, there is a need to overhaul many of the existing operational 
systems, such as in credit and risk assessments, liquidity management, asset and 
liability management, and capital adequacy management. In other words, the 
banks need to go back to basic banking management techniques, as practiced in a 
market economy. Perhaps the greatest change management needed is the 
organizational culture, which involves a radical change in mindset, a paradigm 
shift from the archaic self-centered ways of doing things to morally ethical and 




5.4 Strategies to counter competition  
 
To handle the formidable competitors, the domestic financial institutions, in 
particular the state-owned commercial banks should consider and work on six 
strategies. These involve capitalizing on their current strengths, diversifying their 
products and service offerings, revisiting their market positioning postures, 
overhauling their current operations and making necessary repairs through a 
thorough restructuring exercise, implementing a merger and acquisition (M&A) 
strategy and an alliance strategy with both the domestic and foreign financial 
institutions, and finally, seriously consider a transformation of their organizational 
set-ups. 
 
5.4.1 Capitalize on current strengths 
 
The domestic banks, in particular the state-owned commercial banks, already 
have advantages to start with. They should fully capitalize on their current 
strengths. They are very familiar with the nature of their markets, having the 
support and first-hand knowledge about their existing customer base, and have 
created formidable brand loyalty and well-established “guanxi” relationships with 
both key corporate customers and government bodies. The branch networks are 
established and well-positioned geographically across the country, particularly in 
major cities, serving their respective customer base, and this should enable the 
state-owned commercial banks maintain their status as “banker of choice” based 
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on service and accessibility. They are also the “financier of choice” in fulfilling 
their fiscal obligations, having to finance the state-owned enterprises and 
government infrastructural projects. 
 
The state-owned commercial banks have access to funding from the traditional 
deposit-sources, and the inter-bank market. The foreign banks can only take local 
currency deposits from the corporations two years after the WTO accession, and 
from the local citizens after another three years. This time factor advantage should 
give the domestic banks some leverage as they pursue activities to counter the 
competition. The domestic banks need to strategize on ways to build upon their 
current strengths. Importantly they need to protect their customer base and market 
shares, increase revenue by adding new innovative product lines, carve out niches, 
improve on their delivery channels, being more aggressive in their marketing 
techniques in the areas of demand generation and account management, 
demonstrate higher customer-driven service and increase the use of technology to 
facilitate better business performance.  
 
5.4.2  Diversify product and service offerings 
 
The limited range of products and services provided by the domestic banks fails 
to reflect the Chinese customers’ needs and wants, such as for medium to long- 
term investment purposes. An example would be the short-term deposit-taking 
being currently the only investment vehicle for majority of their retail customers. 
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The banks need to create new customer-driven products and strengthen current 
core products in areas of their greatest comparative advantage.  
 
In retail banking, the deposits-gathering business is the most lucrative for the 
domestic banks as investors lack other “safe” investment alternatives. The USD 
1.6 trillion deposits held by the businesses and individuals, and currently residing 
with the domestic banks proves to be a strong pull for foreign banks to join in the 
competition, as they cannot ignore the potential in this market. The domestic 
banks need to react constructively with attractive products and services to protect 
their viable deposits business before the foreign banks have full access to retail 
banking in five years, upon China’s entry into the WTO. In fact some of the 
domestic banks, in particular the state-owned commercial banks, have been 
proactive in increasing their market share in recent years through introducing the 
automated-teller-machine (ATM) network. The banks make use of a government-
run “Golden Card” 6  system, which is an inter-bank, inter-regional payments 
system based on smartcard and ATM technology. This involves the installation of 
multi-bank ATM networks in major cities built around a common electronic 
clearing and settlement network. The implementation allows banks to offer 
combined ATM and debit cards linked to deposit accounts and helps to improve 
the clearing of withdrawals or funds transfers between accounts.  
    
                                                 
6  Jitong, a Ministry of Electronics Industry subsidiary was responsible for 
building the “Golden Card” system.  
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The current consumer explosion also provides excellent opportunities for banks to 
increase the number of consumer credit products to meet the customers’ 
aspirations and needs. The rising disposable incomes and favorable government 
policies in recent years have helped moved consumers away from traditional bank 
savings to spending on big items such as real estate, private vehicles, travel, 
insurance and securities. Technology has added new consumer wants such as 
computers and mobile phones. The Housing Reform program announced in 1998 
has also helped propelled a consumer-driven residential market. The government 
is instilling the notion that housing is now an individual’s responsibility and not 
the employer’s, in particular the state-owned enterprises being the largest 
employers in this transitional economy. This is also part of the government’s 
efforts to restructure the state-owned enterprises by reducing their liabilities.  
 
Therefore the retail products and services in line with these new consumer needs 
would include housing mortgage and automobile financing, renovation loans, hire 
purchases, personal loans, provision of credit cards, internet-banking and foreign 
exchange services. The more enterprising banks such as the China Construction 
Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China have already moved into 
fee-based businesses like insurance and fund management 7 , seeking to sell 
products through their large branch networks. This change highlights their search 
                                                 
7 Since then, mutual funds have mushroomed across the country and collectively 
hold more than RMB300 billion (S$60 billion) in assets. The potential of the 
industry has attracted foreign heavyweights such as JP Morgan and Societe 
Generale (Straits Times, 21st February 2005. “China allows commercial banks to 
set up mutual fund ventures.” Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.) 
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for new profits as they address their bad-debt problems. A post-WTO era will 
definitely hasten the pace of the domestic banks to pursue revenue aggressively in 
these business areas, as the foreign banks would also be interested to penetrate 
into these same areas.    
 
The state-owned commercial banks have also started to venture into the credit 
card business, in response to a future increase in the retail industry as consumer 
incomes increase. Currently the majority of credit cards in China function as debit 
cards and these are restricted to business people and government officials. But as 
the number of citizens is increasingly becoming middle-class or of high net worth, 
the government is now proactive in promoting this area of banking business.8 It 
hopes to modernize its financial data communications infrastructure by linking 
with foreign credit-card companies such as MasterCard and Visa International. In 
fact the latter has launched China’s first banking-card training center in Beijing 
with the People’s University of China. This outfit will train credit-card managers 
to meet the potential growth of millions of credit-card users in the near future. As 
of June 2004, China had approximately 476,000 Point-of-sales machines and 
64,000 ATMs. About 300,000 merchants accept banking cards.9 
                                                 
8  According to VISA International’s forecast, potential credit card consumers 
number between 30 to 60 million. By 2010, the middle class is projected to 
number more than 200 million. At that time, 50 to 75 million credit cards might 
be in circulation (http://www.buyusa.gov, retrieved on 7th September 2007. 
“Financial Services – U.S. Commercial Service.”). 
9 http://www.buyusa.gov, retrieved on 7th September 2007. “Financial Services – 
U.S. Commercial Service.” 
 
 201
As the growth of personal computers increase in the Chinese economy in the new 
millennium, internet banking opportunities should not be ignored. The Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China has already included this delivery channel in its 
business plans and the Bank of China’s Hong Kong-based subsidiary, the Bank of 
China (Hong Kong) Ltd. (BOCHK), has already worked on a home-banking 
prototype before implementing it in China.10   
 
The post-WTO corporate arena also provides excellent opportunities for the 
domestic banks to increase their market shares, in business areas such as trade 
financing, infrastructural financing, project financing, investment banking 
(underwriting, mergers and acquisitions) and advisory services. However, a few 
factors affect the strengthening of their current core line of business, which is 
lending to large state-owned enterprises or infrastructural financing. These 
include the weak financial conditions of the state-owned enterprises, which are 
accountable for the state-owned commercial banks’ high level of non-performing 
loans, and the fiscal obligations that these banks face.  
 
Although the banks have sought to offer a greater range of services beyond the 
“plain vanilla” business of taking deposits and making loans, they are still 
restrained by the government. Some of the regulations imposed on the products, 
such as the maturity of bank loans and the time taken to approve the launching of 
new products, have hampered the growth of these businesses. The government 
                                                 
10  http://www.cw.com.hk, 28th May 1998. “Bank of China launches home 
banking.” 
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has also implemented a China’s version of the USA’s Glass-Stegall Act of 1933, 
which barred the banks from dealing in corporate stocks and bonds, so as to 
prevent risk despite the global trend towards banks offering more varied services. 
This was enshrined in its 1999 Securities Law. However the government has 
allowed insurance companies and securities firms to sell their products through 
branches of banks after signing cooperation agreements. In fact the central bank 
has now allowed the commercial banks to open intermediate services such as 
derivative financial services, security brokerages services, investment fund 
management, information consulting and finance consulting. 11  These have 
definitely helped to increase the breadth of the domestic banks’ product offerings 
to customers. The Agricultural Bank of China has already paved the way and 
embraced competition by opening 100 “financial supermarkets” nationwide in the 
third quarter of 200112,offering its current and new banking products, from safety 
deposit boxes to insurance products. The China Construction Bank plans to 
implement a computer system linking it with brokerages to give its customers the 
ability to trade shares directly. It has also signed partnerships agreements with 
several brokerages to offer fund management services to investors.   
   
There is also a need for the banks to focus on product management such as 
increasing the number and quality of distribution channels, such as the 
Agricultural Bank of China’s “financial supermarkets”, and the type of demand 
                                                 
11  ChinaOnline, 11th July 2001. “PBOC: Commercial banks eligible to open 
intermediate businesses.”  
12 Reuters, 17th September 2001. “China WTO entry gradually to erode financial 
walls.” http://biz.yahoo.com. 
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generation activities required to drive business volumes. Such activities could 
refer to the choice of media for promoting the product and service offerings, and 
direct marketing.  
 
5.4.3  Market repositioning-target segmentation  
 
A market repositioning exercise is necessary for the domestic banks to counter the 
forthcoming intense competition from the foreign players. The banks need to 
carve out different segments out of their customer base into different target 
groups, and use improved marketing techniques to provide banking solutions 
tailored to these target segments. The segments could be identified as low, 
medium and high growth industries; small, medium or large state-owned 
enterprises; small, medium and large non-state or private enterprises; and as for 
the retail market, customers can be targeted by income groups. The state banks 
are now starting to lend more to the private sector and high-tech industries, areas 
they have traditionally ignored.  
 
5.4.4  Restructuring  
 
The banks need to improve the cost structure of their business operations to stay 
competitive. The cost restructuring process is to include closing branches which 
are economically not viable, and cutting surplus staff. The state-owned 
commercial banks have already started to implement these cost cutting measures. 
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In 1995 they operated a total of about 158,000 offices but this was reduced to 
about less than two-thirds the size by the end of 2002 (Lardy, 2004). There is also 
the need to increase interest incomes.            
 
A restructuring exercise to overhaul the current operational systems is almost 
mandatory in particular if the financially weak state-owned commercial banks 
wish to start “anew” after clearing off the high volumes of non-performing loans, 
by handing them over to asset management companies formed by the authorities 
to manage these huge bottlenecks that prevent them from recapitalizing their 
balance sheets. The state-owned commercial banks had a combined RMB1.8 
trillion of bad loans or 26 per cent of the total loans of RMB6.8 trillion as of end 
of October 200113, and this was only slightly reduced to RMB1.77 trillion as of 
September 200214, according to the central bank. Tight internal controls have to 
be put in place. The capital adequacy ratio needs to be maintained at the BIS- 
recommended level of 8 per cent. Thorough analysis of credit risks have to be 
done if good loans are to be given out, and the new loan classification system has 
to function on an implementation level. The loan origination and credit approval 
functions have to be separated to eliminate “connected” dealings.15 The state-
owned commercial banks also need to improve on their loan recovery rates. 
 
                                                 
13 Straits Times, 4th December 2001. “WTO puts China at risk of major financial 
crisis.” Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.  
14 Bloomberg, 11th November 2002. “China's top 3 banks plan share sales by 
2005.” Business Times, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.  
15 In fact in 1996 the Bank of China had initiated such a move by running ten pilot 
projects relating to this area. 
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A market-driven and revenue-based attitude should be taken in the area of 
management at all levels. Incentive-based and revenue-focus compensation plans 
should be implemented in the sales and marketing arena, to inject a sense of 
competition and accountability. In the skills area, resources should be dedicated to 
train staff at all levels in product knowledge, finance, marketing, customer 
relationships management, and other critical disciplines, and they should be 
empowered to make responsible decisions that contribute to the organization’s 
goals and objectives.         
 
Although restructuring is critical and an important strategy to be undertaken, there 
is no denial that this is going to be a difficult process. In fact restructuring a state- 
owned commercial bank will prove as difficult as restructuring any state-owned 
enterprise as the changes required are too radical, for those who are used to or 
who still prefer a “pre-market economy” way of doing things. Among the four 
state-owned commercial banks, the Bank of China is likely to be the one making 
the furthest leap into the new post-WTO economy. It embraces changes to its 
organizational structure. It also demonstrates willingness to change in response to 
the oncoming competition. It has a relatively clean balance sheet. It has benefited 
tremendously from its international subsidiary in Hong Kong, that is, the BOC 
Group. This consists of twelve smaller banks which have been subjected to 
international competition over the years. The banks have now merged to form the 
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newly established BOCHK16 which has displaced the Hang Seng Bank as Hong 
Kong’s second-biggest bank by assets, after the HSBC. It is the bank‘s most 
profitable unit and a key training ground for its parent bankers wanting to learn 
western banking methods. Therefore, it is no wonder that the Bank of China’s 
staff in the China has better skills than their counterparts in the other three state-
owned commercial banks, and this may have help account for the better 
performance of the bank.     
 
The domestic banks need to implement technology-driven delivery systems to 
modernize bank operations. These include the latest computer systems and 
banking software applications available in the international markets that can be 
tailored to the Chinese environment, improving both the front-office and back-
office operations. This will help increase both staff and customer productivity. In 
1998 the BOCHK and Hong Kong Telecom launched a home banking service 
using the latter’s subscriber-based interactive TV (iTV) platform. 17  This 
implementation is the first in the world running on interactive television, allowing 
iTV subscribers to transfer money between registered accounts in the twelve 
member banks of BOCHK. Other services available include account balance 
inquiry, multi-currency and precious metal trading, time deposit management, 
funds transfers, credit card settlement, information on rates for deposits and 
foreign exchange and prices on precious metals. The integration of smartcard and 
                                                 
16 The BOCHK was founded on 1st October 2001. (Business Times, October 2nd 
2001, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.)    
17  http://www.cw.com.hk, 28th May 1998. “Bank of China launches home 
banking.” 
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videoconferencing services has been included in the second stage of the home 
banking implementation. Such advanced use of technology will certainly help 
prepare the Bank of China in increasing customer satisfaction in China when it 
replicates the services there, thereby giving it a competitive edge over the other 
banks.    
  
5.4.5  M&A and alliance strategies  
 
The Chinese government is becoming more proactive in assisting the local players 
to prepare for the challenges that come with the WTO entry.  It encourages and 
allows the domestic banks and foreign financial institutions to implement a 
mergers and acquisitions’ (M&A) strategy. The resultant pooling of resources 
would not only help the merged entity to strengthen its financial and marketing 
positions but also allow it to import Western management practices. Acquisitions 
also allow the new owner access to the current database of existing customers or 
perhaps tested products. This M&A exercise applies not only to mainland-based 
financial institutions but also the Chinese-owned conglomerates based in Hong 
Kong, such as the China International Trust and Investment Corporation Group 
(CITIC), which owns the Citic Industrial Bank, and the Everbright Group, which 
controls the Everbright Bank and Everbright Securities in China.  
 
In the case of foreign ownership, it is no doubt that foreign investment provides 
one potential source of funding for the large-scale expenditures on equipment and 
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training that the domestic banks, which survive the WTO shake-out, will need to 
make. China’s financial sector would also gain as foreign banks, especially the 
international giants like the Citigroup Inc. and the HSBC Group, offer capital 
market access, structured solutions and unrivalled quality services to their 
preferred customers. In the areas of skills transfer, the domestic banks would 
benefit from their counterparts’ expertise in risk management, balance sheet 
restructuring, project financing, and in the new derivatives and hedging business. 
The strategy that the Chinese government undertakes is to initially allow the 
foreign banks to acquire stakes in smaller banks or other financial institutions, 
owned by the city or the provincial governments. Thereafter it will allow the 
nation’s four state-owned commercial banks to sell stakes to foreign investors to 
help them recapitalize, improve management and clean up the bad debts. Another 
strategy that some provincial governments undertake is to collect stakes 
distributed in various investment arms and then sell them as a whole to foreign 
investors, like in the case of the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank. Table 5.1 
illustrates some of the investments made by the foreign financial institutions in 













Table 5.1: Foreign investments in domestic banks and financial institutions 
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Table 5.1: Foreign investments in domestic banks and financial institutions - 
continue 
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Sources: Various issues of the Business Times and Straits Times, Singapore Press 




The alliance strategy, which normally involves the signing of cooperative and 
agency agreements for marketing the partner’s products and services, would allow 
banks and other financial institutions to satisfy their customers with a broader 
range of product and service offerings. The vast branch networks should play 
instrumental roles in delivering and facilitating the sales of these offerings to a 
captive customer base. The Bank of China has established alliances with local 
banks, insurance companies, securities companies, fund management companies 
to provide a breath of services to their combined customer base. By building 
partnerships with other financial entities, the Bank of China is signaling to the 
marketplace its intention of not only wanting to increase its market penetration 
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levels, but also to be a formidable and credible competitor to some of the 
reputable foreign players in its ability to provide a wider range of products and 
services to meet the new and diverse needs of the Chinese customers in the more 
liberalized setting. This desire is also boosted by the government’s approval of the 
Hong Kong-based Bank of China International (BOCI), the investment banking 
unit of Bank of China, to form a RMB1.5 billion joint venture securities firm with 
Dongfang Asset Management Co., another China-based Bank of China unit, oil 
giant Sinopec Corp., Beijing-based State Development Investment Co., an 
investment arm of the Shanghai city government and another unidentified firm.18 
As illustrated in Table 5.1, the China International Capital Corporation. (CICC), 
an American-based Morgan Stanley’s Chinese joint venture, is an example of a 
Sino-foreign investment banking joint venture operating in China, with a license 
to underwrite both China-based stocks and overseas listings and it has applied for 
a brokerage license to deal in domestic securities on China’s secondary market.      
 
The partnership program between the HSBC and the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China where the HSBC bank depositors can withdraw the local 
currencies from selected Industrial and Commercial Bank of China’s ATMs in 
Shanghai and Guangzhou at a fee, is exemplary of another effective partnership 
program.19 Another one is that of JP Morgan Fleming Asset Management Co. 
working with Huaan Fund Management to set up China’s first joint venture fund 
                                                 
18  Business Times, 15th November 2001. “BOCI gets approval for 1.5b yuan 
venture.” Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.  
19  Business Times, 30th September 1996. Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., 
Singapore.  
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manager; while Fortis Investment Management Co., a unit of the Belgian-Dutch 
financial company Fortis, is working on a partnership with Haitong Securities 
Co., China’s most profitable brokerage.20 The Citibank, a unit of Citigroup Inc., 
has signed a continuation of a cash management agreement with Galaxy 
Securities, China’s largest brokerage.21 The latter was formed in 2000 by merging 
five trust firms. The two companies would also cooperate on training, product 
development, marketing and research. The domestic banks should also take the 
opportunity to form partnerships with foreign insurance companies who have 
been awarded new operating licenses, such as Nippon Life Insurance, New York 
Life Insurance, Manulife Financial, American International Assurance, Metlife 
and Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance.22 
 
5.4.6 Organizational transformations 
 
Lastly, the sixth important strategy to be considered by the domestic financial 
entities relate to organizational transformations. As mentioned earlier in this 
section, among the four state-owned commercial banks, the Bank of China is 
likely to emerge as the most successful and most focused of the group as it 
embraces changes to its organizational structure. It may even compete on an equal 
                                                 
20  Bloomberg, 2nd November 2001. “JP Morgan to form joint venture fund 
manager in China.” Business Times, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.    
21  Bloomberg, 10th April 2002. “China’s Galaxy signs deal with Citibank.” 
Business Times, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.    
22 Straits Times, 13th December 2001. “S’pore banks keep lid on plans as China 
opens up capital markets.” Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.    
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footing with some of the international giants. The other three banks will face 
stiffer challenges in the post-WTO era. 
 
One potentially feasible approach in confronting the intense competition is to split 
these banks into smaller pieces according to business areas, to form new rational 
entities. The banks have over the years moved away from their original intent to 
focus on specific sector areas to handling many overlapped business activities. 
The new approach would be to have, for example, the project finance and 
construction lending divisions of these banks be spun off and consolidated into 
one or two banks. By focusing on their resources rationally, these banks may be 
better positioned to compete aggressively in their niche areas with their foreign 
counterparts. Besides this organizational changes would also be made easier as 
these new entities would only be a fraction of the original organization in terms of 
size and scope.  
 
Another reform alternative involves creating financial institutions capable of 
competing with the likes of bankers such as the Citigroup Inc. and the HSBC 
Group in the international arena. These institutions need to provide a range of 
integrated financial services, ranging from personal banking services, wealth 
management, insurance, mutual funds, securities trading to advisory services. The 
potential candidates who have the financial muscle to create and provide a full 
range of integrated financial services as well as the capability to compete with the 
foreigners include the BOC Group and the CITIC Group.   
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The central bank, the PBC, has also announced another option which it is going 
ahead to implement, that is the public listing of the state-owned commercial 
banks, in particular the Bank of China, China Construction Bank 23  and the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China which are the three top banks in China 
(with combined deposits of more than RMB5.5 trillion). The main reason is to 
raise money to cover the bad loans, which stood at RMB1.77 trillion and RMB1.9 
trillion in September 2002 and 2003, respectively (Barnett, 2004; China 
Knowledge Press, 2005). These banks, together with fourth-ranked Agricultural 
Bank of China, are required to reduce their ratio of bad loans from 25 per cent to 
15 per cent by 2005, with all bad debt fully provisioned for by reserves. The 
shares will be sold both domestically and overseas. The Bank of China’s plan is 
that it should be ready for a public listing in the near future, and will use the 
successful listing of its Hong Kong unit in July 2002 as the model for 
restructuring the rest of the bank.24 The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
is currently discussing with foreign investors to sell a 10 per cent stake by end 
200525 to pave the way for a public listing in 2006 or 2007.26    
                                                 
23 It was the first of the big four state-owned commercial banks to be listed on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the launch of the initial public offering raised 
more than USD9.2 billion in October 2005 (http://www.marketwatch.com, 
retrieved on 10th September 2007. “China Construction Bank nears largest 
domestic IPO.”). 
24 The USD2.8 billion offering was over-subscribed by 7.5 times and this deal 
was a significant move in the reform of China’s banking industry 
(http://www.buyusa.gov, retrieved on 7th September 2007. “Financial Services – 
U.S. Commercial Service.”).  
25 Reuters, 29th April 2005. “ICBC may sell 10% stake, eyes listing”. Straits 
Times, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.  
26 By the time the thesis was revised, the bank was already listed on both the stock 
exchanges of Shanghai and Hong Kong (on 27th October, 2006). Its market 
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However for the PBC’s plan to succeed, the banks would have to convince 
foreign investors that they could improve their transparency on accounting and 
corporate governance. Nevertheless the listing of the state-owned commercial 
banks will put them under the international limelight, and the organizations will 
be driven to perform profitably and be held accountable to global shareholders. 
Their business dealings would have to be transparent and professionally managed. 
This scenario will definitely be a far cry from their pre-listing days.    
 
5.5 The new Chinese banking environment post-WTO  
 
In the near foreseeable future, the financial sector, and in particular the banking 
industry in China will experience a dramatic change in the post-WTO era. There 
is no doubt that the changes in the banking arena have evolved over time since the 
country started its economic reforms program in 1979. But there will be even 
more exciting events in the coming years, fueled by the influx of foreign 
investments and trade. A good demonstration would be the changed financial 
landscape in Shanghai today compared to ten years ago, let alone prior to 1979 
when China was still closed to the outside world. The city is now bustling with 
trading and financial activities, with major international companies making their 
presence there and, major international financial institutions physically fronting 
                                                                                                                                     
capitalization was in excess of RMB1 trillion and hence qualifying it as the 
biggest listed company on China’s A-stock market and one of the biggest listed 
banks in the world (http://www.icbc.com, 31st October 2006. “ICBC celebrates its 
successful listing in Shanghai and Hong Kong.”).  
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the famed Shanghai bund overlooking the Yellow River. This is an ironic 
reminder of the pre-1949 days where some of the same financial institutions 
physically stood before they were closed down when the communists took over 
the country. 
 
The banking environment, however, will face some challenging issues even as it 
takes on new shape and substance. It is inevitable that competition is set to 
increase between the domestic and foreign banks, but on a more positive note, 
they can both play complimentary rather than competing roles. Both parties do 
possess comparative advantages in their own right. They should exploit 
complementary advantages that put them both in “win-win” situations, and 
ultimately also benefiting the consumer. They can do so by continuing to form 
alliances and establishing other partnerships programs. 
 
Although the prospects for growth in the banking industry are bright, there are 
still some impediments to the development of its full potential. The domestic front 
is fraught with weak financial conditions, in particular of the four pillars of the 
domestic financial wall, the state-owned commercial banks. Their non-performing 
loans stood like a sore thumb in the whole banking system, and the situation is 
made worst by the weak financial backgrounds of their main creditors, the state-
owned enterprises. Until the current and future non-performing loans of the state-
owned commercial banks are eradicated or minimized, and the state-owned 
enterprises restructured constructively and successfully, the banking industry will 
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not develop effectively, as desired. As it is, the current status of the state-owned 
commercial banks makes them very vulnerable and this may limit the alliances 
and partnerships that could be forged with their stronger foreign counterparts. 
This will have implications on the transfer of skills to the domestic banks. It is 
likely that the process of reform and restructuring of the state-owned commercial 
banks will take several more years to play out. The financial “revolution” as 
desired, cannot be too fast or too radical given the state-owned commercial banks’ 
dominant position in the marketplace and their legacy of social responsibility. 
There is also the need to address the issue pertaining to the limited development 
of the money and capital markets to fuel domestic demand and sustain the 
economy in the long haul. 
 
If the scenario is such that the financial conditions of the domestic banks are 
improved, prudential and supervisory practices strictly adhered to, with the 
healthy development of the money and capital markets, then the banking climate 
would be very promising indeed. The banking system would then likely be more 
competitive and the allocation of credit would be efficient (to quality borrowers 
only). The overall financial discipline would be improved. Therefore it is clearly 
in the foreign banks’ interest for the domestic Chinese banks to become stronger 
in the short term to ensure a smooth market opening process.  
 
Of great importance is the issue of the prevailing central bank-regulated interest 
rate, which has an impact on the direction that the new banking environment will 
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take, that is, a competitive and profitable or a stifled and unprofitable one. 
Currently the domestic banks offer uniform deposits or lending rates to the 
customers. This creates a competition-slack environment, and without the ability 
to attract a large local currency deposit base, although there exists a large amount 
of excess liquidity in the banking system, the foreign banks will find it difficult to 
even begin compete in the local currency lending business in the near future. The 
WTO-driven opening of the banking industry will require a gradual deregulation 
of the interest rates so as to inject competition into the industry.  
 
The new banking climate in the near term will see the floatation of the domestic 
banks, in particular the state-owned commercial banks, so as to transform the 
banking industry into a competitive and independent industry. This will also serve 
as part of the development of the capital market. The government has already 
paved the way, for example, by allowing two regional banks to be listed on the 
stock exchanges, namely the Shenzhen Development Bank and the Shanghai 
Pudong Development Bank, and these are followed by other commercial banks 
currently seeking approval to be listed. The government appears increasingly to 
have come round to the argument that the “rigors of a shareholder structure” 
could “increase efficiency and forced improved management at the banks”.27  
 
Despite the many teething problems that the domestic banks face, even right 
through the initial phase of the post-WTO period, there is no fear that foreign 
                                                 
27 Financial Times, 1st October 1999. “Building capital markets: More banks in 
China to go public.” Straits Times, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.  
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banks will become a dominant force in the Chinese marketplace. Taking a leaf 
from the experiences of the foreign banks in the other Asian emerging economies, 
it would be “politically incorrect” to assert a stronger presence in China as it is in 
these Asian countries. The host countries still need to protect the domestic banks 
for vested national interests. This is even more so with China’s current social- 
political framework. It is practically impossible for the Chinese administration to 
cede this strategically important industry to foreign control in the foreseeable 
future. In any case, some foreign banks are likely to face constraints by their 
corporate global business strategies with regards to the business areas they are 
likely to enter, particularly in China, which is a new unproven harvest ground to 
many of them. 
    
In the new banking landscape, particularly in the intermediate term, we are likely 
to see the eventual formation and nurturing of domestic integrated financial 
groups that are capable of rivaling the likes of major international players like 
Citigroup Inc. and the HSBC Holdings. The BOC Group and CITIC Group are 
the two likely candidates to make it to this level, and paving the way for others. 
They will compete with the international players in offering their customers a 
complete and integrated range of financial products and services ranging from 
traditional products, personal banking facilities, insurance, mutual funds, stock 
trading, underwriting to advisory services, including value-added services such as 
risk management expertise, structured solutions, internet-banking and quality 
services and support to preferred clients. This scenario will help bring China’s 
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financial services sector to a higher operating level, and hasten its growth 
prospects to be a credible player in the world financial arena.     
 
Finally, however the discussion goes with regards to the new banking 
environment in the post-WTO era, ultimately it will still be shaped by China’s 
trade and investment liberalization and overall economic reform program. As 
highlighted earlier in CHAPTER ONE, China’s international trade has expanded 
steadily with its overall share in world trade rising from less than 1 per cent in 
1979 to about 6 per cent in 2003 (Prasad and Rumbaugh, 2004). In addition, its 
FDI registered almost 4 per cent of the GDP between 1999 and 2003. In 2004 its 
FDI was valued at USD60.6 billion, 3.32 per cent higher than 2003 (China 
Knowledge Press, 2005). The advantages of low wages, the growing spending 
power of the Chinese consumers and the phasing out of trade restrictions between 
China and most other countries are the main factors that account for the strong 
interests in this emerging economy. A healthy pace in both trade and investments 
bides well for the banking system and for all the players involved, that is, the 
domestic and foreign financial institutions, the customers and the government.  
 
5.6 Concluding remarks 
  
The chapter notes that the Chinese banks need to handle a number of challenges 
in a post-WTO banking landscape. However, the new climate also offers new and 
exciting revenue-generating business opportunities. A competitive and vibrant 
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banking marketplace should ensue. To handle the formidable competitors, the 
domestic financial institutions, in particular the state-owned commercial banks 
should consider and work on six recommended strategies. These involve 
capitalizing on their current strengths, diversifying their products and service 
offerings, revisiting their market positioning postures, overhauling their current 
operations and making necessary repairs through a thorough restructuring 
exercise, implementing a merger and acquisition (M&A) strategy and an alliance 
strategy with both the domestic and foreign financial institutions, and finally, 
seriously consider a transformation of their organizational set-ups. On a more 
positive note, the domestic and foreign banks can both play complimentary rather 
than competing roles. 
 
Finally, the new banking climate in the near term will see the floatation of the 
domestic banks, in particular the state-owned commercial banks, so as to 
transform the banking industry into a competitive and independent one; and the 
eventual formation and nurturing of domestic integrated financial groups that are 
capable of rivaling the likes of major international players. However, the new 
banking environment will ultimately still be shaped by China’s trade and 




Conclusion: Does China’s banking system still have a long way to go?   
 
The development of a modern, commercially-oriented financial sector, and in 
particular the banking system, is an important precondition for sustaining China’s 
fast economic development and this will help hasten the government’s overall 
effort to transform the centrally-planned economy into a market-based economy. 
The thesis has effectively tackled the key areas of the Chinese banking reforms. 
This concluding chapter ponders over the important question regarding the 
direction of the banking system in the near future, its nurturing process and 
eventual reformed state. This is answered by revisiting the approach undertaken 
by the government in reforming the banking system as well as understanding the 
position the latter is currently facing, that is, it is now at a “new” crossroads after 
having experienced two and a half decades of transformation.                 
 
6.1 The China approach 
 
The government tackles the financial reform process with a strong dose of “faith” 
by embracing aspects of western banking theories and practices, and tailoring and 
flavoring them with “Chinese characteristics” to meet China’s political and 
macroeconomic environment. It declares, and openly through various “politically-
correct” channels, of desiring to implement the market-economy objectives of 
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directing finance towards the efficient utilization of capital although, in practice, 
incompetence, inertia and politically- driven obstacles exist in the implementation 
process. This is so as the authorities become directly involved in the execution of 
these objectives. However, there is no denial that visible efforts were made at 
adopting a market decision-making process in the financial reform arena. While 
considerable development has occurred in the capital market in recent years, the 
financial sector remains dominated by banks. The banking reforms have been 
undertaken in “measured” tones, along “gradual” implementation phases, guided 
by pragmatism, and “experimental” in nature compared to the “Big Bang” 
approach as adopted by the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, 
with its debatable resultant pitfalls.  
 
While there is awareness of the problems involved in the implementation of 
banking reforms in this transitional economy, there is also recognition that 
significant milestones have been achieved in the last two and a half decades, and 
hence, the Chinese scenario is definitely a far cry from its pre-reform days. The 
financial system has undergone a radical transformation, from a monolithic 
structure with the central bank serving as a “monobank”, performing both central 
and general banking, to a formalization of a comprehensive banking structure 
meeting China’s various needs in the reform era, with a diverse spectrum of state, 
share-holding and regional commercial banks, policy banks and non-bank 
financial institutions. There has been ongoing formalization of legislations to 
regulate the financial sector and the banking industry, in particular with the 
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enactments of the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank 
of China” and the “Commercial Banking Law”, both promulgated in 1995; and 
the legal recognition of the PBC as the country’s central banker in the same year, 
and its subsequent restructuring and reorganization in 1998 were credible steps 
taken to increase its autonomy stature. There was also the unification of the inter-
bank market and the commercialization of the four pillar state-owned banks 
although many factors have continued to keep this latter process from progressing 
smoothly. 
 
The creation of more products and services, as offered in market economies, has 
helped increase the savings and investments options for the customers. With the 
re-entry of foreign financial institutions to the marketplace, which have the 
business objectives of acquiring a pie of the potential huge market in the near 
future, the customers and enterprises will be the main beneficiaries as they are 
now being exposed to more and better product lines and services, particularly in a 
post-WTO environment. The authorities have gradually allowed selected foreign 
banks to deal in local currency businesses, as well as foreign funding and 
ownership in some of the financial institutions, and also listing the latter on both 
the domestic and overseas stock exchanges. There is also a greater involvement of 
the Chinese banks in international banking, making the acquisition and transfer of 
market-economy banking, investment and performance- driven management skills 
possible, and the Bank of China’s Hong Kong-based subsidiary, that is, BOCHK, 
is a success story in this area, as highlighted in CHAPTER FIVE. Finally, there is 
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a WTO-enforced paradigm shift occurring in the banking system. While 
competition in the marketplace was once prohibited in the pre-reform days, it is 
currently the buzz word among the various players who are now competing in 
providing better products and services, better pricing, increasing market-driven 
customer and territorial coverage, and adding value to their sales, marketing and 
support services.   
 
6.2 Banking reforms at the “new” crossroads  
 
While the government has indeed taken quite a long and rough journey to lay the 
necessary ground works for a transformation from a centrally-planned banking 
system to a market-based one, as highlighted by the various banking milestones, 
the measures undertaken in the reform process, however, attained overall mixed 
successes. There is still much ample room for significant improvements as serious 
problems continue to perpetuate the Chinese banking system.         
 
As discussed at great depth in the preceding chapters, a number of constraints 
severely limit the policy choices available to decision-makers. These include the 
political constraints, such as keeping the “de-capitalized” state-owned enterprises 
afloat with unrecoverable bank credit to avoid unrests deemed detrimental to 
social and political stability, and shielding the pillar banks from both domestic 
and foreign competition to avoid financial instability; economic constraints, such 
as the government’s inability to restructure the state-owned enterprises and re-
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capitalize the problematic banks due to its fiscal decline; and institutional 
constraints, such as the “independent” central bank still operating under the 
pervading arm of the State Council and being emasculated with party politics, and 
the state-owned commercial banks still being under the umbrella of the state 
bureaucratic mechanism and not operating as independent commercial entities as 
widely publicized to be. These constraints continue to exist with their 
corresponding negative implications such as the current unhealthy performances 
of the financial institutions, in particular the four state-owned commercial banks 
with their questionable profitability levels and declining rates of return on assets, 
the erosion of the quality of bank assets, inadequate provisioning for the non-
performing loans, and the banks’ capital adequacy levels not meeting the 8 per 
cent Basel standard which the central bank adopted in 1994 and subsequently 
incorporated into the “Commercial Banking Law” in 1995.    
 
There have been ongoing public observations that the measurements of the 
efficiency of the financial institutions’ operations are not reflected accurately or 
not at all in their annual reports, particularly for some of the state-owned 
commercial banks. This scenario implies that even bank regulators have difficulty 
in supervising and enforcing strict international accounting standards and also risk 
management practices among the financial institutions. To do so effectively 
would surely and fully expose the extent of the banking problems, in particular 
the levels of the financial intermediaries’ non-performing loans, and may cause a 
crisis of confidence in the banking system. Thus, banking activities continue to be 
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supervised “ineffectively”. Moreover, some of the government policies inhibit the 
development of a commercial credit culture (Lardy, 2003), such as requiring the 
state-owned commercial banks to finance profitable activities of heavily-indebted, 
money-losing companies, and the implementation of the credit guarantee system 
provided by the provincial and municipal governments which is not based on 
borrowers’ creditworthiness. This ongoing implicitly-guaranteed lending practice 
continues to be in favor of firms in the state sector instead of the non-state sector 
even though the latter’s contribution to growths in industrial output and 
employment surpasses that of the state sector’s (as reiterated in CHAPTER 
TWO). Lately, there is increasing fraud and corruption among senior management 
and employees, an issue of discussion in the later part of this concluding chapter. 
In general, currently there is much agreement among the academia, private and 
public sectors alike, both locally and overseas, that there is much concentration of 
financial risk within the banking system, which translates into overall high 
financial risk for the financial sector. Ultimately the customers, that is, mainly the 
households and genuine domestic and overseas investors, bear most of the risk   
 
Having experienced the transformation period, the Chinese banking system is 
now on a different and higher plane. While there is optimism about its future 
despite the ongoing issues faced by the banking system, it also needs to be 
cautious about its future endeavors. The government is expected to continue 
reforming its banking system, as before, albeit now with it reaching a new 
“crossroads”, in particular with the country having gained WTO-membership 
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stature. Among the key areas that the government should continue addressing or 
even increase the level of urgency in its banking reform program, include the 
continued concurrent reforms in the major “dependencies” areas, such as reforms 
in the enterprise, budgetary and social security systems, non-performing loans’ 
work-out, the enforcement of rules and financial disclosures, the separation of 
business from politics, the implications from competition posed by direct finance, 
the deregulation of the interests rate structure, and ultimately the process of 
gaining a credible presence in the international financial arena. These are no small 
monumental tasks.     
 
Restructuring and privatizing the state-owned enterprises, announced at the 
Fifteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in September 1997, would 
help remove the most important source of any potential banking crisis in the 
Chinese economy. Through improvements in the tax administration, the prospects 
of achieving fiscal revenue buoyancy would help address the lack of financial 
resources required to handle the implications from the restructuring and 
privatization exercise. This would thus reduce the reliance on the banking system 
and also help mitigate the social problems that may arise when the bankruptcy 
law is being enforced to allow the smooth exit of non-performing, inefficient and 
redundant state-owned enterprises. Concurrent and well-structured reforms in the 
social security system would allow future restructuring of more state-owned 
enterprises to be implemented without the social unrests the country is currently 
experiencing. However, with due recognition that while this is no easy task, the 
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challenge lies in the speed of execution and contents of the reform program. The 
on-going resolution of the non-performing loans’ problems has to be escalated as 
it is the most important cause of financial weakness of the banking system. While 
rules are made, they are of negligible use if their implementations cannot be 
enforced. Thus a legal system with enforcements of checks and balances, 
financial disclosures and transparency would help eradicate, if not minimize, the 
pitfalls of the China’s banking and financial systems.     
  
A necessary policy to be strictly adhered to is the separation of business from 
politics. This is required at all levels of government functions and amongst the 
players in the financial sector. However, this “ideal” state is easier said than done 
as there is a lack of incentives for commercially viable banking businesses, such 
as the state-owned commercial banks having to operate and lend in a political 
environment, the unattractive compensation plans for banking staff, and hence the 
difficulty of cultivating a commercial credit culture. Thus it is not surprising that 
fraud and corruptions are on the increase, even among government officials1, 
senior executives 2 , and employees 3  of the state-owned commercial banks. In 
recent years a series of graft cases occurred in the state-controlled banks, such as 
                                                 
1 AP, January 18th 2005. “$1.4b bank fraud busted in China: Dozens of govt 
officials, bank employees arrested.” Today, MediaCorp Press, MediaCorp Pte. 
Ltd., Singapore.  
2  New York Times, March 23rd 2005. “Banking scandals show ugly side of 
China’s expansion.” The Straits Times, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore. 
3 AFP, March 28th 2005. “New scandal in China Bank – Former bank typist 
arrested for embezzling $9.6 million.” Today, MediaCorp Press, MediaCorp Pte. 
Ltd., Singapore.   
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the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank 4 , and thus raised 
transparency and governance issues. Such occurrences could seriously hinder the 
necessary development and modernization of the banking and financial systems, 
which China needs so as to be recognized as a full-fledged economic superpower. 
Thus there is renewed urgency in the China Banking Regulatory Commission’s 
(CBRC) efforts in cleaning up the banking and financial systems particularly 
ahead of the WTO rules becoming effective at the end of 2006, that will see the 
opening of the tightly regulated financial sector to an onslaught of overseas 
competition. These efforts include making more inspections of the pillar banks, 
issuing circulars on how to mitigate lending risks and improve management, as 
well as offering generous rewards to bank employees who expose corruption.5 
The listing of banking groups in the near future would also help to severe the 
political ties between the banking system and the government. 
 
In the new millennium, the Chinese financial landscape will be vibrant with both 
indirect and direct financing playing equally important roles in China’s economic 
development. Such co-existence can also help shape China as an important 
financial player, and increase its readiness to participate actively and gain 
credibility in the international financial arena. In addition, there are invaluable 
lessons learnt from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis as experienced, in particular, 
by Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand. While China appears relatively 
                                                 
4 AFP, March 23rd 2005. “Beijing launches new anti- graft campaign.” The Straits 
Times, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.  
5 New York Times, March 31st 2005. “China will reward bank employees who 
expose graft.” The Straits Times, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., Singapore.  
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unscathed by the Asian financial contagion, due mainly to the absence of capital 
account convertibility and having a better performing real economy than any 
other country in Asia with a trade surplus, steady FDI inflows, sharp rise in the 
official holdings of foreign exchange reserves, and little short-term borrowings; it, 
nevertheless, exhibits characteristics similar to the affected countries at the brink 
of the financial crisis. These include a bank-dominated financial system, weak 
central bank regulation and supervision of banks, excessive growth of lending, 
and a large build-up of non-performing loans (Lardy, 1999). Hence China is still 
vulnerable to any potential banking crisis if these problematic areas are not 
tackled expeditiously. The population would ultimately bear the cost of the 
financial institutions’ poor lending and investing decisions. Both the financial 
institutions and enterprises would incur higher cost of raising funds as their access 
to international capital and equity markets would be made more difficult, as the 
international independent ratings companies highlight the increasing high risk 
profiles of these entities and China’s foreign currency debt. With the domestic 
financial institutions being exposed to full competition from their non-state and 
foreign counterparts in a post-WTO environment, the possibility of full-scale 
banking collapse is not to be taken too lightly.    
 
Therefore, until the various significant problematic areas are implemented 
forthrightly and with reasonable ease and efficiency, the financial recovery of the 
banking system would be unlikely and thus it would also not be difficult to 
conclude that China’s banking system still has a long way to go! Likewise the 
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financial landscape would not be genuinely market-driven if the interest rate 
structure is not fully de-regulated to allow both the domestic and foreign financial 
institutions to offer the most “priced-competitive” products and services to both 
their depositors and borrowers. Nevertheless, the future outlook for Chinese 
banking is promising, as China gains economic and political strengths on the 
world stage. It will also be aided by the roles of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) as an important gateway into international financial 
intermediary and capital markets, and the vibrant city of Shanghai regaining its 
pre- communist era’s financial hub status where world class foreign financial 
institutions flock to these days.   
 
6.3 The contributions of my thesis  
 
The thesis has effectively met its objectives of scrutinizing the layers below the 
“ice-berg” of banking reforms in China and provided some understanding of the 
implementations with their accompanied issues and implications. The journey of 
transformation from a centrally-planned banking system to a market-driven one, 
covering two and a half decades, was not all fanfare but one laden with obstacles, 
challenges and surprises. While there are mixed successes in this “gradualistic” 
transformation process, the analysis helps create awareness of the past legacies of 
the previous regime which have continued to put brakes to the effective 
implementation of the reform measures.  
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The thesis uncovers a number of important areas which have implications on the 
economy at large, such as the workings of the banking system and its sources and 
uses of funds, the process of institutional and legislative development, the 
linkages of banking reforms to monetary policy management, and reforms of the 
enterprise, social security and the budgetary systems. The relationships among the 
various key players, such as the governments (at both the central and local levels), 
financial institutions, the central bank, and the state and non-state enterprises are 
scrutinized and their shortcomings are illuminated. These analyzes are 
strengthened by an econometric evaluation of the impact of financial deepening 
on China’s economic growth, and a non- parametric technique which assesses the 
relative efficiency of the Chinese banks where the empirical results affirming 
their overall relative inefficiency would have implications on the banks’ strategic 
planning and the deregulation of the banking industry.6     
 
A good and crisp understanding of the workings of the central bank leaves one 
pondering over its independence stature and the issues relating to its “inability” or 
“unwillingness” in overall financial sector management. While commendable 
efforts are made at the restructuring of the organization, improving its operational 
and management processes so that the PBC can serve as a better monetary policy 
manager, financial supervisor and regulator in this transitional environment, the 
thesis concludes that they are of insignificance if the PBC is not detached from 
central and local party politics.         
                                                 
6 The footnotes on pages 63 and 111 highlight the influence of small sample sizes 
on the empirical results in both studies.” 
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The pragmatic analysis on the WTO accession factor allows one to take a peep 
into the future of the “new” Chinese banking landscape. It provides a timely fast 
track for China to meet world banking standards and be a potential influential 
world player. It also helps to change the financial institutions’ mindsets on the 
workings of a market-economy banking system management, especially in the 
areas of operational management, customer management and people management. 
This is effectively highlighted by the various recommended strategies that the 
domestic financial institutions should work on to operate successfully in a post-
WTO banking environment.  
 
Lastly, the thesis serves as a useful guide-book for other transitional economies 
which are planning to take a similar banking reform route. It provides lessons in 
many areas such as the importance of the creation and execution of operational 
banking rules and processes; the process of institutional development in the areas 
of formulating organizational structures and the restructuring of major 
institutions; the importance of a functioning legislative infrastructure; the 
commercialization of financial institutions; the importance of having a continued 
endeavor in executing efficient supervision, prudential regulation and proper 
accounting standards; the need for linkages to reforms in other pertinent areas, 
such as the restructuring and privatization of the state enterprises, the social 
security and budgetary systems; and finally the preparedness and strategies 
required to operate in a deregulated post-WTO environment.            
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Indeed the various major areas covered in this thesis on banking reforms in China 
are all- encompassing and of current market-place relevance. The thesis is a 
strong fore-runner for future in-depth analysis of the overall financial sector, such 
as when the contributions of the various non-bank financial institutions, the equity 
and capital markets, and informal financing are included in the financial 
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Major reforms and events 
1979-
1981 
• Representative offices allowed for liaison and market research 
purposes. No banking businesses allowed.  
• 21 foreign banks established representative offices in Beijing, two 
liaison offices in Guangzhou, and one liaison office in Shanghai. 
1982 • Branches were allowed to be established in Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) only, namely in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou. 
Allowed to do limited banking businesses. Wholly-owned foreign 
bank subsidiaries and Sino-foreign joint venture banks were still 
restricted.   
1984 • Foreign currency deposits-taking and loans businesses granted to the 
branches in the SEZs and six banks that remained in Shanghai after 
1949. Customers were joint ventures, fully-owned foreign enterprises 
and Overseas-Chinese concerns. 
• First joint venture bank established, Xiamen International Bank, by 
the Fujian provincial branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China, the Fujian Investment Business Company, and the Fan Yin 




1985 • The enactment of regulations governing the administration of 
representative offices, foreign banks and joint venture banks in SEZs: 
- “The Regulations of Foreign Financial Institutions’ China 
Resident Missions of the People’s Bank of China”. 
- “The Regulations on Administration of Foreign Banks and Joint 
Venture Banks in Special Economic Zones of 1985”. 
• Leasing joint ventures allowed to be established. 
• HSBC, Standard Chartered Bank, Bank of East Asia, OCBC allowed 
to reactivate operations in Shanghai (they had maintained a presence 
in China after 1949).  
1986 • The China International Finance Company was established, a joint 
venture of the Bank of China, Bank of East Asia, the Security Pacific 
Bank of California, the Sumitomo Bank and Nomura Securities of 
Japan. 
1989 • The Shanghai Municipal Administrative Council announced plans to 
develop the Putong New Development Zone in Shanghai, to restore 
Shanghai as China’s main financial center. 
1990 • 1985’s law promulgated replaced by “The Rules on Administration 




1991 • Promulgation of “The Rules on Administration of Establishment of 
Representative Offices by Foreign Financial Institutions in China”. 
• Branches were allowed to operate in Shanghai. The pioneer batch of 
foreign banks setting up branches here included Banque Indosuez 
(which maintained a liquidation presence in Shanghai since 1949) 
and HSBC (only the Shanghai branch remained after 1949 and the 
bank was effectively dormant until allowed into the SEZs in the 
1980s). 
1992 • Foreign banking businesses were allowed in additional 12 cities 
(mainly coastal): Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo, Guangzhou, Tianjin, 
Nanjing, Fuzhou, Shantou, Zhuhai, Qingdao, Xiamen and Shenzhen. 
• Another joint venture bank established, the International Bank of 
Paris and Shanghai. 
1993 • By the end of 1993, representative offices and operational institutions 
(branches, wholly-owned foreign bank subsidiaries or Sino - foreign 
joint venture banks) of over 150 foreign banks from about 30 
countries were established. Established names included the Citibank, 









1994 • Foreign banking businesses allowed in ten more cities: Shijiazhuang, 
Wuhan, Hefei, Xi’an, Chengdu, Hangzhou, Kunming, Haikou, 
Chongqing and Suzhou. 
• China unified its previously two-tier exchange rate system. 
• “The Regulations on the Administration of the Foreign Financial 
Institutions in the People’s Republic of China”, replaced the two 
previous sets of regulations, promulgated in 1985 and 1990 
respectively. Other rules implemented included “The Administrative 
Regulations on the Establishment of Resident Representative Offices 
in China by the Foreign Financial Institutions by the People’s Bank 
of China”. 
• Foreign banks were allowed to participate in foreign exchange swap 
markets, albeit restricted only to one “leg” of the transaction, 
meaning they can only sell foreign exchange into the market. 
1995 • Five foreign banks were allowed to open branches in Beijing: HSBC, 
Citibank, Bank of Tokyo, Banque Indosuez, Bank of East Asia. 
• New regulations promulgated included: 
- “The Regulations governing Chinese and Foreign Investment 
Banks”. 
- “The Regulations for the establishment of investment funds from 
abroad”. 
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1996 • Local currency, Renminbi (RMB), businesses allowed for four banks 
in Shanghai only, with restrictions: Citibank, HSBC, Industrial Bank 
of Japan, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. 
• Foreign banks were allowed to conduct dual-leg foreign exchange 
transactions on China’s inter-bank market in four trial locations. 
1997 • Sino-US WTO agreement reached which allow foreign banks to 
conduct RMB business with business organizations and retail 
business two years and five years, respectively, from the signing of 
the agreement. 
1998 • Ten additional banks granted licenses for RMB business. Foreign 
banks allowed to operate RMB business in Shenzhen.  
1999 • Removal of restrictions on RMB loans with maturity periods more 
than four months from the inter-bank market.   
• By the end of 1999, there were 248 representative offices, 157 
branches, six wholly-owned foreign banks, seven joint ventures and 
seven finance companies. 
• Foreign banks accounted for 1.5 per cent of the total banking assets 






2001 • As of November, 30 banks were allowed to conduct limited RMB 
business in Shanghai and Shenzhen. 
• Announced liberalization of the financial sector as China gained 
membership into the WTO (11th December). The Chinese 
government agreed to open up the financial sector to foreign 
financial institutions. 
• China agreed to commit to full access in five years from the 
accession for foreign banks. The contents of liberalization included: 
1. General rights  
- Foreign banks will have the same rights (national treatment) as  
          Chinese banks (timing – at the accession) 
2. Geographic and customer restrictions 
-   None for the foreign currency business (timing – at the 
accession) 
-   Foreign banks will be able to conduct local currency business 
with non-Chinese enterprises in designated area (timing – at the 
accession)    
-   Foreign banks will be able to conduct local currency business 
with Chinese enterprises in designated area (timing – 11th 
December, 2003) 
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-   Foreign banks will be able to conduct local currency business 
with Chinese individuals (timing – 11th December, 2006) 
-   Both geographic and customer restrictions will be removed 
(timing – 11th December, 2006) 
3. Cross-border supply of services  
-  The provision and transfer of financial information, financial 
data processing, and related software by suppliers of other 
financial services, as well as advisory, intermediation, and other 
auxiliary financial services are allowed (timing – at the accession)  
 
2002 • Since 1st January, all foreign banks have been allowed to provide 
foreign currency-related services in China. 
• The authorities published the Rules for Implementing the 
Regulations Governing Foreign Financial Institutions in the People’s 
Republic of China (January) – on detailed regulations for 
implementing the administration of the establishment, registration, 
scope of business, qualification, supervision, dissolution and 
liquidation of foreign financial institutions.  
• Foreign banks were allowed to commence RMB-denominated 




2004 • The China Banking Regulatory Commission allowed foreign banks 
to expand their local currency business in Shenyang and Xian 
(December).    
2005 • Foreign banks in Ningbo and Shantou were allowed to expand their 
local currency business. China went beyond its WTO commitments 
and opened five other cities – Changchun, Harbin, Lazhou, Nanning 
and Yinchuan, to foreign banks’ local currency businesses (5th 
December). 
 
2006 • As of the end of August, there were already 14 banking 
organizations registered in China with wholly foreign funded and 
joint ventures, which had 17 branches, sub-branches and 
subsidiaries. By the end of September, all 73 foreign banks owned a 
total of 191 branches.  
• The total amount of local and foreign currency of the foreign banks 
was USD102.5 billion, accounting for 1.9 per cent of the total assets 
of all the financial institutions in the banking industry. Their 
deposits and loans in foreign currency accounted for 8 per cent and 
21 per cent of the total amounts, respectively. 
• The Chinese government removed regional and other restrictions on 
foreign banks, treating them the same as Chinese banks, for 
example, they can now sell insurance products just like domestic 
banks and the government will apply the same standards covering 
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registered capital, operating funds, information disclosure and 
affiliated deals to both domestic and foreign banks.   
• The State Council promulgated the Regulations on Administration of 
Foreign Invested Banks, signifying that China has fully opened its 
banking industry to foreign investors (11th November), which came 
into effect on 11th December, the fifth anniversary of China’s 
accession to the WTO.   
 
Sources: Reynolds (1982); Zhang and Zheng (1993); Dipchand et al. (1994); 
Romeyer (1994); Duncan (1995); Lees and Liaw (1996); People’s Bank of China 
(1998); Wong and Liu (2000); Salomon Smith Barney, 21st September 2000. 
“China & the WTO”, Economic & Market Analysis: China; various articles from 
the Business Times and the Straits Times, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd., 
Singapore; and websites (http://en.ce.cn; http: //www.buyusa.gov; 


























II.  DEA Results  
 
 


























ICBC  0.9010 1.0000 0.9010 Decreasing 0.8228 1.0000 0.8228 Decreasing 
BOC  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 Constant 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 Constant 
CCB  0.7622 0.9220 0.8266 Decreasing 0.6894 0.8403 0.8204 Decreasing 
ABC 0.7320 1.0000 0.7320 Decreasing 0.6060 0.7668 0.7903 Decreasing 
BOCOMM  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 Constant 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 Constant 
CITICIB 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 Constant 0.9633 1.0000 0.9633 Decreasing 
CEB 0.8231 0.8680 0.9483 Decreasing 0.7065 0.7946 0.8891 Decreasing 
CMSB 0.9033 0.9571 0.9438 Decreasing 0.7913 0.8973 0.8818 Decreasing 
HXB  0.7373 0.7378 0.9994 Increasing 0.6664 0.6704 0.9940 Increasing 
CMB 0.8699 0.8699 0.9999 Increasing 0.8085 0.8497 0.9516 Decreasing 
SPDB 0.9374 0.9527 0.9839 Decreasing 0.8614 0.9100 0.9465 Decreasing 
IB 0.8653 0.8830 0.9800 Decreasing 0.7433 0.7654 0.9711 Decreasing 
SZDB 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 Constant 0.7841 0.8148 0.9623 Decreasing 
BOS 0.9041 0.9114 0.9920 Increasing 0.9834 0.9878 0.9955 Increasing 
BJCCB 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 Constant 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 Constant 
TJCCB 0.5363 0.5504 0.9744 Increasing 0.4988 0.5578 0.8942 Increasing 
HZCCB 0.8326 0.9133 0.9117 Increasing 0.8765 1.0000 0.8765 Increasing 
DGCCB 0.4289 0.4881 0.8786 Increasing 0.3740 0.4525 0.8264 Increasing 
NJCCB 0.6227 0.7206 0.8642 Increasing 0.5147 0.6110 0.8424 Increasing 
XCCB 0.6161 0.6476 0.9514 Increasing 0.4694 0.5585 0.8405 Increasing 
DLCCB 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 Constant 0.8653 1.0000 0.8653 Increasing 
WXCCB 0.6891 0.7453 0.9246 Increasing 0.7052 0.8922 0.7904 Increasing 
WHUCB 0.6023 0.6746 0.8928 Increasing 0.4837 0.6310 0.7667 Increasing 
NBCB 0.7491 0.7981 0.9387 Increasing 0.6331 0.7318 0.8652 Increasing 
JNCCB  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 Constant 0.7916 0.9086 0.8712 Increasing 
CQCB 0.6390 0.7658 0.8344 Increasing 0.4973 0.6856 0.7253 Increasing 
QDCCB 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 Constant 0.8049 1.0000 0.8049 Increasing 













B. Sources of Scale Inefficiency 
 
 
MODEL A MODEL B 
 
No. of banks with No. of banks with 
Organizational 
Status  
IRS  CRS  DRS  IRS   CRS DRS 
All banks  
 




0 1 3 0 1 3 
Nation-wide banks 
 
1 2 2 1 1 3 
Regional banks 
 


































C. Relationship between PTE, SE and Banks’ Assets and Net Income   
               (RMB million)   
 




PTE SE ASSETS NET 
INCOME 
 
ICBC  0.9010 1.0000 0.9010 4,776,773.0000  6,749.0000
BOC  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 3,593,908.0000 10,924.0000
CCB  0.7622 0.9220 0.8266 3,083,195.0000 4,304.0000
ABC 0.7320 1.0000 0.7320 2,976,566.0000 2,897.0000
BOCOMM  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 766,874.0000 1,227.7000
CITICIB 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 335,162.6000 1,416.3000
CEB 0.8231 0.8680 0.9483 328,343.1000 271.6000
CMSB 0.9033 0.9571 0.9438 241,671.0000 884.6000
HXB  0.7373 0.7378 0.9994 178,146.5000 705.5000
CMB 0.8699 0.8699 0.9999 371,659.9000 1,734.3000
SPDB 0.9374 0.9527 0.9839 279,300.7000 1,285.3000
IB 0.8653 0.8830 0.9800 178,277.5000 476.5000
SZDB 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 164,768.4000 386.9000
BOS 0.9041 0.9114 0.9920 168,600.0000 800.0000
BJCCB 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 135,272.0000 607.8000
TJCCB 0.5363 0.5504 0.9744 44,223.2000 407.0000
HZCCB 0.8326 0.9133 0.9117 32,131.9000 149.7000
DGCCB 0.4289 0.4881 0.8786 24,742.9000 151.9000
NJCCB 0.6227 0.7206 0.8642 23,895.3000 166.0000
XCCB 0.6161 0.6476 0.9514 22,680.4000 81.3000
DLCCB 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 21,133.0000 100.5000
WXCCB 0.6891 0.7453 0.9246 19,218.9000 26.9000
WHUCB 0.6023 0.6746 0.8928 18,968.6000 52.7000
NBCB 0.7491 0.7981 0.9387 18,965.1000 27.3000
JNCCB  1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 16,738.6000 49.0000
CQCB 0.6390 0.7658 0.8344 14,866.0000 22.0000
QDCCB 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 14,231.6000 27.0000




































ICBC 0.8228 1.0000 0.8228 4,776,773.0000   6,749.0000
BOC 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 3,593,908.0000 10,924.0000
CCB 0.6894 0.8403 0.8204 3,083,195.0000 4,304.0000
ABC 0.6060 0.7668 0.7903 2,976,566.0000 2,897.0000
BOCOMM 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 766,874.0000 1,227.7000
CITICIB 0.9633 1.0000 0.9633 335,162.6000 1,416.3000
CEB 0.7065 0.7946 0.8891 328,343.1000 271.6000
CMSB 0.7913 0.8973 0.8818 241,671.0000 884.6000
HXB 0.6664 0.6704 0.9940 178,146.5000 705.5000
CMB 0.8085 0.8497 0.9516 371,659.9000 1,734.3000
SPDB 0.8614 0.9100 0.9465 279,300.7000 1,285.3000
IB 0.7433 0.7654 0.9711 178,277.5000 476.5000
SZDB 0.7841 0.8148 0.9623 164,768.4000 386.9000
BOS 0.9834 0.9878 0.9955 168,600.0000 800.0000
BJCCB 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 135,272.0000 607.8000
TJCCB 0.4988 0.5578 0.8942 44,223.2000 407.0000
HZCCB 0.8765 1.0000 0.8765 32,131.9000 149.7000
DGCCB 0.3740 0.4525 0.8264 24,742.9000 151.9000
NJCCB 0.5147 0.6110 0.8424 23,895.3000 166.0000
XCCB 0.4694 0.5585 0.8405 22,680.4000 81.3000
DLCCB 0.8653 1.0000 0.8653 21,133.0000 100.5000
WXCCB 0.7052 0.8922 0.7904 19,218.9000 26.9000
WHUCB 0.4837 0.6310 0.7667 18,968.6000 52.7000
NBCB 0.6331 0.7318 0.8652 18,965.1000 27.3000
JNCCB 0.7916 0.9086 0.8712 16,738.6000 49.0000
CQCB 0.4973 0.6856 0.7253 14,866.0000 22.0000
QDCCB 0.8049 1.0000 0.8049 14,231.6000 27.0000
ZNJCCB 0.5292 1.0000 0.5292 4,757.3000 12.1000
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
